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Chapter 1
Introduction
The spillover of information from more developed economies to the less developed
ones is of key importance for sustainable transition towards higher living standards
in emerging societies. The amount and type of essential information which is trans-
ferred to developing world is far from being exhausted by technological spillover ef-
fect, which is extensively studied in the literature (see, for instance, Acemoglu et al,
2006). Of equal importance is, for instance, information about comparative perfor-
mance of foreign societies, as it helps identifying how far home country is from what
this world considers as a group of leading economies. A possibility to compare the
level of development in domestic economy with the one in foreign societies is also
important for dynamic comparisons, as the latter helps assessing the progress which a
developing society is making.
How fast does an economy evolve is closely linked to the quality of public goods
provided by the state, as the rule of law, security of property rights, public infrastruc-
ture, etc. As long as public policies are designed or implemented with substantial
flaws, the quality of public goods provision remains below its frontier level, which not
only has direct effects, as less safety or low accessibility of education, but also reduces
the pace of economic growth.
An opportunity to observe the level of economic maturity, as well as the effect
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of public policies in more developed societies can enhance the demand for higher
quality public goods at home. The latter will require the bureaucracy to perform closer
to its frontier level, which a less effective authority, especially a corrupt one, would
like to avoid, as corruption and high-quality public goods are hardly compatible. As
a conflict of interests between society and corrupt bureaucracy might transform into
political confrontation and undermine political status quo, the regime has incentives to
restrict information flows about the reference economy.
In the second chapter I consider an autocratic society where a ruling regime lim-
its access to information flows concerning the outside world, to prevent its citizenry
from learning about the comparatively poor performance of home economy. I analyze
the use of censorship in the context of asymmetric information. However, I deviate
from conventional representation of information asymmetry, where the more informed
agent, in contrast to the less informed one, knows the precise realization of a particular
random variable. In my setting, the latter is instead publicly known, while only the
informed agent is aware of how the random variable is distributed. As an application
of this type of information asymmetry I refer to Socialist autocracies, as the Soviet
Union, GDR or North Korea, where, considering the comparative performance of the
home economy, the ruling regime acquired the role of informed agent, whereas the
citizenry had instead little opportunity to compare their living standards with the ones
abroad. As a result of asymmetric information, the regime in power can distort infor-
mation regarding the comparative development of the home economy, even though the
level of development itself can be publicly observable.
I find that higher technological backwardness, lower quality of domestic institu-
tions, low level of income inequality and low costs of collecting information about for-
eign economies lead to more restrictive and comprehensive censorship. These findings
are consistent with the stories of socialist dictatorships, as the Soviet Union or North
Korea, where very restrictive forms of censorship, as political isolationism, were/are
used.
I also explain why these forms of censorship are less popular now. I argue that iso-
3lationism restricts interactions among societies, and therefore limits opportunities for
adoption of frontier technologies, which results in underdevelopment, higher vulnera-
bility to negative shocks, and potentially higher political turbulence. This for instance
was the case for Japan in the 17th-19th centuries, the Russian Empire under the rule
of tsar Nicolas I, China in the 14th-19th centuries, the Soviet Union, and it is still the
case for modern Cuba and North Korea. All these regimes experienced severe eco-
nomic and technological backwardness as a result of limited interactions with foreign
economies. In the Soviet Union a sharp drop in oil prices in mid-1980s led to food
shortages. Chronic deficits resulted in mass protests in the late 1980s and the Soviet
regime in Russia collapsed shortly. To avoid these outcomes, a ruling regime might
reconsider its plan to implement the most restrictive forms of censorship. This finding
is in line with censorship policy which is implemented in nowadays China.
In the third chapter I emphasize the importance of complementarity among key
determinants of economic growth. As this complementarity can be important in par-
ticular cases, reforming one fundamental, while ignoring substantial flaws inherent to
another key variable, might have low effectiveness. For instance, a reform which aims
to increase the stock of human capital by improving the quality of education in the
economy where property rights are weakly protected might fail to achieve its goals.
Insufficient protection of property rights discourages firms from investing into tech-
nologies and capital, which restricts demand for skills, as a higher human capital level
becomes an advantage if it is complemented with appropriate technology. Similarly,
a low level of human rights protection encourages individuals to transfer their human
capital to another economy, thus reducing the stock of human capital in the source
economy and making investment into new technologies less effective, as the latter
can’t be combined with sufficient number of qualified employees.
I consider a developing economy in which the representative firm’s production
function exhibits complementarities between human capital and the available level of
technology. The firm invests in the acquisition of new technology, while employees
decide how much human capital to acquire. The speed of human capital accumulation
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positively affects the growth rate of the economy, and as a result a reform that improves
the educational system can lead to faster growth. Importantly though, if property rights
are weakly enforced, firms have limited incentives to invest in the acquisition of new
technologies. This might constrain the demand for human capital, making an educa-
tional reform potentially unsuccessful. I thus conclude that only if an improvement in
the school system is combined with better property rights enforcement will an educa-
tional reform unambiguously lead to faster growth.
This model can potentially explain why, instead of increasing the level of skills in
the economy, an educational reform can result in the outflow of human capital. If a high
level of corruption in the economy restricts the level of investment and slows down the
pace of technological evolution, individuals have incentives to transfer their human
capital to a less corrupt country, where technology is more advanced and incomes
are therefore higher. Individuals thus might benefit from the implementation of an
educational reform in the source country, as they can acquire more education and use
it later in a more developed economy. The latter result is similar to ”knowledge leaks”
which are discussed in Easterly (2001). When the level of knowledge in a particular
society is on average high, individuals have high incentives to invest into education. If
instead the level of knowledge is low, individuals have little incentives to invest into
human capital, or if they do so, they will likely migrate from the economy in a ”brain
drain”.
In the last chapter I examine the role of income redistribution in political sustain-
ability of development policies in emerging economies. As high quality public goods
and policies are of key importance for fast economic growth, the presence of less cor-
rupt and more professional bureaucracy in power might be pivotal for catching up with
more developed societies. The latter is not an easy task though. Since the presence of
a large cohort which is separated from fast growing markets is a feature of many de-
veloping societies, and as the process of integration of disadvantaged individuals into
rapidly developing sectors might be complicated and slow, in the short term economic
growth alone can therefore be insufficient for reducing the level of poverty. As a re-
5sult, the poor remain politically sensitive to income transfers, and thus they grant their
support to political force which, as they expect, will provide them with a higher level
of transfers. As those features which are important for enhancing economic growth
are not necessarily required to perform income redistribution, a more professional and
less corrupt bureaucracy, unless it provides income transfers, might not receive politi-
cal advantage in such a society.
My study was motivated by one of the most intriguing results of the Georgian par-
liamentary elections of 2012, where economic success of a growth-enhancing policy
was not followed by a higher political popularity of the ruling regime. In the con-
text of a non-overlapping generations growth model with high-skilled and low-skilled
employees, I argue that a potential explanation for this result is that growth policies ig-
nore the importance of income redistribution. Even though reforms enhance economic
growth, most of their benefits might be transferred to high-skilled individuals. Their
low-skilled counterparts’ gains from economic growth are instead low and therefore
leave this group poor and sensitive to income transfers. If the latter are not provided,
the reformist regime’s likelihood to survive in power declines, even though its policies
increase growth rates. I also show that a policy which enhances social mobility, thus
helping low-skilled individuals to transit to the high-skilled group, can be a long-run
substitute for income redistribution, but can not replace the latter in the short term.

Chapter 2
Extractive Institutions, Closed
Borders and Economic Development
Information flows are often strategically manipulated. In politics, control over infor-
mation helps securing power and even gaining popularity, and can be achieved using a
variety of different instruments. Politicians can try to influence the media and suppress
independent journalists, might close national borders and not let their own citizens
travel abroad, they might not allow foreigners to visit their country, or they can even
create totalitarian societies to keep communications among people under control.
For instance, today’s Chinese government retains control over media1 and severely
regulates access to the Internet2; independent journalists are often under attack in Rus-
sia, and several of them have ended up losing their lives while carrying out inquires
into the murky interactions between business and politics 3; the leaders of North Korea
keep the country in isolation4, and do not allow North Koreans to travel abroad freely.
In the past, the Stalinist Soviet Union encouraged people to live in communal apart-
1See Brady, A-M., 2007, ”Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary
China,” Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
2Human Rights Watch, 2006, ”How Censorship Works in China: A Brief Overview”.
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/china0806/3.htm.
3Crowfoot, J. (edited), 2009, ”Partial Justice: An inquiry into the deaths of journalists in Russia,”
1993-2009, IFJ: Brussels.
4The Economist magazine, September 27th, 2008.
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ments, where they could be supervised by informers, and, as a result, flatmates were
bewaring each other and practiced self-censorship5.
In autocracies, the ruling regimes usually use power to silent political opponents,
and therefore placing itself on pedestal is relatively easy there. Individuals, however,
can acquire negative information about the ruling regime from communications with
numerous foreign sources. To avoid this, censorship in non-democratic societies cov-
ers not only domestic information, but also news about particular foreign economies
and their leaders, who are perceived as direct ideological opponents and critics of the
domestic regime. For instance, Russian state-controlled media readily releases a neg-
ative news about those foreign politicians who are in conflict with the leadership of
Russia, while in many cases a news about the Russian leadership from a foreign media
is a taboo on Russian TV, people from mainland China need to receive a pass from
authorities to visit Taiwan, CNN is not broadcasting in Cuba, and it is difficult to find
an issue of the Yedioth Ahoronoth in Tehran.
In this chapter we study a particular restriction on information flows which results
in a special case of information asymmetry. In most of the existing literature where
information asymmetry is key to the analysis, the informed player knows how a par-
ticular random variable is distributed and what is its precise realization. Instead, the
uninformed player is only aware of the distribution of the random variable.
We consider a different type of information asymmetry, where the informed player
again knows the distribution function of a random variable and its precise outcome,
however, the uninformed agent knows a particular realization of the random variable,
but not its distribution function.
We summarize these two cases in the following table:
5Figes, O., 2007, ”The Whisperers: Private Life in Stalin’s Russia,” Penguin
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What do players know about the random variable of interest?
Players Literature This model
The informed player distribution and pre-
cise realization
distribution and pre-
cise realization
The uninformed
player
distribution precise realization
Table 1. Different cases of information asymmetry.
As an application of this type of information asymmetry, we refer to the politics of
the Socialist autocracies, as the Soviet Union, GDR or North Korea, where, consider-
ing the relative performance of the home economy, the ruling regime acquired the role
of informed agent, whereas the citizenry had instead little opportunity to compare their
living standards with the ones abroad. These regimes practiced restrictions on infor-
mation flows from all around the world and restricted the mobility of their citizens, not
allowing most of them to cross national borders. As a result of this censorship, in many
socialist autocracies, as the Soviet Union, a lot of people were convinced that capital-
ist societies practiced significant income inequality and that rich individuals enjoyed
luxurious lives there, while relatively poor cohorts were instead living in misery.
The goal of this chapter is to develop a model which helps understanding the key
commonalities among autocratic regimes practicing the most restrictive forms of cen-
sorship of information flows about other economies6. To this end, our work answers
the following questions: what kind of rational motives do autocrats follow when they
introduce censorship? What are the main determinants of censorship policy? We
address these two questions and build a theoretical model which is able to explain
regime’s incentives for censorship.
We find that a low level of income inequality, low-quality institutions, a high tech-
nological backwardness under autocratic rule, as well as low costs of acquiring in-
6As, for instance, political isolationism.
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formation about a reference foreign economy, all result in a higher likelihood of in-
troducing isolationism. These findings are consistent with particular episodes from
the history of socialist dictatorships, such as the Soviet Union, GDR, Cuba and North
Korea, where isolationism was/is implemented.
When the cost of acquiring information about reference economies is relatively
low, and the home economy remains less developed as a result of bad policies, the
regime in power has higher incentives to introduce more restrictive forms of censor-
ship, as otherwise individuals can learn about the comparatively high level of develop-
ment abroad and turn against the ruling regime. This result can probably explain why
common borders with developed countries or geographic proximity to more developed
economies made isolationism particularly attractive for countries as the Soviet Union
or North Korea.7
Better technology or institutions in foreign societies increase the gap between in-
comes in the home economy and the ones abroad. As home individuals stay relatively
poor, an opportunity to compare their incomes with the ones of the foreigners and to
learn about the comparatively poor performance of th home economy, might reduce
the level of support to the ruling regime. To avoid this outcome, the regime in power
can implement more restrictive forms of censorship. The socialist economies, such as
Maoist China or GDR, which practiced isolationism and censorship, were, at the same
time, characterized by comparatively poor institutions and a low level of non-military
technological development.8
Finally, if income inequality in the home country is comparatively low, and the
economy is poor, most of individuals from home are worse off than their foreign coun-
terparts. As this might lead to a lower level of political support to the ruling regime, the
latter has incentives to restrict information flows about foreign societies. Again, one
can notice that income inequality in the Soviet Union, GDR, Cuba and North Korea
7The Soviet Union’s neighbours were, among other economies, Norway and Finland, and North
Korea shares one of its borders with the Republic of Korea.
8Ellman (1986), for instance, points on significant technological gap between the Soviet Union and
the West.
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was/is very low.
We also discuss the key trade-offs which arise when extremely restrictive forms
of censorship, as political isolationism, are introduced. We assume that this kind of
censorship imposes significant costs on home economy. Distorting information about
a foreign country, or even directly restricting communications between home economy
and a foreign country, can result in significant deterioration of bilateral relationships,
an therefore economic, educational, technological and other forms of interactions be-
tween nations might also be negatively affected.9 As a consequence, this can lower the
home economy’s opportunities to imitate technologies from the world technological
frontier, which might reduce the pace of technological development, as well as the rate
of economic growth. The latter corresponds to the case of Japan during the 17-19th
centuries (see, for instance, Bernhofen and Brown, 2004 and Bernhofen and Brown,
2005) or the Russian Empire under the rule of tsar Nicolas I (see Acemoglu and Robin-
son, 2006), as well as the late Soviet Union. It also reflects the case of modern Cuba
and North Korea. All these regimes experienced substantial economic and technolog-
ical backwardness, and fell far behind technologically advanced economies.10
As a result of slow growth, home economy remains poor and therefore sensitive to
various negative shocks, as adverse natural conditions which can affect food supplies
and lead to starvation, or sharp reduction in exports prices, etc.11 Seeing their liv-
ing standards decline, citizens can start feeling discontent about the regime in power,
9A long-term diplomatic conflict can, for instance, reduce developing country’s opportunities to
adopt technologies from the world technological frontier.
Hayakawa, Kimura and Lee (2011) emphasize external conflicts as one of the main negative deter-
minants of the FDI level. Since FDI is an important source of technological spillover, a threat of an
external conflict can therefore reduce the spillover effect. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009) argue
that nations which have a higher level of trust to each other also tend to invest more into each other’s
economies. Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2010) show that a more trusted country has more chances
to attract venture capital from a trusting economy.
10There is evidence that this technological backwardness was in large part due to the fact that cen-
sorship and isolationism complicated the process of technological diffusion and technological progress
(for instance, Malia, 1994, argues that technological gap between isolated Soviet Union and the West
was widening).
11For instance, a negative oil price shock in the second half of the 1980s resulted in a significant
reduction in living standards in the Soviet Union.
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which can transform into mass protests and result in a regime change. To avoid the
latter, the ruling regime might implement less restrictive forms of censorship.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the related
literature and outlines our model. Section 3 introduces the baseline model, and Section
4 incorporates technological diffusion into the benchmark model in order to consider
the cost of censorship. Section 5 concludes the chapter.
2.1 Related Literature and an Outline of the Model
2.1.1 Literature Review
The existing literature provides an extensive discussion of various issues related to the
effects of control over media. The analysis of censorship, however, is scant and the
study of the effects of isolationism has mainly focused on trade isolationism.
We first mention particular papers which emphasize the importance of media for
the formation of public opinion. Gentzkow (2004) shows a significant negative impact
on voters turnout in the United States which was caused by introduction of television.
A lower coverage of elections by television in comparison to newspapers resulted in
smaller turnout rates, which indicates that television can be considered as the key me-
dia source for influencing individuals’ political participation. Gentzkow and Shapiro
(2004) show how media shape attitude towards the United States in a number of Mus-
lim countries. Della Vigna and Kaplan (2007) analyzed in a quasi experimental setting
the effect of the introduction of Fox News on voting behavior in a metropolitan area in
the United States, and found a positive impact on the share of Republican vote during
presidential elections.
Although it is natural to assume that the news content influences readers’ views,
the reverse could also be true. Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) consider the determi-
nants of news accuracy. They find that higher competition among media companies
does not necessarily guarantee higher accuracy of information. At the same time, the
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heterogeneity of readers’ political views leads to polarization of competing media and
thus a reader with access to all media sources can gain an unbiased perspective on the
news.
Since media is a powerful mean of formation of political views, there is little sur-
prise that the politicians try to take it under control. McMillan and Zoido (2004)
analyze media capture in Peru during Alberto Fujimori’s presidency. They show that
the media is the most important of the whole checks and balances system: legislative
and judicial systems are less crucial for the civic control.
Shleifer, Djankov, McLiesh and Nenova (2003) test the public interest theory against
the public choice one regarding the state control over media. They show that the for-
mer, which assumes that government interferes mainly as the market does not provide
the Pareto efficient solution, fails against the latter, which instead suggests that the
state ownership over media is mostly caused by self interested motives of bureaucrats.
In particular, the authors showed that in most of cases, media firms have ownership
structures with controlling and large shareholders, who are either families or govern-
ments. The authors also found that poorer, more autocratic countries with relatively
low primary school enrollment rates, and more intervening state, are characterized by
greater state ownership of the media. Besides, greater state ownership is accompanied
by less free press, weaker political rights, poor governance, underdeveloped capital
markets, and bad health outcomes.
Besley and Prat (2006) study in what cases media capture is more likely to emerge.
They define censorship as the elimination from the news of any negative information
about a ruler. Authors conclude that higher media pluralism, lower rents from holding
office, higher media independence and higher commercialization of the media lead to
lower corruption, higher turnover and lower probability of media capture.
Leeson (2008) examines the relationship between media freedom and political par-
ticipation, voters turnout and political knowledge. He finds that low media freedom
is associated with poor political knowledge, low political participation and low voters
turnout.
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Egorov, Guriev and Sonin (2006) study why an independent media can serve auto-
crat’s interests and how the abundance of natural resources limits this opportunity.
As we mentioned before, studies on isolationism are restricted to the effects of
trade isolationism. For instance, Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2001), Alcala and
Ciccone (2003), Spolaore and Wacziarg (2005) conclude that economic performance
depends positively on a country’s size and openness, but negatively on the interaction
between size and openness, showing that the benefits from size are larger for less
open countries, and benefits from openness are higher for smaller economies. Based
on these results, small countries have particularly strong interests in maintaining free
trade, as so much of their economy depends upon international markets. Spolaore and
Wacziarg (2005) treat openness as an endogenous variable, and show empirically that
larger countries tend to be more closed to trade.
2.1.2 Model Outline
In most of the mentioned literature censorship is narrowed to the state control over
national media. The latter, however, is only one source of information, although a very
important one. But there are many more: foreign media, visits to foreign economies,
contacts with foreigners visiting the home country, etc. The literature normally does
not discuss at length a possibility of censoring these sources, even though this sort of
censorship was widely introduced in the past century’s autocracies, modern Cuba and
North Korea still use it, and some other autocracies practice it in less restrictive and
more fragmented forms.
We are trying to fill this gap in this chapter and consider limits on the inflow of
information which comes from the outside the country, as foreign TV channels, news-
papers and magazines, contacts with foreigners, or visits to foreign countries. As we
focus on non-democratic regimes, where national media is typically under control, we
assume that the local media industry is censored.12
12The elite in power might be concerned about a free media, as the latter can play a crucial role in
replacing the regime (see, for instance, McFaul, 2005), so the latter might prefer keeping the media
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We introduce a simple growth model, in which the quality of institutions and tech-
nological development affect the level of per capita income in each of two economies
- Home and Foreign - and income distribution determines how well-off a particular
individual is relative to other individuals within her home economy. Per capita income
and income distribution also define whether an individual belonging to a particular in-
come group in Home is better or worse off compared to an individual from a similar
income group in Foreign.
We assume that the ruling regime in Home needs public support to stay in power,
and if the regime’s policies satisfy the majority of population this support is provided,
while in the opposite case the regime is instead forced to resign. In the baseline version
of the model we assume that the regime is overthrown if in the steady-state the majority
of home individuals do not believe they are at least as rich as their counterparts abroad.
We assume that the ruling regime in Home will derive a private benefit as long
as the quality of institutions remains low. However, if the quality of institutions in
Home is low, the majority of Home citizens receive a smaller income than individuals
in Foreign, where, by contrast, the quality of institutions is high. The latter result
holds even if Home and Foreign share the same level of technology. As the regime in
power knows that the presence of low-quality institutions will result in comparatively
low incomes and, as a consequence, in public discontent about the regime’s policies, it
introduces isolationism, thereby preventing individuals from comparing their incomes
with Foreign’s.
The key results of the benchmark model are as follows: a low level of income
inequality, low costs of acquiring information about Foreign, low-quality institutions
and a low level of technology in Home, all lead to a higher likelihood of introducing
isolationism.
Censorship, however, results in significant costs for the economy, and some of
these costs are surveyed in the literature (see, for instance, Egorov, Guriev and Sonin
under control. However, non-democratic elites are much less able to control foreign media, as well as
other non-national news sources, directly.
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2006). However, as the existent studies do not address the issues of censorship of in-
formation about foreign economies, they do not consider costs which are specific to
this particular kind of censorship. We therefore incorporate these costs into our model
by assuming that isolated countries are likely to fall down into technological back-
wardness, as an isolated economy also has a lower access to innovations developed
abroad.
We argue that, as a consequence of a lower opportunity to imitate foreign tech-
nologies, growth rates decline, and therefore home economy remains poor and thus
sensitive to various negative shocks, as adverse natural conditions, sharp reduction in
exports prices, etc.13 Seeing their living standards decline as a result of a shock, citi-
zens can start feeling discontent about the regime in power, which can turn into mass
protests and result in a regime change. Therefore, the ruling regime might also have
incentives to avoid isolationism.
We discuss these features in an extension, where we introduce a possibility of tech-
nological diffusion in home economy. We assume that isolationism reduces Home’s
opportunities to imitate technologies, and thus Home fails to catch up with the foreign
level of technology. As a consequence, isolationism, together with low quality insti-
tutions, reduces growth rates, resulting in persistently poor society which is highly
sensitive to negative shocks. A negative shock can push incomes of the majority of
individuals below a particular minimal threshold. As the latter can result in political
turbulence, the regime in power is likely to be more careful when it decides whether
isolationism should or should not be implemented, and, overall, there is less chance
that isolationism will be introduced.14 However, a careful consideration of the effect
of isolationism on technological evolution requires a separate study, and therefore we
restrict our contribution to discussion.
13As, for instance, a negative oil price shock which resulted in a significant reduction in living stan-
dards in the Soviet Union in the second half of the 1980s.
14If, however, home country is technologically self-sufficient, then its output is less sensitive to the
opportunity to access foreign technologies. In this case, isolationism is more likely to be introduced. In
particular, the latter is the case when the initial level of technology and the rate of innovations in Home
are large.
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2.2 The Baseline Model of Censorship
2.2.1 A Solow model with institutions
We consider a Solow model economy where labor-augmenting technology is evolving
at a constant rate g, but where population instead does not grow.15 A Cobb-Douglas
technology combines labor L, capital K(t), the level of labor-augmenting technology
A(t), and the quality of institutions β to produce a single output good Y (t):
Y (t) = βKη(t) (A(t)L)1−η (2.1)
We assume that the quality of institutions β can take two values:
β =
 β
HIGH
βLOW
, βHIGH > βLOW (2.2)
The level of β is chosen by the ruling regime, and we will discuss later how does the
regime make a decision about the quality of institutions.
In terms of per unit of effective labor, equation (2.1) can be rewritten as follows:
yˆ(t) = kˆη(t) (2.3)
where yˆ(t) = Y (t)
A(t)L
represents the level of output per unit of effective labor, kˆ(t) =
K(t)
A(t)L
corresponds to the level of capital per effective labor unit, and A(t) = β
1
1−ηA(t).
The capital accumulation process is driven by the following standard rule:
∂kˆ(t)
∂t
= skˆη(t)− (δ + g)kˆ(t) (2.4)
where δ reflects a depreciation rate and s is a saving rate. For derivation of equation
15The latter assumption is introduced to simplify derivations and it does not affect any essential result
of our model.
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(2.4) see Appendix A.1.
In the steady-state16 ∂kˆ(t)
∂t
= 0, which implies that the steady-state level of capital
per effective labor unit is as large as follows:
kˆ(t) =
(
s
δ + g
) 1
1−η
(2.5)
Given this result, the steady-state output level per unit of effective labor can there-
fore be derived from equation (2.3):
yˆ∗(t) =
(
s
δ + g
) η
1−η
(2.6)
It follows that the steady-state per capita income level, which is defined as y∗(t) =
A(t)yˆ∗(t), is thus given by:
y∗(t) = β
1
1−ηA(0)egt
(
s
δ + g
) η
1−η
(2.7)
Finally, the steady-state level of output is equal to Y ∗(t) = y∗(t)L, and, as y∗(t) is
determined in equation (2.7), Y ∗(t) is therefore equal to the following expression:
Y ∗(t) = Lβ
1
1−ηA(0)egt
(
δ + g
s
) η
1−η
(2.8)
2.2.2 The political process
The quality of institutions β is chosen by the ruling regime. The latter obtains a private
benefit from staying in power, which is a function of the quality of institutions β:
D =
 B > 00 if
β = βLOW
β = βHIGH
. (2.9)
16To avoid unnecessary complications, we will not consider transitional dynamics in this work, and
focus our analysis on the steady-state.
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As the ruling regime extracts benefits from the low-quality institutions, it is there-
fore interested in maintaining the quality of institutions at a low level, even though,
as it follows from equation (2.7), bad institutions result in a lower level of per capita
income (see also Acemoglu (2003) or Sonin, (2003)). The regime in power therefore
sets β = βLOW .
However, to stay in power, the regime needs to gain support from a fraction α of
the population which is as large as L. The regime will enjoy sufficient popularity if
enough citizens are convinced that per capita income in the home economy is at least
as high as per capita income in some “reference” foreign country.17
We assume that the national media is under control of the political regime, and
therefore the regime in power can censor any news. As a result, citizens can learn
about the level of per capita income in the foreign country only from communications
with foreigner individuals, visiting the foreign economy, or from the foreign media.
We assume that the latter sources supply unbiased news about the foreign economy.
Even though the regime can not directly influence the foreign media news content,
it can however dump the foreign media down inside the home economy. The regime
can also ban citizens to leave the home country. We assume that all these restrictions
are implemented synchronically, and therefore we can aggregate them into a single
policy which we call “isolationism”. If citizens can not visit the foreign country and
have no access to the foreign media, then they receive information about the foreign
economy only from the ruling regime.
The regime can control the level of censorship by setting a particular value of the
17History provides a lot of examples of elites and nations who considered other economies as ref-
erence points: the Soviet Union and the US, North Korea and South Korea, the GDR and Western
Germany, etc. For the Soviet elite it was always important to keep people convinced that the Soviet
regime performs better than the one in the US, for the North Korean regime it is of primary importance
to make its citizens think that it does better than the regime in South Korea, and for Chinese communists
it has always been important to compare China’s performance with that of Taiwan.
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following parameter:
θ =
 θ
I
θNI
(2.10)
where θI corresponds to “isolationism”, while θNI instead reflects “non-isolationism”.
We assume that choosing θI allows the regime to distort information about the foreign
economy. For instance, if at a particular point in time t the true value of per capita
income in the foreign country is yFtrue(t), the regime can instead report a different
value yFfalse(t) < y
F
true(t), and, as the home economy is isolated, individuals have no
opportunity to verify whether this information is correct or not.
Finally, we assume that accessing the state-controlled media is free of charge, while
other sources of information, as visits to Foreign, are costly, and the fee for alternative
sources of information is equal to T , which remains constant over time.
2.2.3 Home and Foreign: the baseline differences
In this subsection, we summarize the key differences between home and foreign economies,
which we call Home and Foreign in the remaining part of the chapter.
First, we assume that β, the level of institutional quality, is higher in Foreign:
βi =
 β
HIGH
βLOW
if
i = F
i = H
(2.11)
where H corresponds to Home, and F , instead, reflects Foreign, βHIGH > βLOW .
Second, we assume that the initial level of technological development A(0) also
differs for Home and Foreign:
Ai(0) =
 A
HIGH(0)
ALOW (0)
if
i = F
i = H
(2.12)
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and AHIGH(0) > ALOW (0).
These two assumptions, together with an assumption that α, δ, g, s and L are iden-
tical for two economies, imply that per capita income in Home is lower than per capita
income level in Foreign, i.e. yH(t) < yF (t).18.
We also assume that output is distributed unequally both in Home and in Foreign.
This implies that per capita income in Home yH(t) and per capita income abroad
yF (t) do not necessarily reflect the income level of a random individual. As the Solow
growth model does not explicitly consider the issue of capital and labor ownership, we
therefore assume that each individual supplies a particular amount of capital and labor
inelastically. Then, a citizen receives income corresponding to her labor and capital
contributions.
Individual j′s share in the steady-state income is equal to γHj in Home and γ
F
j in
Foreign, j = 1, ..., L, and shares of all citizens sum up to 1 in each economy. We also
assume that γji ∈
[
γi,γi
]
is uniformly distributed,19 where 0 ≤ γi ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ γi ≤ 1,
γi ≤ γi, i = H,F , are, correspondingly, the lower and the upper bounds of the
respective income shares. A larger distance between γi and γi reflects a higher level of
inequality in a particular economy. An individual whose share γi is close to γi receives
a low level of income, while those individuals whose shares γi are instead closer to γi
are, on the contrary, rich. Finally, the cumulative distribution function F (γ′) reflects
the proportion of individuals whose income shares do not exceed a particular share γ′.
18As AF (0) > AH(0) and βF > βH , from equation (2.8) it follows that the level of income in the
steady-state is Y ∗(t) = L (β)
1
1−η A(0)egt
(
s
δ+g
) η
1−η
, and thus we conclude that income is larger in the
foreign economy, i.e.
Y ∗F (t) > Y
∗
H(t)
or, alternatively
L
(
βF
) 1
1−η AF (0)egt
(
s
δ + g
) η
1−η
> L
(
βH
) 1
1−η AH(0)egt
(
s
δ + g
) η
1−η
Since we assume that the population size in two economies is identical, it also follows that yH(t) <
yF (t).
19We don’t consider a non-linear distribution, as the latter substantially complicates our analysis,
without producing, at the same time, any important results.
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When income distribution in economy i = H,F is perfectly equal, all income
shares γi reduce to a constant 1
L
, i.e. γi = 1
L
for all individuals in country i = H,F .
However, if income distribution in economy i = H,F is instead not perfectly equal,
then γi can take different values. In the latter case the mean values of γi is equal to
γi+γi
2
, i = H,F .20
It therefore follows that citizen j′s income in country i = H.F corresponds to her
share in the level of output produced in this economy:
Rij = γ
i
jY
i(t) (2.13)
As the cost of acquiring information from alternative sources is equal to T , only
those Home individuals whose income level satisfies the following condition can afford
paying this cost:
RHj = γ
H
j Y
∗(t) ≥ T (2.14)
The threshold individual who is as rich as to be able to afford paying this fee is thus
defined from the following equation:
γth(t) =
T
Y ∗(t)
(2.15)
Therefore, the proportion of individuals whose income level is sufficient to pay the
cost corresponds to the following expression:
L =
γH − γth(t)
γH−γH L (2.16)
20In general, the mean of γi is equal to
γi+γi
2 , while in the case of perfectly equal distribution the
mean is instead equal to 1L , as γ
i = γi = 1L .
We introduce a number of assumptions about income distribution and we show that
γi+γi
2 =
1
L . As
this finding is purely technical, we place a derivation of it in Appendix A.2.
Given this result, we conclude that even though inequal income distribution implies the existance of
individuals with higher and lower income shares, on average an individual receives exactly a share 1L of
the total income.
Therefore, from
γi+γi
2 =
1
L , where i = H,F we can also conclude that γ
H − γF = γF − γH .
See Appendix A.2 for a derivation of this result.
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We notice that γth(t) declines over time if the level of Y t(t) instead increases.
2.2.4 Incentives for censorship
No difference in average incomes: AF (0) = AH(0), βF = βH , and T = 0.
In this subsection, we introduce a number of simplifying assumptions and first analyze
a very basic version of the model to focus on its important features. We remove these
restrictions in the following sections and build upon the basic version to derive our key
results.
We assume temporarily that, first, the level of technology and the quality of insti-
tutions are the same in Home and Foreign, i.e. AF (0) = AH(0) and βF = βH , which
implies that income levels in two countries are also the same, i.e. yH(t) = yF (t),
and second, we assume that the cost of purchasing information about Foreign, i.e. T ,
equals to zero.
To grasp the main features of the model, we will be using a graphical representa-
tion throughout the entire chapter. In Figure 1, the income share γi, where i = H,F , is
placed along the horizontal axis, while the vertical axis instead reflects its cumulative
distribution function. We consider a particular example where income shares are dis-
tributed more unequally in Home than in Foreign. As a consequence of comparatively
more equal income distribution in Foreign, the cumulative distribution function of in-
come shares in the foreign economy, i.e. γF , which is represented as the thick line, is
steeper and both its limit points are located closer to the vertical line. The vertical line
starts from the point γ = 1
L
on the horizontal axis, and reflects the egalitarian distribu-
tion. We introduce this line for technical convenience, as it helps to compare the level
of inequality and income in Home and Foreign. Finally, the thin line illustrates the
cumulative distribution function of income shares in Home. As income distribution
is less equal in Home, the thin line is flatter and its limit points are less close to the
vertical line21
21Each cumulative distribution function also has two horizontal parts, one starts from zero and goes
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Figure 1. Income distribution in Home and Foreign. Income distribution is more
unequal in Home, while the level of output is the same in Home and Foreign.
To proceed, we rank individuals according to their income shares in two economies,
and then consider a random pair of individuals, one from Home and the other one from
Foreign, having the same rank. As we can see, apart from the intersection point be-
tween the thick and the thin lines, where γH = γF = 1
L
, these two individuals have
different incomes.22 For instance, relatively poor citizens in Home receive a lower
along the horizontal axis up to point (γi, 0), i = H,F , and the other one instead starts at point(
γi, F
(
γi
))
and goes parallel to the horizontal axis. However, as these parts never appear in our
analysis, we therefore do not reflect them in any figure.
22We assume that poor people from Home compare their incomes with incomes belonging to the
Foreign poor, rich individuals from Home compare their incomes with the ones of rich individuals
from Foreign, and Home middle class citizens compare their incomes with the ones of middle class
individuals from the foreign economy. At the first glance, this assumption might look a bit extreme,
as it should be hard for a person who visits a foreign country for a short period of time, or who reads
a foreign newspaper, to find out the exact earnings of a foreign individual which belongs to her same
income quantile. However, in real life a lot of indirect opportunities for comparison are available. In
countries with high income inequality, poor individuals reside in shanty towns, while the rich instead
occupy luxurious neighbourhoods, so if a poor person from a country with lower income inequality
visits a country with higher income inequality, she will probably infer that individuals belonging to her
social class are better off in Home.
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income share than the respective foreigners. This fact can be observed if we track
the dashed line which starts at point η on the vertical axis, until its intersection with
the thin and the thick lines, and then go vertically down and compare the respective
income shares. It occurs that the larger share belongs to a foreign individual, as γH ,
representing a share of particular individual from Home, is lower than γF , reflecting
instead the income share of the corresponding foreigner. As long as η, corresponding
to a random point on the vertical axis, is less than 1
2
, which implies that the cohort
under consideration is comparatively poor, the relation between γF and γH remains
the same, i.e. γF > γH .
Therefore, when inequality in Home is higher, we conclude that Home poor in-
dividuals, i.e. those individuals whose income shares are less than 1
L
, are poorer than
their Foreign counterparts. Similarly, we can show that the rich in Home, whose shares
are instead larger than 1
L
, are richer than the respective individuals in Foreign.
If there is no difference in income inequality between two countries, then the thick
and the thin lines coincide, and Home individuals are equally well off in Home and
Foreign.
Finally, if Foreign is more unequal than Home, then the rich are worse off in Home,
while their poor compatriots are instead worse off in Foreign.
We summarize this discussion in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. For F
(
γF
)
= F
(
γH
)
, where F
(
γF
)
and F
(
γH
)
are cumulative distri-
bution functions of income shares in Foreign γF and Home γH respectively:
1. Assume that the difference between the lowest income share in Home and the
one in Foreign is negative, i.e. γH−γF < 0, which implies a higher level of inequality
in Home. In this case, an individual from Home is poorer than her counterpart from
Foreign, i.e. γH < γF , if she belongs to the poor cohort, i.e. if γH < 1
L
;
She is as rich as the respective foreigner, i.e. γH = γF , if her income share is equal
to the average one, i.e. γH = 1
L
;
She is richer than her foreign counterpart, i.e. γF < γH , if she belongs to the rich
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group, i.e. γH > 1
L
.
2. Assume that the difference between the lowest income share in Home and the
one in Foreign is positive, i.e. γH − γF > 0, which implies a higher level of income
inequality in Foreign.
In this case, an individual from Home is richer than her counterpart from Foreign,
i.e. γF < γH , if she belongs to the poor cohort, i.e. if γH < 1
L
;
She is as rich as the respective foreigner, i.e. γH = γF , if her income share is equal
to the average one, i.e. γH = 1
L
;
She is poorer than her foreign counterpart, i.e. γH < γF , if she belongs to the rich
group, i.e. γH > 1
L
.
3. Assume that the difference between the lowest income share in Home and the one
in Foreign is zero, i.e. γH − γF = 0 which implies no difference in income inequality
between two economies. In this case all individuals in Home are exactly as rich as
their counterparts in Foreign, i.e. γH = γF .
This Lemma follows from the following expression:
γF = γH +
2
(
γH − 1
L
) (
γH − γF )
γH − γH (2.17)
which we derive in Appendix B.1
Therefore, if incomes in two economies are the same, the rich are better off in less
equal Home, while the poor instead are worse off living there. As a result, the former
sympathize the ruling regime, while their poor compatriots, by contrast, oppose it.
Average incomes are different, but T = 0.
We remove two simplifying assumptions which were introduced in the previous sub-
section, and instead assume that AF (0) > AH(0), and βF > βH . We, however, keep
the assumption regarding the cost of acquiring information from alternative sources
T , which remains zero.
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From equation (2.7) we can notice that a higher level of technology, as well as a
higher quality of institutions in Foreign, result in a larger level of per capita income
in Foreign, which becomes larger than the one in Home, i.e. yF (t) > yH(t). When
output in Foreign becomes higher, it is no longer the case that the entire rich cohort in
more unequal Home is richer than the respective cohort in the foreign economy. As we
will see shortly, the share of income belonging to a rich individual from Home should
be substantially larger than the average share γH = 1
L
to let this individual be richer
than her foreign counterpart.
Let us again consider a graphical representation, which explicitly takes into ac-
count the differences in per capita income levels in two economies.
Figure 2. Comparison of Home and Foreign individuals: the case of higher inequality
in Home, income level is higher in Foreign.
The case which is illustrated in Figure 2 is similar to the one which we discussed
in Figure 1, as income inequality in Home is again higher than in Foreign. However,
we now allow for different initial levels of technological developmentAF (0) > AH(0)
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and institutional quality βF > βH , which results in a positive difference between per
capita steady-state income levels in Home yH(t) and abroad yF (t). As a consequence
of a higher income in the foreign economy, the cumulative distribution function for
Foreign, which is represented as the thick line, is shifted to the right. The difference
between yF (t) and yH(t) also affects the composition of variables on the horizontal
axis, where ργF substitutes γF . We will consider parameter ρ =
(
βF
βH
) 1
1−η AF (0)
AH(0)
again
shortly.
From Figure 2 we can identify a cohort of individuals from Home who are at least
as rich as their foreign counterparts. These individuals’ output shares γH should be at
least as large as γ̂H , where the latter represents a threshold income share corresponding
to a particular individual from Home whose income level is as large as the one of the
respective individual from Foreign. Therefore, it follows that the cohort of relatively
rich home individuals, whose income shares range from 1
L
to γ̂H , are less rich than their
foreign counterparts. This result differs from the one of the previous subsection, where,
as we concluded from Figure 1, all Home individuals with income shares ranging
from 1
L
to γH either as well off as, or better off than the respective foreigners. In
this subsection, even though rich individuals in Home again possess higher income
shares than their foreigner counterparts, a part of them is, nevertheless, comparatively
poorer, since the effect of a lower income level in Home dominates as long as income
shares remain lower than γ̂H . As a consequence, the group of individuals who are
worse off than the respective foreigners, and therefore stay in opposition to the ruling
regime, is larger compared to the case of equal income levels in Home and Foreign,
i.e. yH(t) = yF (t), which was considered in the previous subsection. This cohort
corresponds to the bold section of the horizontal axis in Figure 2, which is as large as
γ̂H − γH , while in the previous section it was equal to 1
L
− γH , which is smaller than
γ̂H − γH , as 1
L
is lower than γ̂H .
We now repeat the same comparison algebraically. Our goal is to define the number
of regime supporters in Home. By assumption, only those individuals who are richer
than their foreign counterparts support the political regime. As a Home individual
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who supports the regime is at least as well off in Home as in Foreign, her income
RHj = γ
H
j Y
H(t) should therefore be at least as large as the one of the respective
foreigner, which is equal to RFj = γ
F
j Y
F (t). As α, δ, g, s and L are the same in two
countries, from equation (2.7) it follows that γHj Y
H(t) ≥ γFj Y F (t) corresponds to the
following inequality:
γHj
(
βH
) 1
1−η AH(0) ≥ γFj
(
βF
) 1
1−η AF (0)23 (2.18)
We normalize both sides of inequality (2.18) over
(
βH
) 1
1−η AH(0), and, as a result,
its left-hand side, i.e. γH
(
βH
) 1
1−η AH(0), reduces to γH , while the right-hand side, i.e.
γF
(
βF
) 1
1−η AF (0), becomes equal to γF
(
βF
βH
) 1
1−η AF (0)
AH(0)
.24 To see how many individ-
uals from Home are richer than corresponding foreign individuals, and thus how pop-
ular the ruling regime is, we equalize γH and γF
(
βF
βH
) 1
1−η AF (0)
AH(0)
, as we need to define
a threshold level of γH belonging to a particular individual from Home who is as well
off as the respective foreign individual. We then combine γH = γF
(
βF
βH
) 1
1−η AF (0)
AH(0)
with equation (2.17) to receive the following expression:
γH
(
βH
) 1
1−η AH(0) =
=
(
γH +
2
(
γH − 1
L
) (
γH − γF )
γH − γH
)(
βF
) 1
1−η AF (0) (2.19)
23To show that the latter is indeed the case, we can use equation (2.8) again and notice that
γFj Y
∗
F (t) = γ
F
j L
(
βF
) 1
1−η AF (0)egt
(
δ + g
s
) η
η−1
and
γHj Y
∗
H(t) = γ
H
j L
(
βH
) 1
1−η AH(0)egt
(
δ + g
s
) η
η−1
After we cancel out identical factors, we notice that βF = βHIGH , βH = βLOW , βHIGH > βLOW ,
AF (0) = AHIGH(0), AH(0) = ALOW (0), and AHIGH(0) > ALOW (0). We substitute these values
into γHj
(
βH
) 1
1−η AH(0) and γFj
(
βF
) 1
1−η AF (0) to receive the required result.
24Where
(
βHIGH
βLOW
) 1
1−η AF (0)
AH(0)
> 1, since, by assumption, AF (0) > AH(0) and βF > βH .
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In Appendix B.2 we show how to derive the following result from equation (2.19):
γ̂H =
1
L
γH−γH
γF−γF − 1
γH−γH
γF−γF
(
βH
βF
) 1
1−η AH(0)
AF (0)
− 1
(2.20)
The right-hand side of equation (2.20) therefore defines the share γ̂H belonging
to the threshold individual from Home, who is as well off as the respective foreign
individual.
In the following proposition, we summarize the key findings which follow from
equation (2.20):
Proposition 1. As long as the cost of acquiring information about the foreign
economy T is equal to zero, the following results hold:
1. if Home is more unequal than Foreign, i.e. if γ
H−γH
γF−γF > 1 , then a higher initial
level of technology AF (0) and a higher quality of institutions βF in Foreign, a
lower level of technology AH(0), a lower quality of institutions βH and a lower
relative inequality in Home γ
H−γH
γF−γF , all result in a higher γ̂
H , implying less sup-
port to the ruling regime and, as a consequence, a higher level of censorship25;
2. if instead Foreign is more unequal than Home, i.e. if γ
H−γH
γF−γF < 1, then a higher
initial level of technology AF (0) and a higher quality of institutions βF in For-
eign, a lower level of technology AH(0), a lower quality of institutions βH and a
higher relative inequality in Home γ
H−γH
γF−γF , all result in a lower γ̂
H , implying less
support to the ruling regime and, as a consequence, a higher level of censorship;
3. finally, if Home is as unequal as Foreign, i.e. if γ
H−γH
γF−γF = 1 , then γ̂
H = 0, ,
implying no support to the regime in power.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
25As political isolationism
2.2 The Baseline Model of Censorship 31
Intuition behind this proposition is as follows. If income is more unequal in Home,
which is the case when γ
H−γH
γF−γF > 1, then a higher technological endowment in For-
eign, i.e. a larger AF (0), or better foreign institutions, i.e. a higher βF , and therefore
a larger income gap between Home and Foreign, reduce the cohort of those rich indi-
viduals from Home who are better off living in Home than in Foreign. As the latter
reduces the number of individuals supporting the regime in power, the authority has
higher incentives to introduce isolationism. The opposite is true if the level of initial
technology AH(0), or the quality of institutions βH in Home becomes higher. In this
case, the group of rich individuals in Home who are richer than the corresponding for-
eign individuals becomes larger. At the same time, as long as the level of income in
Home is lower than the one in the foreign economy, the entire group of poor individ-
uals in Home is worse off than their foreign counterparts, as Home is not only more
inequal and, therefore, pro-rich, as was the case in the previous subsection, but it is
also poorer than Foreign.
In the opposite case of lower income inequality in Home corresponding to γ
H−γH
γF−γF <
1, a higher level of technology AF (0) or a higher quality of institutions βF in Foreign
results in a lower share γ̂H . We can see this result in Figure 3, where, as before, the
thick line represents Foreign, and the thin one corresponds instead to Home. However,
this time the thin line is steeper, which reflects a lower income inequality in Home. An
increase in AF (0) or βF results in a higher γF
(
βF
βH
) 1
1−η AF (0)
AH(0)
, and, as a consequence,
the thick line shifts to the right. The new intersection point is now at point B, i.e.
below and to the left from the initial point A. Therefore, better institutions and better
technologies in Foreign result in a larger number of foreigners who are richer than
home individuals, thus reducing the level of the ruling regime support from F (γ)L
individuals to F (γ)L. The latter increases the ruling regimes incentives to implement
more restrictive forms of censorship.
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Figure 3. Comparison of home and foreign individuals: the case of lower inequality in
Home, average incomes are different in Home and Foreign.
When income inequality is lower in Home than in Foreign, an increase in the level
of inequality in Home, i.e. a larger γ
H−γH
γF−γF , results in a reduction of γ̂
H . This result is
intuitive, as if Home is less unequal than Foreign, as is the case in Figure 3, an increase
in the level of inequality in Home results in a larger number of poor individuals who are
poorer than their foreign counterparts. As a result, this reduces the share of individuals
who support the regime in power.26
When the level of income inequality in Home is, by contrast, larger than in Foreign,
an increase in γ
H−γH
γF−γF results is a larger number of rich Home individuals who are better
off living in Home, as a higher inequality benefits the rich cohort. As a consequence,
the regime becomes more popular among rich individuals, while dissatisfaction among
the poor instead increases.
26As inequality in Home becomes higher, the thin line in Figure 3 is getting flatter and the intersection
point with the thick line moves down along the thick line representing Foreign, more far away to the left
from point 1L on the horizontal axis.
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If two countries have the same level of income inequality, i.e. if γ
H−γH
γF−γF = 1, then
the thin line representing Home is located entirely parallel and to the left from the thick
line, which implies that no one is better off in Home than in Foreign, and, as a result,
no one supports the regime in power.
Average incomes are different and T > 0.
We, finally, consider the case when purchasing information about Foreign is costly,
and therefore T becomes a positive value. We remind that the threshold individual
who can afford paying T is defined from the following expression:
γth(t) =
T
Y H(t)
(2.21)
where Y H(t) = L
(
βH
) 1
1−η AH(0)egt
(
δ+g
s
) η
1−η .
In the presence of positive T and comparatively higher income inequality in Home,
the ruling regime is supported by two different groups of individuals: the poorest and
the richest. As individuals belonging to the former group are very poor, they can’t af-
ford paying T and therefore receive information about Foreign from the official media.
The latter group is instead rich, and it supports the regime as this cohort is better off
living in more unequal Home than in less unequal Foreign. Since there are γ
th(t)−γH
γH−γH L
individuals belonging to the former group and γ
H−γ̂H
γH−γHL to the latter, the number of in-
dividuals in opposition therefore equals to the remaining part of the population, which
is as large as follows:
Lo =
γ̂H − γth(t)
γH − γH L (2.22)
We remind that, by assumption, the regime stays in power if at least αL individuals
support it, and thus isolationism is introduced if the number of supporters reduces
below αL, or, alternatively, when the number of oppositionists, who, in this particular
case, are represented by the middle-class individuals, becomes larger than (1 − α)L,
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i.e. when the following condition holds:
γ̂H − γth(t)
γH − γH L > (1− α)L (2.23)
If income distribution is instead less unequal in Home than in Foreign, the group
supporting the regime in power is represented by the poorest individuals, as they are
better off in Home than in Foreign. As γ̂
H−γH
γH−γHL individuals belong to this group,
the size of the group at the opposition is thus belongs to the remaining part of the
population and is reflected in the following expression:
Lo =
γH − γ̂H
γH − γHL
27 (2.24)
Therefore, the ruling regime introduces isolationism when the following condition
holds:
Lo =
γH − γ̂H
γH − γHL > (1− α)L (2.25)
From Proposition 1 we know how does the threshold share γ̂H , which is a part of
equations (2.22) and (2.24), react if any ofAF (0), βF ,AH(0), βH , γH−γH or γF−γF
changes. From equation (2.21) we know how γth(t), which is also a part of equation
(2.22), is affected by a change in the level of T or Y H(t). We therefore can summarize
all these effects in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. As long as the cost of acquiring information about the foreign economy
T is positive, the following results hold:
1. if income inequality in Home is higher than in Foreign, then a higher cost of
acquiring information from alternative sources T or a higher level of income
inequality in Home γH −γH , a lower level of technology AF (0), a lower quality
27Alternatively, the size of opposition can be equal to Lo = γ
H−γth(t)
γH−γH L if γ
th(t) > γ̂H . We,
however, assume that γth(t) ≤ γ̂H to exclude this case, and we explain why do we do so in the next
footnote.
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of institutions βF and a lower income inequality γF−γF in Foreign, do not result
in a larger opposition cohort. The latter implies a lower level of censorship in
Home. The effect of a higher level of technology AH(0) or a higher quality
institutions βH in Home is instead ambiguous;
2. if income inequality is higher in Foreign than in Home, and γ̂H > γth(t), then
a higher quality of institutions βH , a higher level of technological development
AH(0) in Home, a higher cost of acquiring information from alternative sources
T , a higher level of income inequality γF−γF , a lower level of technologyAF (0)
and a lower quality of institutions βF in Foreign, do not result in a larger oppo-
sition cohort. The latter implies a lower level of censorship in Home. The effect
of a lower level of income inequality in Home γH − γH is instead ambiguous.28
Proof. See Appendix B.4 for the proof.
We do not explicitly carry out a comparative static exercise on δ, s, L, g, as the
results of this exercise are very standard and intuitive. Moreover, we limit our discus-
sion of Proposition 2 to those results which illustrate particular historical episodes, and
mention all other findings very briefly.
The intuition for Proposition 2 is as follows. When the level of T is larger, which
implies that acquiring information about Foreign is more expensive, the size of the
group that can afford paying T is comparatively small, and, as a result, the group
opposing the ruling regime is lower as well. Therefore, a low T instead might poten-
tially result in a larger group of oppositionists, which creates higher risks for the ruling
regime. This result can probably explain why common borders with developed coun-
tries or geographic proximity to more developed economies, all implying a very low
28We introduce the following assumption:
γ̂H > γth(t)
in the second part of Proposition 2, as otherwise there is more ambiguity when the values of parameters
change. For instance, assume that initially γ̂H is lower than γth(t), and an institutional reform results in
a higher level of βH . As a consequence, γ̂H goes up, while γth(t) instead goes down. If γ̂H < γth(t)
is still satisfied after this reform is implemented, then the regime in power loses popularity even though
it introduced a positive change, which is counterintuitive.
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value of T , made isolationism particularly attractive for countries as the Soviet Union,
GDR, North Korea or Cuba.29
Better technology or institutions in Foreign, i.e. AF (t) or βF , increase incomes
abroad, and, as a result, home individuals become comparatively poorer. In this case,
according to equations (2.22) and (2.24) the number of opposition members increases
and, as a consequence, the likelihood of isolationism becomes larger. Again, the so-
cialist economies, such as the Soviet Union, Maoist China, Cuba, GDR and North
Korea, which practiced isolationism and censorship, were, at the same time, character-
ized by comparatively poor institutions and a low level of non-military technological
development.30
If income inequality is lower in Home than in Foreign, then according to equation
(2.24) the number of individuals who do not support the regime in power is large.
Only very poor individuals are better off in Home, and therefore they provide political
support to the ruling regime. As the number of oppositionists in much larger, the
regime in power has incentives to end up using isolationism. Again, one can notice
that income inequality in the Soviet Union, GDR, Cuba and North Korea was/is very
low.31
If income inequality is comparatively higher in Home than in Foreign, then an
increase in income inequality in Foreign tends to decrease the number of those rich
individuals in Home who are better off than their counterparts in Foreign, therefore
resulting in a lower popularity of the ruling regime. If inequality is instead increas-
ing in Home, then one can notice that the number of poor individuals who can afford
paying T , and thus receive unbiased information regarding their comparative incomes,
declines, whereas the number of home individuals who are richer than the respective
29The Soviet Union’s neighbours were, among other economies, Norway and Finland. GDR was hav-
ing a common border with Western Germany, North Korea shares one of its borders with the Republic
of Korea, and Cuba is located close to the US.
30Ellman (1986), for instance, points at a significant technological gap between the Soviet Union and
the West.
31Using better opportunity to manipulate information flows, political regimes in these isolated
economies were convincing their citizenry that capitalist societies were instead highly inequal, and
that most of the wealth there was belonging to the rich elites.
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foreign individuals becomes instead larger. Therefore, the number of individuals be-
longing to the middle income group who, as they are worse off than their foreign coun-
terparts, are in opposition to the ruling regime, becomes lower, and thus there is less
need for the regime to introduce isolationism. The case when an ineffective and cor-
rupt regime is opposed by the middle class individuals, but earns support from the rich
who benefit from a high level of income inequality, and the poor who receive informa-
tion regarding their comparative incomes from the state-controlled media, is consistent
with a number of recent historical episodes, as the ones of modern Venezuela or Rus-
sia.
If income inequality is lower in Home than in Foreign, better home technology and
better domestic institutions will result in a larger support from the poorest individuals,
as, since Home is more equal, and therefore more pro-poor than Foreign, the num-
ber of poor individuals who are better off than corresponding poor individuals abroad
increases. But those Home individuals who are comparatively rich will remain un-
satisfied, as, first, Home stays poorer than the foreign economy, and second, the rich
receive lower stakes in Home than their counterparts in Foreign. However, the number
of regime supporters becomes unambiguously larger when domestic technology and
institutions improve. More formally, as a result of higher quality institutions in Home,
according to equation (2.20) the new threshold level γ̂H becomes larger. As the level
of income in Home is comparatively lower, from equation (2.24) it follows that those
individuals whose income share satisfy γ̂H < γ ≤ γH oppose the regime in power.
As the share γ̂H increases, the size of the group at opposition reduces, and thus the
number of regime’s supporters becomes larger.
If income inequality is instead larger in Home than in Foreign, the effect of having
access to a better technology or better institutions in Home is more complicated. On
one hand, a higher level of technology or better institutions result in a larger income
level, and, as Home is more inequal and therefore more beneficial for the rich, more
individuals from the rich group support the regime in power. However, as poorer
individuals also become richer, more of them can afford paying T , and, as a result, a
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larger cohort of poor citizens becomes aware that their consumption standards are still
lower than the ones of their foreign counterparts. As a consequence, a part of poor
individuals can turn against the regime in power. Which effect dominates remains
ambiguous.
One can notice that the above environment gives a too strong prediction in partic-
ular cases. For instance, as we concluded above, if inequality in Home is higher than
in Foreign, then a larger group of poor individuals can’t afford paying T . If Home
does not improve its technology fast enough, then the gap between Home and Foreign
decreases slowly. At the same time, as the level of technology in the home economy
becomes higher over time, Home individuals become richer in absolute terms, while
the value of T , by assumption, remains constant. From equation (2.21) it follows that
there are less people who can not afford acquiring information from alternative sources
and therefore are unaware that they are poorer than foreigners, i.e. γth(t)L becomes
smaller over time. As a result, the amount of regime supporters declines, and thus
the number of regimes practicing isolationism should grow. However, this prediction
contradicts the reality, as the number of isolationist economies instead becomes lower.
We suppose that this contradiction follows as we did not consider the costs associ-
ated with isolationism in our study. As a consequence, since isolationism is assumed to
be costless, our analysis has so far shown that growing discontent about the policy of
the ruling regime unambiguously results in the introduction of isolationism. However,
as is argued below, the presence of the costs resulting from isolationism can signifi-
cantly change the behavior of the ruling regime.
2.3 Isolationism and Technological Diffusion
So far, we have developed a one-direction relationship between economic growth and
censorship: as we showed in the previous section, slow economic growth is more
likely to result in censorship, as the ruling regime has incentives to hide the fact that
Home does not catch up with Foreign from the public. We, however, suppose that
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this relationship is instead two-sided: not only does the pace of economic growth af-
fects a decision to introduce isolationism, but isolationism can itself affect economic
development. Historical evidence suggests that economies in isolation fall down into
technological backwardness.32 A potential explanation for this result is that isolation-
ism complicates the process of technological diffusion, thus leading to a lower pace
of technological development in the isolated economy.33 As a consequence of slow
evolution of technology, the level of output can also grow slowly. In the presence of
slow economic growth, a developing society might remain poor and, as a result, sensi-
tive to various macro shocks. Therefore, a shock can substantially increase the level of
poverty, thus resulting in mass protest and creating serious political risks for the ruling
regime. As an illustration, we refer to the example of the late Soviet Union. With its
ineffective economic and political institutions, the latter was not able to catch up with
more developed Western economies. However, as a vast majority of Soviet citizens
were deprived from a possibility to visit the West because of isolationism, they had
very little chance to compare their incomes with the ones in the Western block. As a
result of isolationism, the Soviet economy had limited opportunities to imitate tech-
nologies from the world technological frontier, and therefore evolution of technology
in most of sectors of the Soviet economy was slow (see, for instance, Harrison, 1993).
32This was the case for Japan in the 17th-19th centuries, the Russian Empire under the rule of tsar
Nicolas I, China in the 14th-19th centuries, the Soviet Union, and it is still the case for modern Cuba
and North Korea. All these regimes experienced severe economic and technological backwardness as a
result of limited interactions with foreign economies.
33Isolationism can result in deterioration of bilateral diplomatic relation, which can, in turn, nega-
tively affect other forms of cooperation between the involved economies. For instance, Pollins (1989a)
and (1989b) provides an empirical evidence on relation between bilateral trade and diplomacy. He
argues that countries with better diplomatic relations have closer trade connections. A long-term
diplomatic conflict can also result in a lower level of foreign investment into conflicting economies.
Hayakawa, Kimura and Lee (2011) emphasize external conflicts as one of the main negative determi-
nants of the FDI level. As FDI is an important channel of technological spillover, a threat of a conflict
can therefore lower the spillover effect. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009) argue that nations which
trust each other also tend to invest more into each other’s economies. Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann
(2010) show that a more trusted country has better opportunities to attract venture capital from a trust-
ing economy. Since political conflict can undermine the level of trust among the conflicting nations,
the presence of a conflict can therefore have a negative impact on the willingness of involved nations
to invest into each other’s economies. As a result, the spillover of knowledge from a more developed
country to a less developed one can become lower.
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Nevertheless, because of high oil prices during most of 1970s, as well as in the first
half of 1980s, the Soviet regime was able to satisfy basic needs of the majority of the
Soviet citizens. However, this became difficult when oil prices declined in mid-80s.
The latter resulted in mass protests against the communist rule. In 1991 the Soviet
regime was displaced.
In this section, we add technological diffusion to the Solow model to show how a
possibility of technological spillover increases per capita income in the steady-state.
In the absence of technological diffusion economic growth is instead slow, and there-
fore the steady-state level of per capita income is lower compared to the economy with
technological adoption. However, as a careful consideration of the effect of isolation-
ism requires a separate study, we restrict our analysis of the costs of isolationism to
discussion.
We extend our baseline model and allow Home to adopt foreign technologies. The
latter possibility is captured in the following equation, which corresponds to Acemoglu
(2008):
∂AH(t)
∂t
=
(
AF (t)− AH(t))µ+ gAH(t) (2.26)
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (2.26), i.e.
(
AF (t)− AH(t))µ ,
reflects the improvement to the existing technology that is brought about by diffusion,
where 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 is the rate of technological adoption. The other term, i.e. gAH(t),
captures instead the innovative component of technological progress, where g corre-
sponds to the rate of innovation. Therefore, Home’s technology improves as a result
of two different processes: first, Home copies foreign technologies, and second, it de-
velops new technologies itself. As in the previous section, the rate of innovation g is
assumed to be the same in two economies, Home and Foreign.
Capital is accumulated according to a standard process:
∂kˆ(t)
∂t
= skˆη(t)− (δ + λ) kˆ(t)
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The only difference between this equation and its analog from the previous section,
i.e. equation (2.4), is that now the rate of technological progress corresponding to
λ is equal to µ 1
a(t)
+ (g − µ), where a(t) = AH(t)
AF (t)
, while in the economy without
technological diffusion it was instead equal to g.34 The term a(t) = A
H(t)
AF (t)
captures the
rate of technological backwardness of the home economy, which diminishes over time
as a result of technological diffusion.
In Appendix C.2 we show that a positive rate of diffusion µ implies that the level
of technology in Home catches up with the one in Foreign, i.e. a(t) = 1, or AH(t) =
AF (t). As the home economy catches up with the leading technological frontierAF (t),
its steady-state level of technology AH(t) therefore becomes equal to AF (0)egt in-
stead of AH(0)egt in the case of no diffusion. Moreover, as a result of technologi-
cal adoption, the steady-state level of per capita income also becomes larger, since
AF (0) > AH(0):35
y(t) = β
1
1−ηAF (0)egt
(
δ + g
s
) η
η−1
(2.27)
Assume that isolationism affects the rate of diffusion µ. In particular, let us con-
sider the diffusion rate µ as a function of θ, representing a decision on isolationism,
which was introduced in equation (2.10). For simplicity, assume the following link
between µ and θ:
µ(θ) =
 0µ > 0 if
θ = θI
θ = θNI
(2.28)
Condition (2.28) implies that under isolationism Home citizens can’t copy foreign
technologies, and, as a result, the rate of technological diffusion µ(θI) equals to 0. As
it follows from equation (2.27), in this case Home ends up having the same steady-state
levels of technology AH(t) = AH(0)egt and per capita output y(t)36 as in the previous
section where a possibility of diffusion was not considered. The steady-state level of
34This result is derived in Appendix C.1.
35For the proof of this result see also Appendix C.2.
36Where y(t) = β
1
1−ηAH(0)egt
(
δ+g
s
) η
η−1
42 Extractive Institutions, Closed Borders and Economic Development
per capita income therefore becomes lower if isolationist policy is introduced. If there
is no isolationism, i.e. if θ = θNI , then µ(θNI) is equal to a positive constant µ and,
thus, the steady-state level of technology in Home AH(t) catches up with the level of
technology in Foreign AH(t).
We therefore notice the important difference with the discussion in the previous
section. There, isolationism was immaterial for economic growth, as economic growth
affected isolationism, but not vice versa. In this section, the influence is instead two-
sided: economic performance of the home economy affects the regime’s decision to
introduce isolationism, and, on the contrary, isolationist policy influences economic
growth.
As isolationism results in a lower level of per capita output compared to the case
of no isolationism, its implementation becomes costly for the economy. If the level of
output per capita remains relatively low because of slow growth, then a negative shock
can result in adverse consequences for a large group of individuals, as their incomes
might decline below a particular minimal threshold. A natural disaster, a technological
cataclysm, a mistake in a policy, a drop in the price level of a key exported commodity,
or any other negative macro shock, can lead to a shortage of basic consumption goods,
mass homelessness, etc. There are many historical illustrations available. China dur-
ing the Great Leap Forward (see, for instance, Li and Yang, 2005), a policy which was
introduced by Chairman Mao to increase the share of industrial sector in the economy,
was designed with significant flaws, which caused millions of deaths all over China.
The inefficiency of North Korean agriculture and its inability to provide food in suf-
ficient amounts for North Koreans resulted in hundreds of thousands of died because
of hunger in mid-1990s.37 In the Soviet Union a sharp drop in oil prices in mid-1980s
led to food shortages. Chronic deficits in Soviet Russia resulted in mass protests in the
late 1980s and the Soviet regime collapsed shortly.
Therefore, as a relatively poor country is more vulnerable to negative shocks, it can
become a place of significant political turbulence, which can create threats to political
37http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/281132.stm
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stability of the ruling regime. Higher growth rates can thus be very important for the
ruling regime, as with faster income growth the economy has better chances to reach
higher levels of income before a negative shock hits the economy.
As a final illustration to our discussion we briefly mention the history of modern
China. Under the rule of Chairman Mao, China practiced isolationism and experienced
significant economic turmoil, which resulted in multiple losses of lives. In terms of
our model, the latter can be considered as the effect of a negative macro shock. After
Mao’s death, Deng Xiaoping improved institutions, opened the economy, and therefore
enhanced the opportunity to adopt foreign technologies. The latter was followed by
high growth rates and larger incomes, which resulted in a higher legitimacy of the
ruling Communist Party.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we consider a political regime which derives private benefits from
maintaining low-quality institutions. As long as the quality of institutions remains
low, the economy can not catch up with a more developed foreign country. As citizens
consider the latter as a reference economy, they might turn against the regime in power
since their incomes remain persistently lower compared to the ones in the foreign
economy. To prevent political unrest, the regime in power can strategically isolate
the economy and therefore eliminate the opportunity to collect information about the
living standards in the foreign country.
We first introduce a baseline model where we assume no technological diffusion
from the more developed foreign country to the low-developed home economy. In
the context of a Solow growth model, we show that the most restrictive forms of cen-
sorship, as political isolationism, are more likely to be implemented if a country is a
technological or institutional laggard, i.e. if the reference economy is more developed
than the home country considering the level of technology and the quality of institu-
tions. Isolationism is also more likely to occur if the home economy is less inequal
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than the foreign one. Finally, the chance for isolationism is higher when collecting
information about the reference foreign economy is less costly. These findings are
consistent with particular episodes from the history of socialist dictatorships, such as
the Soviet Union, GDR, Cuba and North Korea, where isolationism was/is used.
We proceed with a discussion of the costs of censorship, and suggest how do these
costs might result in a slower pace of technological development and potential politi-
cal turbulence. We assume that isolationism reduces the level of technological diffu-
sion, and, as a consequence, the speed of technological development, as well as output
growth, become lower. As a result of low growth rates, a substantial part of population
can stay comparatively poor and therefore sensitive to negative shocks which might
potentially hit the economy. As a consequence of such a shock incomes can end up
falling below a particular minimal threshold, which might result in political unrest and
a regime change. The ruling regime therefore has incentives to avoid using isolation-
ism and instead improve the quality of institutions. The latter finding can be illustrated
with the history of modern China, which transited from a more restrictive isolation-
ist regime under the rule of Mao Zedong to a less restrictive one under his successor,
Deng Xiaoping.
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2.5 Appendices
2.5.1 Appendix A.1
As the production function has a Cobb-Douglas form, the output per unit of effective
labor can therefore be written as follows:
yˆ(t) = kˆη(t)
The level of capital per unit of effective labor, in turn, is equal to kˆ(t) = K(t)
A(t)L
, and
therefore the level of output per effective labor unit is yˆ(t) = Y (t)
A(t)L
.
As g =
∂A¯(t)
∂t
A¯(t)
=
β
1
1−η ∂A(t)
∂t
β
1
1−η A(t)
=
∂A(t)
∂t
A(t)
, a solution for A(t) is equal to A(0)egt, where
A(0) corresponds to the initial state of technology in the economy.
Given no population growth, differentiation of kˆ(t) with respect to t results in the
following expression:
∂kˆ(t)
∂t
=
∂K(t)
∂t
A(t)L− ∂A(t)
∂t
K(t)L(
A(t)L
)2 = ∂K(t)∂tA(t)L − gkˆ(t) (2.29)
As ∂K(t)
∂t
= sY (t)− δK(t), equation (2.29) can, thus, be rewritten as follows:
∂kˆ(t)
∂t
=
sY (t)− δK(t)
A(t)L
− gkˆ(t) = skˆα(t)− (δ + g) kˆ(t)
2.5.2 Appendix A.2
First, we discuss the technical result which we use in Section 2.2.3. This result claims
that γ+γ
2
= 1
L
.
To begin with, we consider the case of egalitarian income distributions. Assume
that in a particular society consisting of L38 individuals, everyone receives the same
38Where L is finite.
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income share γ = 1
L
.
Next, assume that the ruling regime decides to redistribute income shares to create
a cohort of relatively poor individuals, as well as a cohort of relatively rich citizens.
Assume also that γi+1 − γi = d for i = 1, ...L− 1, where d > 0.
If γ1 = γ then one can derive the following result:
γL = γ + (L− 1) d = γ (2.30)
We then sum all the income shares up:
γ1 + ...+ γL = γ + ...+ γ + (L− 1) d =
= Lγ +
L− 1
2
(2d+ (L− 2) d) =
= Lγ +
L− 1
2
Ld = L
(
γ +
L− 1
2
d
)
= L
(
γ + γ + (L− 1) d
2
)
To derive the latter result, we used the definition of the sum of a finite arithmetic
progression.
As all shares sum up to 1, we can derive the following expression:
γ1 + ...+ γL = L
(
γ + γ + (L− 1) d
2
)
= 1 (2.31)
We combine equations (2.30) and (2.31) to receive the planned result:
L
(
γ + γ
2
)
= 1
or, alternatively,
γ + γ
2
=
1
L
(2.32)
If one needs to use a different income distribution implying a different value of d,
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and if, in addition, L stays constant, then one can notice that equation (2.32) holds
again.
We now consider a particular procedure which the ruling regime implements to
run the income distribution policy. First, the regime in power takes a value ε from one
individual and transfers this value to another individual. The former individual is then
ranked as the poorest citizen, while the latter is instead considered as the richest one.
After that, the regime takes a value which is smaller than ε from an individual who
is then considered as a slightly richer one than the poorest citizen and transfers it to a
person who is then considered as a slightly poorer one than the richest individual, etc.
As a result, the difference in income shares between the richest and the poorest
individuals is as large as γL − γ1 = γ − γ = 2ε, the difference between the second
richest and the second poorest individuals is, respectively, equal to γL−1−γ2 = 2ε−2d,
the next difference is equal to γL−2 − γ3 = 2ε− 4d, and so on.
One can notice that the index belonging to the first term on the left-hand side of
the above sequence starts from the highest number L and then reduces, while index
belonging to the second term starts instead from 1 and goes up. Indexes converge at
L
2
, and thus we can conclude that γL−L
2
− γL
2
= 0. Therefore, 2ε−Nd = 0 or d = 2ε
N
.
Since ε reflects a particular income distribution policy, which affects the level of d,
then the value of d also reflects the same income distribution policy.
In this work we assume that L is large enough, and therefore we can use the prop-
erties of the continuous uniform distribution function to derive the required results.
In this Appendix we also prove that from
γi =
2
L
− γi, i = H,F (2.33)
it follows that
γH − γF = γF − γH (2.34)
We can see that the difference between the uppermost point in the domain of γi
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and its lowermost point is equal to the following expression:
γi − γi = 2
L
− γi − γi = 2
L
− 2γi = 2
(
1
L
− γi
)
(2.35)
where i = H,F , and γi is the uppermost point in the set of realizations of γi, while
γiis instead the lowermost point belonging to the same set.
As both distributions of γi, i = H,F are characterized by the same mean 1
L
, then
the upper and the lower bounds of income shares distributions in Home and in Foreign
are related to each other as follows:
γH + γH
2
=
γF + γF
2
(2.36)
and therefore we can conclude the following:
γH + γH = γF + γF (2.37)
or, alternatively,
γH − γF = γF − γH (2.38)
2.5.3 Appendix B.1
Consider a particular value ωH = F
(
γH
)
belonging to the vertical axis in Figure 2.
Given this value, we can find the respective income share in Home, which is equal to
γH . As the share of income γ follows a uniform distribution, and the upper and the
lower bounds of the share γ in Home are equal to γH and γH respectively, we conclude
that ω = γ
H−γH
γH−γH .
Similarly, we can derive the respective value of ωF for the foreign country: ωF =
γF−γF
γF−γF .
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Equalizing these two values results in the following expression:
γH − γH
γH − γH =
γF − γF
γF − γF (2.39)
From the previous discussion we know that γ
i+γi
2
= 1
L
, where i = H,F , and the
upper bound in the domain of γi, which is γi, is as larger as the following: γi = 2
L
−γi,
i = H,F .
After substituting the latter result into equation (2.39), we obtain the following
expression:
γH − γH
1
L
− γH =
γF − γF
1
L
− γF (2.40)
After rearranging, we receive the following result:
γH
(
1
L
− γF )
1
L
− γH −
1
L
(
γH − γF )
1
L
− γH = γ
F (2.41)
Finally, the next trick helps to reach the desired expression:
γH
(
1
L
− γH + γH − γF )
1
L
− γH −
1
L
(
γH − γF )
1
L
− γH =
= γH +
2
(
γH − 1
L
) (
γH − γF )
γH − γH = γ
F (2.42)
In addition, as 0 ≤ F (γ) ≤ 1, one needs to impose the following restriction:
γi − γi
γi − γi ≤ 1, or γ
i ≤ γi and γi ≤ γi, where i = F,H
2.5.4 Appendix B.2
To start from, we first consider expression (2.19):
γH
(
βH
) 1
1−η AH(0) =
(
γH +
2
(
γH − 1
L
) (
γH − γF )
γH − γH
)(
βF
) 1
1−η AF (0)
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As 1
L
=
γH+γH
2
, equation (2.19) can be rewritten as follows:
γH
(
βH
) 1
1−η AH(0) =
(
γH +
(
γH − 1
L
) (
γH − γF )
1
L
− γH
)(
βF
) 1
1−η AF (0)
We derive the following result from the above expression:
γ̂H =
1
L
(
γF − γH) (βF ) 11−η AF (0)(
1
L
− γH) (βH) 11−η AH(0)− ( 1
L
− γF ) (βF ) 11−η AF (0) (2.43)
We can use the following result from Appendix A2:
1
L
=
γH + γH
2
=
γF + γF
2
which can, alternatively, be represented as
γH − γF = γF − γH
to derive the following equation:
γF − γH = 2(γ
F − γH)
2
=
γF − γH + γH − γF
2
=
=
γH − γH − (γF − γF )
2
(2.44)
To proceed, we substitute this result into equation (2.43) and again use the fact that
1
L
=
γH + γH
2
=
γF + γF
2
to receive the following equation:
γ̂H =
1
L
((
γH − γH)− (γF − γF )) (βF ) 11−η AF (0)(
γH − γH) (βH) 11−η AH(0)− (γF − γF ) (βF ) 11−η AF (0) (2.45)
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Dividing and multiplying equation (2.45) by
(
γF − γF ) (βF ) 11−η AF (0) gives us
the final expression:
γ̂H =
1
L
γH−γH
γF−γF − 1
γH−γH
γF−γF
(
βH
βF
) 1
1−η AH(0)
AF (0)
− 1
2.5.5 Appendix B.3
Let
(
γH − γH
)
(
γF − γF
) = x,
((
βH
βF
) 1
1−η AH(0)
AF (0)
)
= B and 1
L
= b.
We notice that equation (2.20) can be rewritten as follows:
y = b
(
x− 1
Bx− 1
)
(2.46)
where B > 1, as
(
βH
βF
) 1
1−α AH(0)
AF (0)
< 1 by assumption.
It, then, follows that a derivative of y with respect to x is equal to the following:
∂y
∂x
= b
∂
(
x−1
Bx−1
)
∂x
= b
Bx− 1−Bx+B
(Bx− 1)2 = b
B − 1
(Bx− 1)2 < 0 (2.47)
Therefore, the threshold share γ̂H decreases when income inequality in the home
country increases, or, alternatively, when income inequality in the foreign country de-
creases.
A derivative of y with respect to B corresponds to the following expression:
∂y
∂B
= b
∂
(
x−1
Bx−1
)
∂B
= b
x (1− x)
(Bx− 1)2 (2.48)
The sign of the above expression depends on whether the value of x is larger or
smaller than 1.
If x =
(
γH − γH
)
(
γF − γF
) > 1, then ∂y
∂B
< 0, and if instead x =
(
γH − γH
)
(
γF − γF
) < 1 , then
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∂y
∂B
> 0.
The value of B increases when βH increases, βF decreases, AH(0) increases and
AF (0) instead decreases.
2.5.6 Appendix B.4
To prove the first part of Proposition 2,39 we use equations (2.20), (2.21) and (2.22).
Consider the effect of a higher T . We rewrite equation (2.22) as follows
Lo =
f1
(
L,AH(0), βH , AF (0), βF , γH , γH , γF , γF
)−
γH − γH
−f2
(
AH(0), βH , T, δ, g, s, L, t
)
γH − γH L (2.49)
where f1
(
L,AH(0), βH , AF (0), βF , γH , γH , γF , γF
)
corresponds to γ̂H , which is
defined in equation (2.20), and f2
(
AH(0), βH , T, δ, g, s, L, t
)
is equal to γth(t), which
is, in turn, determined in equation (2.21). We notice that T affects the second term in
the large brackets.
From equation (2.21)
γth(t) =
T
L (βH)
1
1−η AH(0)egt
(
δ+g
s
) η
η−1
it follows that the level of T affects the second term in equation (2.49) positively.
Therefore, a higher level of T leads to a reduction in the number of individuals belong-
ing to the opposition.
We notice that AF (0), βF , and γF − γF are all belong to the first term of equation
(2.49), and, as it follows from Proposition 1, if these parameters become lower, γ̂H
becomes lower as well. This increases the level of popularity of the regime in power.
39i.e. the part which cinsiders the case of comparatively higher income inequality in Home.
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A higher γH − γH results in a reduction in the level of γ̂H , and moreover, the
denominator of equation (2.22) becomes larger. The latter increases the amount of the
regime supporters unambiguously.
According to Proposition 1, a higher level of AH(0) and a higher level of βH , both
result in a reduction in the level of γ̂H . However, from equation (2.21) it follows that
they also reduce the second term in equation (2.49), and thus it remains ambiguous
which effect dominates. A reduction in the level of γ̂H increases the number of rel-
atively rich supporters, however, at the same time, a reduction in the level of γth(t)
decreases instead the number of the regime supporters among relatively poor individ-
uals.
To prove the second part of Proposition 2,40 we use equation (2.24):
Lo =
γH − f (L,AH (0) , AF (0) , βH , βF , γH , γH , γF , γF )
γH − γH L
From Proposition 1 we know that a lower AF (0) and a lower βF , a higher AH(0),
a higher βLOW and a higher γF − γF , all result in a larger value of γ̂H , and therefore
the second term of equation (2.24) increases, which reduces the number of individuals
who do not support the regime in power. A lower level of γH − γH results in a higher
value γ̂H , and therefore the second term in equation (2.24) increases. Given that γH =
2
L
− γH , the first term in equation (2.24) can be rewritten as 1
2
γH
γH− 1
L
and thus we can
write the following expression:
∂
(
γH
γH− 1
L
)
∂
−
γH
=
γH − 1
L
− γH(
γH − 1
L
)2 = − 1L(
γH − 1
L
)2 < 0
As a consequence, the first term increases when the level of γH − γH decreases. The
latter results in ambiguity considering the influence of the level of γH − γH on the
number of regime supporters.
40i.e. the one which assumes a lower level of income inequality in Home.
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Finally, the requirement that γ̂H > γth(t) was introduced in the second part of
Proposition 2, as otherwise there is more ambiguity resulting from a change in pa-
rameters’ values. For instance, assume that initially γ̂H < γth(t), and then a positive
change in the level of domestic institutions βH will result in a higher level of γ̂H and
a lower γth(t) at the same time. If condition γ̂H < γth(t) is still satisfied after this
change takes place, then the regime loses popularity, even though it introduces a posi-
tive change, which is counterintuitive.
2.5.7 Appendix C.1
With adoption of technologies, technological development in Home is driven by the
following equation:
∂AH(t)
∂t
=
(
AF (t)− AH(t))µ+ gAH(t) = µAF (t) + (g − µ)AH(t) (2.50)
We can use equation (2.50) to derive the expression for the capital accumulation
process:
∂kˆ(t)
∂t
=
∂K(t)
∂t
A(t)L− ∂A(t)
∂t
K(t)L(
A(t)L
)2 = ∂K(t)∂tA(t)L − µAF (t) + (g − µ)AH(t)AH(t) kˆ(t) =
=
∂K(t)
∂t
A(t)L
−
(
µ
1
a(t)
+ (g − µ)
)
kˆ(t) = skˆη(t)−
(
δ + µ
1
a(t)
+ (g − µ)
)
kˆ(t)
where a(t) = A
H(t)
AF (t)
2.5.8 Appendix C.2
As in the steady-state ∂a(t)
∂t
= 0, we can derive the following result:
∂a(t)
∂t
=
∂AH(t)
∂t
AF (t)− ∂AF
∂t
(t)AH(t)
(AF (t))2
=
µAF (t) + (g − µ)AH(t)
AF (t)
− ga(t)
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= µ+ (g − µ)a(t)− ga(t)
or, alternatively
µ (1− a(t)) = 0 (2.51)
As µ > 0, equation (2.51) holds if a(t) = 1, which implies that AH(t) = AF (t) =
AF (0)egt.
The level of technology is larger in the case of technological adoption, as AH(t) =
AF (0)egt > AH(0)egt, and therefore from equation (2.7) it follows that the level of per
capita output in Home becomes larger as well.
2.5.9 Appendix C.3
In this part of the current Appendix we are considering the transitional dynamics of
the economy with technological diffusion.
Equation (2.50) takes the following form after we differentiate it with respect to t
once again:
∂2AH(t)
∂t2
= µ
∂AF (t)
∂t
+ (g − µ) ∂A
H(t)
∂t
(2.52)
A solution for equation ∂A
F (t)
∂t
= gAF (t) corresponds to the following expression:
AF (t) = AF (0)egt (2.53)
Therefore, equation (2.52) can be rewritten as follows
∂2AH(t)
∂t2
= µg AF (t) + (g − µ) ∂A
H(t)
∂t
(2.54)
From equation (2.50) one can receive the following result
AF (t) =
∂AH(t)
∂t
−(g − µ)AH(t)
µ
(2.55)
One can substitute equation (2.55) into equation (2.54) to receive the following
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expression:
∂2AH(t)
∂t2
= g
(
∂AH(t)
∂t
−(g − µ)AH(t)
)
+ (g − µ) ∂A
H(t)
∂t
=
= (2g − µ) ∂A
H(t)
∂t
−g(g − µ)AH(t)
or
∂2AH(t)
∂t2
− (2g − µ) ∂A
H(t)
∂t
+ g(g − µ)AH(t) = 0 (2.56)
The particular integral of (2.56) is zero, as g(g − µ)AH(t) = 0.
We, first, need to find a solution of the homogeneous equation which corresponds
to equation (2.56):
r2 − (2g − µ) r + g(g − µ) = 0
As a result, we receive the following solutions:
r1 =
g+g−µ−µ
2
= g − µ
r2 =
g+g−µ+µ
2
= g
It follows that
AH(t) = AH1 e
(g−µ)t + AH2 e
gt (2.57)
When t = 0, from equation (2.57) we can derive the following result:
AH(0) = AH1 + A
H
2
AH1 = A
H(0)− AH2 (2.58)
At t = 0 equation (2.50) turns into the following equation:
∂AH(t)
∂t
= µAF (0) + (g − µ)AH(0) (2.59)
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And a derivative of equation (2.57) with respect to t, evaluated at t = 0, results in
the following expression:
∂AH(t)
∂t
= AH1 (g − µ) + AH2 g (2.60)
Setting equations (2.59) and (2.60) equal to each other, and using equation (2.58),
gives the following result:
(λ− µ) (AH(0)− AH2 )+ gAH2 = µAF (0) + (g − µ)AH(0)
or, alternatively:
(λ− λ+ µ)AH2 = µAF (0)
and, therefore:
AH2 = A
F (0) (2.61)
and
AH1 = A
H(0)− AF (0) (2.62)
Finally, substituting expressions (2.61) and (2.62) into equation (2.57) results in
the following equation:
AH(t) =
(
AH(0)− AF (0)) e(g−µ)t + AF (0)egt (2.63)
If µ ≥ g, equation (2.63) turns into AH(t) = AF (t) in the steady-state.

Chapter 3
Are Educational Reforms Necessarily
Growth-Enhancing?
Weak Institutions as the Cause of
Policy Failures
A vast literature has emphasized the role of human capital as a key determinant of
long-term growth (see, for instance, Mincer, 1984, Lucas, 1988, Stokey, 1991, Barro
and Lee, 1993 and Barro, 2002). Quantitative estimates by Barro (1998) suggest that
on average one additional year of upper-level schooling for males raises the growth
rate by 1.2% per year.
At the same time, many papers indicate that the provision of educational services
in developing economies operates relatively far away from the efficient frontier (see,
for instance, Hanushek, 1995, Glewwe, 1999a), even if these countries spend hun-
dreds of billions dollars every year to support and improve education (see, for instance
Glewwe, 2002). In fact PISA1 (OECD, 2010) results indicate that the vast majority
1”PISA (the Programme for International Student Assessment) is an international study that was
launched by the OECD in 1997. It aims to evaluate education systems worldwide every three years by
assessing 15-year-olds’ competencies in the key subjects: reading, mathematics and science. To date
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of developing countries perform below the OECD average as far as scores in read-
ing, mathematics and sciences are concerned. This implies that there is a significant
potential for improvement in education standards, and much attention has been dedi-
cated in the literature to these issues. For instance, Glewwe (2002) studies what kind
of cognitive skills are more relevant for individual income growth. The World Bank
(2001) argues that investment in education, which should result in a better educational
infrastructure, properly trained teaching staff and equipped classrooms and laborato-
ries, is a policy priority. Thus, a reform of the educational system which is aimed at
dealing with the variety of inappropriate practices impeding the transfer of knowledge
to young generations and at improving education standards has the potential to be a
solution to these problems. In this chapter, we argue though that this type of reform
taken in isolation does not necessarily lead to the desired outcomes, and that the results
highlighted in the existing literature are driven by a partial equilibrium focus.
To capture the important interaction between demand and supply of human capital
we develop a general equilibrium model, in which we show that the equilibrium level
of education can fail to adjust to the positive changes introduced by the educational
reform. This can be the case when an improvement in the quality of the education
system does not lead to an actual increase in the demand for education.
Why can the demand for education be low? In the case of developing economies,
the literature has highlighted the role of liquidity constraints, which make it impossible
for individuals to choose their education optimally (see Morley and Coady, 2003 or the
World Bank, 2001). In this chapter we instead show that even if liquidity constraints
are not binding, education opportunities might remain unexploited. We argue that an
individual’s demand for education depends indirectly on institutional features, as the
quality of property rights protection, the risk of expropriation, etc. When property
rights are weakly enforced, returns on investments are low, and firms tend to acquire
less new capital and technologies. Therefore, if factors of production are comple-
ments, employees prefer to invest less in the acquisition of human capital, as the level
over 70 countries and economies have participated in PISA”, http://www.oecd.org/pisa/
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of a corresponding complementary factor remains low. Thus, if an economy is char-
acterized by poor protection of property rights, then higher education standards can be
demanded only if individuals have the opportunity to transfer their human capital to
another economy, where the level of technology is higher, and, as a result, the returns
on human capital are higher as well. We thus argue that to be successful in bringing
about faster growth, an educational reform should be accompanied by an institutional
reform, which improves the quality of property rights protection.
Our work thus builds on the literature emphasizing the importance of complemen-
tarity between production factors. Following Acemoglu (1994) and Redding (1996)
we argue that the investment into one factor of production affects the decision to invest
into another factor. Importantly, these papers pay limited attention to what can restrain
the accumulation of complementary factors. Our contribution lies in modelling the
role of corruption as a key obstacle to the investment into a complementary factor. Our
work is therefore also related to the broad literature which links corruption and the
quality of institutions to investments and growth. For instance, Mauro (1995) and Mo
(2001) provide quantitative estimates of the negative influence of corruption on growth
rates. Works by Clarke (2001) and Keefer and Knack (1997), which are closer to our
work, show that R&D expenditures increase when the rule of law improves, and the
risk of expropriation declines. Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) provide empirical
evidence on the complementarity of skills and the quality of economic institutions.
However, none of these papers provide a theoretical analysis of how imperfect institu-
tions and, in particular, a high level of corruption affect human capital accumulation.
To fill this gap we develop a model which describes how this complementarity
works. In our setting, identical firms combine technology and human capital to pro-
duce output. Following Redding (1996), we consider a non-overlapping generations
economy where output is shared between firms’ owners and employees. When a new
generation arrives, firms produce output and invest part of it into the acquisition of a
new technology. When young, the employees decide how to allocate their human cap-
ital stock, which they inherit from the previous generation, between production and
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investment in human capital. Education and investment in the new technology result,
respectively, in a larger human capital stock and a higher level of technology, which are
used to produce output when the generation becomes old. Firms and employee share
the same information, and thus the employees can perfectly foresee how much output
do the firms plan to invest in a new technology. When firms invest more into new tech-
nologies, employees also prefers to acquire more human capital, since the latter will
earn a higher return. In this benchmark version of the model, the economy starts by
imitating technologies from the leading frontier, and then converges to a steady-state,
where it substitutes imitation with innovation.
Empirical evidence, however, suggest that convergence did not take place in the
case of many developing countries (see, for instance, Acemoglu, 2008). In some in-
stances, developing economies grow at relatively low rates and end up in non-convergence
traps (see, for instance, Acemoglu at al, 2006). To incorporate this possibility, we add
imperfect institutions to the baseline model. Following Shleifer and Vishny (1993), we
introduce corruption in the economy and assume that firms need to share their prof-
its with bureaucrats.2 We show that corruption reduces firms’ incentives to invest in
a new technology, and this affects the economy’s ability to catch up with the lead-
ing technological frontier. As production factors are complements, employees reduce
their investments into human capital in response to a slower pace of technological ad-
vancement. Therefore, when an educational reform brings about new opportunities to
acquire human capital, it can occur that the level of demand for these opportunities
is low.3 To induce the employees to use these opportunities, the government should
encourage firms to invest more in the acquisition of new technologies.
To this end, the government can try to reduce the level of corruption by implement-
2Alternatively, we could introduce a manager to the model, assume that he steals a part of a typical
firm’s profit, and that the judiciary is too weak and corrupt to punish him. This argument has been
pursued, for instance, by Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1994), or
Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
3It can also occur that such a reform reform will result in acquiring more education, if, at the same
time, a typical employee can transfer her human capital to another economy where the level of technol-
ogy is higher, and therefore her skills are in demand. Thus, instead of increasing the stock of domestic
human capital, an educational reform might result in emigration of high-skilled individuals.
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ing an anti-corruption policy. We argue that tackling corruption might be a solution
to the problem of low investment in the acquisition of new technologies and human
capital. An effective anti-corruption campaign4 reduces the level of expenditures on
bribes, therefore increasing firms’ profits and inducing them to invest more in the ac-
quisition of new technologies. When the level of investment into a new technology
increases, employees acquire more human capital, and, as a result, an educational re-
form becomes more effective.
We thus emphasize that in the presence of corruption, an educational reform aim-
ing to expand supply of high-quality educational services and therefore to increase the
level of human capital in the economy can become less effective. As corruption re-
duces incentives to invest in the acquisition of new technologies, and as technology
and human capital are complementary factors of production, the demand for education
can decrease below the available level of supply. To avoid this potential imbalance be-
tween supply and demand for high-quality education, the government can intervene to
induce firms to invest more into new technologies. To this end, the government might
try to tackle corruption by introducing an anti-corruption campaign.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our
baseline growth model. In Section 3 we incorporate corruption into the model and
show how does it affect the effectiveness of an educational reform. In Section 4, we
discuss the effect of an anticorruption policy on the acquisition of new technologies
and human capital accumulation. Section 5 provides a summary.
3.1 The Model
In the following section we present our benchmark developing economy which invests
in the acquisition of new technology and accumulates human capital. So far, we con-
sider a low level of education supply as the only impediment to economic growth. To
4The literature which focuses on possible avenues of reducing the level of corruption is vast (see,
for instance, Reinikka and Svensson, 2005, or OECD, 2005), and therefore surveying it is beyond this
chapter’s scope.
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remove this barrier, the government introduces an educational reform. As a result, the
level of human capital increases, as well as the rates of economic growth.
3.1.1 Production
In this section, we present our baseline growth model which builds upon Redding
(1996). We consider a non-overlapping generations economy,5 where each generation
lives for two periods, j = 1, 2. In period 1 a new generation is born, produces output
and makes investment decisions. In period 2 the same generation produces output once
again and passes away.
Each generation is made up of M employees working at N identical firms, and
N individuals, each owning one firm6. Every firm combines technology and human
capital to produce the final output. In each period j = 1, 2, a typical firm produces the
following level of output:
Yt,j = A
θ
t,j (ht,jmt)
1−θ (3.1)
where t represents a particular generation, Yt,j corresponds to the level of output which
is produced in period j = 1, 2 by individuals belonging to generation t and employed at
the representative firm, At,j is the level of technology which is identical for every firm,
ht,j reflects the amount of human capital per employee, and mt denotes the number of
employees per firm, which is also the same for every firm,7 as well as for every period
5We use a non-overlapping generations framework, as we consider the evolution of two different
production factors, and it is of key importance for us to make sure that the levels of these factors
evolve synchronically. In the presence of a standard overlapping generations framework only the young
generation has incentives to accumulate a particular factor of production, while the old generation, by
contrast, prefers to consume instead of investing. Therefore, a standard overlapping generations model
does not fit with our goals.
Alternatively, we could use an overlapping generation framework where each generation lives for three
periods. However, the latter increases the number of overlapping cohorts, as well as the number of
production factors. As a 3-period model is too difficult to analyze, we use an alternative dynamic
framework where the economy is instead represented as a collection of non-overlapping two-period
optimization problems.
6In the baseline version of our model we could consider an alternative economy where a single
employee works for a single owner. However, as later in the chapter we show how restricted competition
can help solving the problem of low investment, we need to introduce more than one firm, and therefore
more than employee and one owners.
7As all the firms are identical and therefore are equally attractive for employees, the labor force is
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j = 1, 2.8
The entire generation t therefore produces as much output as follows:
Yt = N
2∑
j=1
Aθt,j (ht,jmt)
1−θ (3.2)
The representative owner provides his workers with technology At,j to produce
output, and receives a payoff which is as large as a share 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 of his firm’s
production level Yt,j , j = 1, 2.9 This sharing rule implies that both, the owner and the
employees, can be considered as stakeholders, and therefore they all benefit when their
firm produces a higher level of output.10
We assume that technology is transferred from the previous generation to the fol-
lowing one.11 The presence of this intergenerational spillover effect implies that in
uniformly distributed among the firms, which implies that mt = MN .
8All the variables belonging to equation (3.2) do not have a subscript indicating that they correspond
to a particular firm, as their values are identical for all N firms, and therefore there is no need to
emphasize any difference among the firms by introducing a subscript.
9The workers instead receive (1− β)Yt,j .
10β could be interpreted as an outcome of the Nash bargaining.
Moreover, this sharing rule also satisfies the conventional product sharing rule, where factors of
production are paid according to their marginal contributions.
To show that the latter is indeed the case, we first decompose a particular level of output Y , which is
produced using a Cobb-Douglas technology, into corresponding factor revenues:
Y = MPX1X1 +MPX2X2
where MPXn, n = 1, 2 reflects the marginal contribution of factor Xn, n = 1, 2.
We notice that the income share corresponding to factor X1 is equal to βX1 = MPX1X1Y , and
therefore we can rewrite Y as
Y = βX1Y + (1− βX1)Y
Scaling the level of production by a positive constant δ will result in a different level of output satisfying
the following decomposition:
δY =
MPX1δX1
δY
δY +
MPX2δX2
δY
δY
We notice that MPX1δX1δY =
MPX1X1
Y = βX1. It therefore follows that βX1 is a constant function of δ
and represents a particular output sharing rule.
11This intertemporal spillover effect can be interpreted as a bequest which the previous generation
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period 1, a firm belonging to generation t uses the following technology to produce
Yt,1:
At,1 = At−1,2 (3.3)
where At−1,2 is the level of technology which was used by generation t − 1 in period
2.
Following Lucas (1988) and Redding (1996) we assume that human capital is also
transferred from the preceding generation to the next one, and therefore a new genera-
tion t uses the following stock of human capital in period 1:
Ht,1 = (1− δ)Ht−1,2 (3.4)
where 0 < δ < 1 reflects the rate of intertemporal human capital depreciation.12 We
assume that all young members of generation t receive the same share in the aggregate
human capital stock (1 − δ)Ht−1,2, which is inherited from the previous generation
t − 1. We therefore indicate that the level of wealth is equally distributed among the
employees.13
3.1.2 Investment
In period 1 the representative owner chooses whether to retain the inherited technology
At,1 or to improve upon it. The owner can improve upon the old technology in the
following way:
At,2 = η (αt)A
L
t,1 + (1− η (αt))At,1 (3.5)
Equation (3.5) reflects a possibility of adoption from exogenously given frontier
leaves to its successors.
12We assume that δ is sufficiently small, and therefore when a typical employee belonging to gener-
ation t invests in the acquisition of additional human capital, her final level of human capital is larger
than the one of the representative employee from generation t− 1 in period j = 2.
13This assumption facilitates aggregation of the most important variables of our model. A different
assumption would complicate aggregation and therefore the whole analysis of the model would become
more difficult without adding any important results.
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technology. We therefore consider technology as a stock of knowledge, which can be
extended if a firm “buys” additional knowledge from the leading technological frontier.
To see that the latter is indeed the case, we can rewrite At,2 as the sum of the old
technology which is represented by At,1 and a particular share of the distance between
the old technology and the leading frontier η (αt)
(
ALt,1 − At,1
)
, where 0 ≤ η (αt) ≤
1, η′ (αt) > 0, η′′ (αt) < 0, η (0) = 0, ALt,1 corresponds to the state of the world
technological frontier in period 1, which evolves at an exogenously given rate g, and
0 ≤ αt ≤ 1 reflects the share of income which the representative firm invests into
a new technology. The level of technology in period j = 2, i.e. At,2, can thus be
represented as At,2 = At,1 + η (αt)
(
ALt,1 − At,1
)
, which, after minor manipulations,
transforms into equation (3.5).
Even though in the presence of technological adoption the level of domestic tech-
nology At,1 can approach the leading frontier, it, however, can not converge to the
world frontier entirely. Instead, the level of domestic technology always remains be-
low the frontier technology level.14 To allow for convergence, we assume that the
economy substitutes imitation with innovation as soon as the level of At,1 becomes
sufficiently high.15 Before the level of technology reaches this particular threshold,
firms prefer to invest into technological adoption, but as soon as firms reach this level
of technology, they substitute imitation with innovation. This assumption is in line
with the literature on technological progress and productivity growth. For instance,
14To show that the latter is indeed the case, we use the steady-state version of the adoption equation
(3.5), which implies that as long as imitation of foreign technologies remains the only source of tech-
nological evolution, the level of domestic technology grows at the same rate as the leading frontier, i.e.
at a rate g (we will prove this result shortly):
At,1(1 + g) = η (α)A
L
t + (1− η (α))At,1
where α is the steady-state level of αt.
After rearranging, this equation transforms into the following expression:
At,1 =
η (α)ALt
g + η (α)
which, as η(α)g+η(α) < 1, and as long as g > 0, implies that At,1 < A
L
t .
15Starting from a particular instant, innovation should therefore lead to a faster pace of technological
evolution compared to immitation. We remind that, as a result of the adoption, the steady-state level of
technology evolves at the rate g, corresponding to the growth rate of the frontier technology.
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Acemoglu et al, (2006) argue that at the earlier stages of development an economy
benefits more from the state of the world technology, while at a higher stage of tech-
nological maturity, when the economy is close to the world technological frontier,
innovations instead become comparatively more important. Equation (3.6) shows how
the level of technology At,1 which was inherited from the previous generation t − 1
can be improved when the representative firm innovates:
At,2 = µλ (αt)At,1 + (1− µ)At,1 (3.6)
From equation (3.6) it follows that innovations come with a constant success proba-
bility µ, and a new innovation increases the level of technologyAt,1by a factor λ (αt) ≥
1, which is characterized by the following properties: λ′ (αt) > 0, λ′′ (αt) < 0,
λ (0) = 1. With probability 1 − µ the level of technology remains instead constant.
Therefore, the right-hand side of equation (3.6) corresponds to the expected level of
technology in period 2. The owner substitutes imitation with innovation when the
following inequality holds:
µ ≥ g
λ(θ, µ)− 1 (3.7)
It therefore follows that inequality (3.7)16 holds if the success probability µ is large
enough, and g, representing the growth rate of the frontier technology, is instead suffi-
ciently small.
Finally, there is a storage technology which pays a return r = 0 in period 2 if
the representative owner invests a part of his income in this technology in period 1.17
16As in the case of immitation the steady-state level of technology grows at the rate g, we therefore
can rewrite equation (3.5) as follows:
At,2 = (1 + g)At,1 (3.8)
We notice that for innovations to be more productive than immitations, the following inequality
should hold:
At,2 = µλ (αt)At,1 + (1− µ)At,1 ≥ (1 + g)At,1 (3.9)
After minor manipulations, we arrive at inequality (3.7).
17We incorporate the storage asset into the model to capture a possibility of a non-convergence trap,
which emerges when the local technology does not converge to the world technological frontier.
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A firm uses this alternative asset if investing into productive technology provides a
negative payoff. In the latter case, the owner substitutes investing into a new technol-
ogy with acquiring the storage asset, and therefore the economy stays with the same
technology until the payoff from investing into a new technology becomes positive.
3.1.3 Equilibrium
In period j = 1 the representative firm invests αtβYt,1 into a new technology, and the
returns are realized in period 2. The representative owner thus receives (1− αt) βYt,1
in period 1 and βYt,2 in the following period 2. We remind that the level of output in
periods j = 1, 2 is as large as Yt,j = Aθt,j (ht,jmt)
1−θ, and therefore the owner’s payoff
function can be written as follows:
Wo = (1− αt) βAθt,1 (ht,1mt)1−θ + βAθt,2 (ht,2mt)1−θ (3.10)
Employees instead receive as much as (1− β)Yt,1 in period 1 and (1− β)Yt,2 in
the following period 2. In period 1 they can also invest a fraction ϕt of their human
capital endowment ht,1 to increase their human capital stock. For simplicity, we as-
sume that human capital is created according to a one-to-one technology, and therefore
in period 2 an employee receives (1 + ϕt)ht,1 if she invests ϕtht,1 in period 1.18
As we added a possibility of human capital accumulation to the model, we change
the owner’s payoff functions (3.10) into the following expression:
Wo = (1− αt) βAθt,1 (ht,1 (1− ϕt)mt)1−θ + βAθt,2 (ht,1 (1 + ϕt)mt)1−θ (3.11)
At the beginning of period 1, firms decide how much to invest in the acquisition
of new technologies, whereas employees decide how much human capital to acquire.
When the level of technology is far from the leading frontier, the owner adopts new
18A different assumption would cost us algebraic and geometric convenience, including explicit al-
gebraic solutions and their geometric representation, without producing any tangible benefits and addi-
tional insights.
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technologies from the world frontier and thus maximizes the payoff function (3.11) s.t.
equation (3.5), therefore choosing the optimal level of technological adoption. In this
case, the corresponding first order condition for the owner is given by the following
equation:
η′(α∗t ) =
1
θ
(
ALt,1
At,1
− 1
) (3.12)
From equation (3.12)19 it follows that when the economy adopts technologies from
the world technological frontier, the optimal share of income which the representative
firm invests into a new technology, i.e the optimal αt, is higher, the larger is the differ-
ence between the local technology and the leading frontier
ALt,1
At,1
, and the larger is the
measure of importance of technology for production θ.
We remind that as soon as the distance to the frontier technology reaches a particu-
lar threshold level, the representative firm substitutes imitation with innovation. When
the latter occurs, the owner maximizes equation (3.11) s.t. equation (3.6) to receive the
optimal value of αt. In the case of innovation, maximization results in the following
first order condition:
λ′ (α∗t ) =
1
θµ
(3.13)
From equation (3.13) one can notice that the optimal value of αt does not depend
on the distance to the world frontier
ALt,1
At,1
any longer and becomes instead a positive
function of the constant probability of success µ. The effect of θ, the measure of
importance of technology for production, on the optimal value of αt remains positive.
It therefore follows that α∗t is a constant, which implies that the level of domestic
technology increases at a constant rate, and thus the innovation stage corresponds to
the balanced growth path.
When the representative firm improves upon its technology, a typical employee
19See Appendix A for the detailed derivation of equations (3.16), (3.12) and (3.13).
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maximizes the following payoff function:
We = (1− β)Aθt,1 (ht,1 (1− ϕt)mt)1−θ + (1− β)Aθt,2 (ht,1 (1 + ϕt)mt)1−θ (3.14)
Differentiating equation (3.14) with respect to ϕt results in the following first order
condition:
1 + ϕ∗t
1− ϕ∗t
=
At,2
At,1
(3.15)
or, alternatively
ϕ∗t =
At,2 − At,1
At,2 + At,1
(3.16)
We notice that the right-hand side of equation (3.16)20 is less than one and becomes
smaller over time, since the difference between At,2 and At,1 decreases as long as the
representative firm invests into a new technology.21
From equation (3.12) it follows that in the case of adoption, the value of α∗t is larger
the further away the level of domestic technology At,1 is from the leading frontier ALt,1.
At the same time, from equation (3.5) we can conclude that a larger α∗t results in a
higher level of technology in period 2, i.e. in a higher At,2. According to equation
(3.16), a larger distance between the level of technology in period 2, i.e. At,2, and its
initial level At,1, results in a higher fraction of human capital ϕ∗t which is invested into
human capital accumulation. When firms innovate, from equation (3.13) it follows
that α∗t becomes a constant, and as a result ϕ
∗
t becomes a constant as well.
22 Finally,
20See Appendix A for the detailed derivation of equations (3.16), (3.12) and (3.13).
21We can use equation (3.16) to show that the latter is the case. After minor manipulations, we arrive
at the following result:
ϕ∗t = 1−
2At,1
At,2 +At,1
It follows that ϕ∗t is going to 0 as soon as At,2 is getting closer to At,1, and it is instead close to 1 when
At,2 is significantly larger than At,1.
22We can derive the latter result from equation (3.16):
ϕ∗t =
µ (λ (αt)− 1)
µ (λ (αt)− 1) + 2
It follows that ϕ∗t is a constant, as, according to equation (3.13), αt is also a constant.
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when firms do not invest into new technologies, i.e. when α∗t = 0, the level of technol-
ogy remains constant At,1 = At.2, and therefore from equation (3.16) we obtain that
ϕ(0) = 0.
We are now ready to summarize our findings in the following proposition:
Proposition 1.
1. The economy converges to a unique steady-state.
2. Furthermore, an increase in the relative distance to the leading technological
frontier
ALt,1
At,1
, an increase in the measure of importance of technology for produc-
tion θ, and an increase in the probability of successful innovation µ, all increase
incentives to invest into new technologies. In turn, a larger pace of technological
evolution induces employees to acquire more human capital.
Proof. We temporarily assume that adoption is the only source of technological progress
in the economy and we first establish uniqueness. To this end, we lag equation (3.5)
back to t− 1 and use equation (3.3) to show that At,1 is a function of α∗t−1, and there-
fore the more the previous generation t − 1 invested into a new technology, i.e. the
larger was the level of α∗t−1, the higher is the level of technology At,1 which was in-
herited by generation t from its predecessors. As a result of a larger At,1, the distance
between the level of domestic technology At,1 and the leading technological frontier
ALt,1 becomes lower. From equation (3.12) it follows that the distance to frontier
ALt,1
At,1
and the optimal share of income invested by the owner α∗t , are positively related, and
therefore as
ALt,1
At,1
decreases, α∗t becomes lower as well. As a result, the level of α
∗
t−1
exceeds α∗t . However, in the opposite case of sufficiently low level of α
∗
t−1,
23 the gap
between the level of domestic technology At,1and the leading frontier ALt,1 becomes
instead larger, and then, from equation (3.12) it follows that the value of α∗t becomes
larger as well. The latter result implies that α∗t becomes larger than α
∗
t−1. Finally, at a
23The level of α∗t−1 should be as low as to let the world frontier grow faster than the local technology.
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particular level of α∗t−1 the gap between the level of domestic technology At,1 and the
leading technological frontier ALt,1 remains constant, and, as a result, the level of α
∗
t
also remains constant, which implies that α∗t−1 = α
∗
t .
24
We can now characterize this steady-state. From the denominator of the right-
hand side of equation (3.12) it follows that the optimal share of income invested by
the owner α∗t remains a constant when the distance between the level of domestic
technology At,1 and the leading technological frontier ALt,1 does not change, which
occurs when the local technology grows as fast as does the leading frontier, i.e. at a
rate g.
Now, we add innovations to the economy. When the distance to the leading frontier
becomes sufficiently small, the economy substitutes imitation with innovation. When
firms innovate, they converge to the leading frontier ALt,1 at a rate which is defined by
µ and θ.25 As µ and θ are both constants, the steady-state level of α∗t is unique, which
implies that the steady-state level of ϕ is unique as well.
The proof of the second part of the proposition follows directly from equations (3.12),
(3.13) and (3.16).
We can also introduce the same argument graphically.
24We complete the proof of uniqueness and global stability of the steady-state in Appendix A.
25As we showed earlier, this rate should be larger than g, as otherwise the representative firm does
not have incentives to substitute adoption with innovation.
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Figure 1. Steady-state level of investment into technological evolution in the economy
without corruption.
To this end, we, first, compare the payoff from investing into a new technology and
the one from investing into the storage asset. These two payoffs are identical when the
following equation holds:
(1− ϕ(α∗t ))1−θ
[
1− α∗t +
1 + ϕ(α∗t )
1− ϕ(α∗t )
]
= 2 (3.17)
In Figure 1, the share α∗t is placed along the horizontal axis, whereas Rt, repre-
senting the payoff from investment, corresponds instead to the vertical one. The curve
which we call the adoption function represents the left-hand side of equation (3.17),
and reflects the payoff from adopting a technology from the world frontier. In Ap-
pendix A we show that the left-hand side of equation (3.17)26 is an increasing function
of α∗t . As we know from equation (3.12), the larger is the distance to the leading
26Which is equal to (1− ϕ(α∗t ))1−θ
[
1− α∗t + 1+ϕ(α
∗
t )
1−ϕ(α∗t )
]
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frontier
ALt,1
At,1
, the higher is the value of α∗t . Therefore, as the left-hand side of equa-
tion (3.17) increases when α∗t grows, it also increases when the distance to the leading
frontier
ALt,1
At,1
becomes larger. On the contrary, when the distance to the leading frontier
reduces, both, α∗t and (1− ϕ(α∗t ))1−θ
[
1− α∗t + 1+ϕ(α
∗
t )
1−ϕ(α∗t )
]
, become lower. Consider
a point on the adoption function which is close to the dashed line, as, for instance,
point A. The dashed line intersects the horizontal axis in α∗t = 1, corresponding to the
largest possible value of α∗t . Therefore, as point A is close to the dashed line, it reflects
a comparatively large value of α∗t , which, according to our discussion, corresponds to a
higher level of distance to the world technological frontier
ALt,1
At,1
. By contrast, a point on
the adoption function which is far away from the dashed line, as point B, corresponds
to a lower level of α∗t , which reflects a lower level of technological gap
ALt,1
At,1
.
When firms do not invest into new technologies, i.e. when α∗t = 0, the left-hand
side of equation (3.17) is equal to 2. The horizontal line, which reflects the payoff
from investing into the storage technology, also intersects the vertical axis in Rt = 2.
However, when α∗t > 0, the left-hand side of equation (3.17) is larger than 2, which
implies that as long as α∗t > 0. the payoff from investing into the storage asset is lower
than the payoff from acquiring a new technology. When the gap between the level of
domestic technology and the leading frontier is positive, i.e. when
ALt,1
At,1
is larger than 1,
the economy can imitate technologies from the leading frontier, and, as it follows from
equation (3.12), α∗t remains positive. Therefore, for α
∗
t > 0, the adoption function is
placed strictly above the horizontal line, representing the payoff from investing into
the storage technology.
When α∗t becomes equal to α
∗, the economy substitutes imitation with innovation
and transits to the balanced growth path. The vertical line, which we call the innovation
function, intersects the adoption function in the point corresponding to the steady-state
value α∗, which is obtained from equation (3.13). From equation (3.13) it also follows
that α∗ is positive when both θ and µ are positive, and, as the left-hand side of equation
(3.17) is larger than 2 when α∗t = α
∗ > 0, it therefore follows that investing into
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innovations also result in a larger payoff level than acquiring the storage asset.
3.1.4 Education in the Economy without Corruption
In the previous subsection we focused on the behavior of α∗t , the optimal share of
income which the owner invests into a new technology. To see how an educational
reform can result in a higher level of human capital and faster economic growth, we
need instead to consider the behavior of ϕ(α∗t ), the optimal fraction of human capital
endowment which is invested in human capital accumulation.
We notice that, as long as firms imitate technologies from the leading frontier,
ϕ(α∗t ) is a concave function of α
∗
t
27 and it becomes instead a constant when firms
innovate. We call ϕ(α∗t ) the dynamic demand function, as it reflects the level of
education demanded by each generation of employees.
Figure 2. Educational reform in the economy without corruption.
27This result follows from the following two derivatives:
∂ϕ(α∗t )
∂α∗t
=
2A2t,1
θ (At,2(α∗t ) +At,1)
2 > 0
∂2ϕ(α∗t )
∂ (α∗t )
2 = −4
A3t,1
θ2 (At,2(α∗t ) +At,1)
3 < 0
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In Figure 2, the dynamic demand function corresponds to the curve as long as the
economy adopts technologies from the leading frontier. The curve is therefore denoted
as ”dynamic demand function, adoption stage”. However, after the economy substi-
tutes imitation with innovation, the level of α∗t becomes a constant and so does ϕ(α
∗
t ).
Therefore, when the economy innovates, the dynamic demand function transforms in-
stead into a horizontal line, which is called ”dynamic demand function, innovation
stage”.
We start considering the behavior of ϕ(α∗t ) from the adoption stage. As it follows
from equation (3.12), when the distance to the frontier technology
ALt,1
At,1
is comparatively
large, the value of α∗t is high as well. At the same time, from equation (3.16) we
conclude that a large α∗t results in a high level of ϕ(α
∗
t ). The latter is comparatively
close to ϕ(α∗t ) = 1, corresponding to the largest possible value for ϕ(α
∗
t ), which is
depicted in Figure 2 as a dashed line. Therefore, a point on the curve which is close
to the dashed line, as point C, reflects a high value of α∗t and mirrors a large level of
technological backwardness
ALt,1
At,1
. On the contrary, a point belonging to a section of the
”dynamic demand function, adoption stage”, which is relatively far from the dashed
line, as, for instance, point B, corresponds to a smaller value of α∗t and thus to a lower
distance to the frontier technology
ALt,1
At,1
.
When the economy substitutes imitation with innovation, the optimal share of in-
come α∗t which the owner invests into a new technology becomes a constant α
∗, and
therefore the corresponding value of ϕ(α∗), which can be obtained from equation
(3.16), transforms into a constant as well. As a result, the dynamic demand func-
tion becomes a horizontal line, which implies that every subsequent generation invests
the same share of its human capital stock in the acquisition of new human capital.
We now consider how a reform of educational system can result in a higher level of
equilibrium ϕ(α∗t ), the optimal fraction of human capital endowment which is invested
in education. We notice that point B, belonging to the ”dynamic demand function,
adoption stage” curve, represents the level of demand for education of a particular
generation t. Assume that the level of supply of education corresponds instead to
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point A, which is located strictly below point B. The latter implies that for a particular
generation t, the available level of supply ϕAt is lower than the demanded level of
education, corresponding instead to ϕBt . In this case, if the government intervenes and
introduces an educational reform which increases the supply of education ϕAt from
point A to point B, the human capital stock in the economy, and, as a result, the rate of
economic growth, become larger.28
We are ready to formulate our next result:
Proposition 2. As long as the economy is free of corruption, and if the level of demand
for education is above the available supply, an educational reform results in a larger
human capital stock.
Proof. We, first, notice that the actual level of investment in the acquisition of addi-
tional human capital is defined from the following expression:
ϕt = min
{
ϕS,1t , ϕ
D
t
}
(3.18)
ϕS,1t corresponds to exogenously given level of supply of education, while ϕDt =
ϕ(α∗t ), where ϕ(α
∗
t ) is defined in equation (3.16), reflects instead the level of demand
for education and belongs to the dynamic demand function. If the level of supply is
lower than the level of education demanded by the employees, i.e. if ϕS,1t < ϕDt , then
the actual level of investment in human capital is equal to ϕS,1t = min
{
ϕS,1t , ϕ
D
t
}
.
An educational reform which increases the level of supply from ϕS,1t to ϕ
S,2
t = ϕ
D
t
28This kind of reform is relevant for developing countries, which typically have less developed edu-
cation systems. A particular developing economy can, for instance, suffer from poorly trained teaching
staff, a limited number of universities and schools, etc.
Many papers argue that the quantity of education, measured in terms of the average years of schooling
(see, for instance, Hanushek and Woessmann, 2007), or adult literacy rate (see Durlauf and Johnson,
1995) have positive effect on economic growth. Other papers, as, for instance, Hanushek and Kimko
(2000) and Hanushek and Kim (1995), report instead a strong and robust influence of the quality of
education on economic growth. Thus, if an economy is characterized by a low level of human capital,
growth can be accelerated if the most limiting constraints on education capacities can be removed.
In this case, an educational reform, comprising technical and financial assistance aiming to improve
education standards, can be promising.
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therefore results in a larger level of investment in the acquisition of human capital
ϕS,2t = ϕ
D
t = min
{
ϕS,2t , ϕ
D
t
}
, as ϕS,2t = ϕDt > ϕ
S,1
t . As a consequence, the level of
human capital in the economy becomes larger.
Therefore, in our benchmark model an educational reform which is introduced
in the presence of limited supply of education, can result in a higher level of human
capital. However, as we will see in the following section, this result does not necessary
hold in the presence of corruption.
3.2 Corruption
In this section, we introduce corruption into the model by assuming that the owners are
required to pay a share of their income in order to receive a license, a permit, etc.29 We
consider an extreme case of corruption, where a bureaucrat completely avoids prose-
cution if he subtracts a part of the owner’s income, and therefore can not be punished by
the owner. We assume that the diverted income is not invested into a new technology,
as it is instead pocketed by the bureaucrat. We show that the presence of corruption
reduces firms’ incentives to invest into new technologies. As a low level of investment
in the acquisition of new technologies reduces the pace of technological evolution, the
economy has less chances to approach the world technological frontier and to reach the
innovation stage. Instead, it is more likely to end up in a non-convergence trap.30 As
a consequence, investments into human capital also decrease, and thus an educational
reform which enhances educational opportunities might be ineffective.
29Our assumption about the presence of corruption in a developing economy corresponds to a broad
literature, as, for instance, Mauro (1995), Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and Svensson (2005).
30Alternatively, we could consider the case of income diversion within the representative firm.
Even though owners transfer the right to run a firm to managers, the latter, however, might pursue
diffarent interests. As property rights are comparatively weakly protected in developing and transitional
economies, powerful managers are able to follow their own interests therefore reducing shareholders’
benefits (see, for instance Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1994), or
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), and Black (1998)).
In our setting, managers would be thus able to expropriate a part of the owners’ income therefore
reducing frims’ incentives to invest into new technologies.
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3.2.1 The Model with Corruption
Assume now that a part of the representative owner’s income can be stolen at no cost.
The latter, however, occurs only if the owner runs an investment project. In other
words, if the representative firm does not adopt technologies or innovate, then income
can not be taken away. A state official can subtract a share 0 < γ < 1 of the owner’s
income, and, as a consequence, the owner receives the remaining share 1− γ.
Therefore, by contrast to the previous section, where the owner’s payoff function
corresponded to equation (3.14), in the presence of corruption the owner receives a
lower income, which is reflected in the following expression:
Wo = (1− γ)
[
(1− αt) βAθt,1 (ht,1mt)1−θ + βAθt,2 (ht,2mt)1−θ
]
(3.19)
Before he starts a new project, the owner needs to make sure that the project provides
a higher payoff than investing in the storage technology, and the latter is the case if and
only if the following inequality holds (see Appendix B for more details):
1− γ ≥ 2
(1− ϕ(α∗t ))1−θ
[
1− α∗t + 1+ϕ(α
∗
t )
1−ϕ(α∗t )
] (3.20)
We notice that in the previous section, where we considered the case without cor-
ruption, γ was equal to 0. In the presence of corruption, γ is instead positive and, as a
result, the left-hand side of condition (3.20) is smaller than 1. At the same time, in the
previous section we showed that the denominator of the right-hand side of inequality
(3.20), which is identical to the left-hand side of equation (3.17), is converging to its
lowest value, which is 2, if α∗t is approaching 0. Therefore, if the latter is the case, the
value of the entire right-hand side of inequality (3.20) is close to its maximum value,
which is 1. Thus, for comparatively high values of γ and low values of α∗t , condition
(3.20) does not hold, as in this case its left-hand side is substantially lower than 1,
while its right-hand side is instead close to one. The latter implies that in the presence
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of corruption the owner is less willing to invest into a new technology.
We assume that a bureaucrat chooses the level of γ exogenously, and the owner
invests into a new technology as long as inequality (3.20) holds. The lowest level of
α∗t satisfying inequality (3.20) is the one which also satisfies equation (3.21):
γ = 1− 2
(1− ϕ(α̂∗))1−θ
[
1− α̂∗ + 1+ϕ(α̂∗)
1−ϕ(α̂∗)
] (3.21)
where α̂∗ reflects the value of α∗t at which the payoff levels from investing into a
new technology and acquiring the storage asset are identical. We notice that in the
benchmark version of our model both γ and α̂∗ were equal to zero.
If we return back to Figure 1, we can observe that the vertical distance between a
point on the adoption function and the payoff from the storage technology, represented
as the horizontal line, is higher, the larger is the value of α∗t . Therefore, after a bureau-
crat subtracts a share γ from the owner’s income, as long as α∗t remains comparatively
large, the owner’s income from investing into a new technology is still larger than his
payoff from acquiring the storage asset. However, when α∗t becomes smaller, the dif-
ference between these two payoffs decreases and it becomes zero when α∗t reduces to
α̂∗ > 0. As α̂∗ > 0 results in a positive level of investment into a new technology, the
distance to the leading frontier
ALt,1
At,1
reduces, and for the next generation it occurs that,
according to equation (3.12), the value of α∗t becomes lower than α̂
∗, which implies
that condition (3.20) does not hold any longer.31 As a result, the owner starts investing
into the storage asset instead of investing into a new technology. He will reverse his
decision and will invest into new technologies again when the gap between the payoff
from investment into a new technology and the one from investing into a storage asset
becomes positive again. For the latter to occur, the level of α∗t should increase, which,
according to equation (3.12), is a consequence of a larger value of
ALt,1
At,1
, the measure of
technological backwardness.
We consider the latter argument once again in more detail. Assume that a gen-
31This is because α̂∗ corresponds to the lowest value of α∗t for which inequality (3.20) holds.
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eration t invests α∗t = α̂
∗ into a new technology, and therefore α∗t satisfies equation
(3.21), which implies that the actual level of investment in the acquisition of new tech-
nologies will be positive. As we know from Proposition 1, for the next generation t+1
the optimal share will be equal to α∗t+1, which is lower than α̂
∗. This is because the
economy is converging to the world technological frontier, and from equation (3.12)
it follows that for generation t + 1 investing α∗t+1 = α̂
∗ is not any longer optimal.
However, if, at the same time, the value of γ does not decline, and instead remains
constant, then α∗t+1 does not satisfy inequality (3.20), as it is lower than α̂
∗, which is
the lowest value satisfying this inequality. In this case, given the optimal αt+1 = α
∗
t+1,
which is defined from (3.12), and the level γ, the payoff from investing into the stor-
age asset becomes larger than the payoff from investing into a new technology, which
implies that the representative owner will not invest into technological adoption, and
therefore the actual value of αt+1 will be equal to zero. At the same time, as the level
of the leading technology instead increases at a rate g, the distance between the local
technology and the world frontier will thus become larger. If, for generation t + 2,
the distance to the leading frontier
ALt+2,1
At+2,1
becomes sufficiently large, the optimal value
of αt+2 will satisfy inequality (3.20) and therefore the owner will start investing into
a new technology again. However, investing into a new technology will result in a
lower distance to the technological frontier
ALt+3,1
At+3,1
, and therefore will lead to a lower
level of α∗t+3, which might, potentially, not satisfy inequality (3.20). The latter will
again reduce the payoff from investing into a new technology below the payoff from
investing into the storage asset, and so on. From this discussion, it follows that in the
presence of corruption, the economy does not converge to the technological frontier.
Instead, the distance to the leading technology, on average, remains constant, which
implies that in general the level of domestic technology and the world technological
frontier grow at the same rate g. We label the latter result as the ”non-convergence
trap”. As the economy does not approach the leading frontier, it therefore does not
substitute imitation with innovation.
From equation (3.21) it follows that a larger share of income γ, which a bureaucrat
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subtracts from the owner’s income, results in a higher threshold fraction of income
α̂∗ which the owner invests in the acquisition of new technologies. At the same time,
according to equation (3.12), a higher α̂∗ corresponds to a larger distance to the leading
frontier
ALt,1
At,1
. If the distance to technological frontier can be considered as a measure
of development, then, as a larger γ results in a higher value of
ALt,1
At,1
, it thus follows that
a higher γ implies a larger technological backwardness, and therefore a lower level
of development. We summarize the detrimental effect of corruption on technological
evolution in the following expression:
ALt,1
At,1
= f (γ) (3.22)
Equation (3.22) implies that as long as the level of corruption γ does not change,
the technological gap
ALt,1
At,1
remains constant. We can also rewrite equation (3.22) as
follows:
zγ =
ALt,1
At,1
= f (γ) (3.23)
where zγ reflects the level of technological backwardness as a function of the level
of corruption. Thus, when the level of corruption does not change, domestic technol-
ogy remains a constant fraction 1
zγ
of the leading technology level. We summarize our
finding in the following proposition:
Proposition 3. The higher is the share of income γ which a bureaucrat diverts from
the representative owner, the larger is the non-reducible gap which remains between
the local technology and the world technological frontier.
Proof. From equation (3.21) it follows that a larger is the share γ which a bureaucrat
diverts from the representative owner, the larger is a threshold optimal share of income
α̂∗ which the owner invests into a new technology. From equation (3.12) it, in turn,
follows that a larger α̂∗ corresponds to a higher distance to the world technological
frontier
ALt,1
At,1
.
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Therefore, we conclude that corruption can reduce the pace of technological evo-
lution. As a consequence, in the presence of corruption, the economy might get into
the non-convergence trap.
We illustrate these results in Figure 3:
Figure 3. A non-convergence set in the economy with corruption.
This picture is similar to Figure 1, but there is one important difference: the pres-
ence of corruption shifts the adoption function down. On the contrary to the case
without corruption, the set of optimal values α∗t for which the storage asset provides a
higher payoff than investing into a new technology is not empty any longer. In Figure
3, we can see a set of values 0 ≤ α∗t ≤ α̂∗ (represented as a bold section of the hor-
izontal axis) for which the horizontal line, reflecting the payoff from storage asset, is
located strictly above the adoption function, corresponding instead to the payoff from
investing into a new technology. Whenever α∗t belongs to this set, which we call the
non-convergence set, a firm prefers to retain the old technology rather than to acquire
a new one. Thus, if the level of α∗, corresponding to the share of income which the
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owner starts investing into technological evolution as soon as the economy reaches the
innovation stage, belongs to this set, the economy can not substitute imitation with
innovation. In Figure 3, α∗ corresponds to the intersection between the vertical line,
representing the innovation stage, and the adoption function. α∗ thus reflects the stage
of technological maturity at which the economy substitutes imitation with innovation,
and in this particular example it belongs to the non-convergence set, which implies
that no transition from adoption to innovation will occur in this economy. Instead, the
economy will attain the level α∗t = α̂
∗ corresponding to the intersection between the
adoption function and the horizontal line, representing the payoff from investing into
the storage asset, and its technology will evolve at a pace g, reflecting the growth rate
of the world technological frontier.
3.2.2 Education in the Economy with Corruption
As a higher level of corruption results in slower technological evolution, it should also
reduce the rate of human capital accumulation. From equation (3.16) it follows that
the optimal fraction of human capital endowment which is invested in the acquisition
of human capital ϕ∗t is equal to zero whenever αt = 0. Therefore, the employees
do not acquire human capital when the representative owner does not invest in a new
technology. In the previous subsection we showed that in the presence of corruption,
the economy might end up in the non-convergence trap, where it grows as fast as does
the world technological frontier, i.e. at the rate g, which is lower than the economy’s
potential growth rate. From equation (3.16) it follows that if the average growth rate of
technology At,1 is as large as g, then the level of investment in human capital becomes
a constant and equals to ϕ∗t =
g
2+g
, which is also below its potential. It therefore
follows that individuals acquire less human capital when the level of investment into
adoption reduces as a result of corruption.
We can now show why the presence of corruption might reduce the effectiveness
of educational reform. Again, we explain our argument graphically.
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Figure 4. Educational reform in the economy with corruption
In Figure 4, as long as α∗t ≥ α̂∗, the dynamic demand function is represented by
the same curve as in Figure 2. When α∗t becomes lower than α̂
∗, the representative
owner starts investing into the storage technology, as any α∗t which is less than α̂
∗
does not satisfy inequality (3.20). As we showed in the previous subsection, the level
of domestic technology increases, on average, at a rate g if the economy ends up in
the non-convergence trap. The latter implies that the level of aggregate human capital
stock Ht also grows at a constant rate which is determined by g. Therefore, after
the economy reaches α∗t = α̂
∗, the dynamic demand function becomes a constant
ϕ(g) represented as point C on the dashed line which we denote as ”dynamic demand
function, non-convergence trap”.
We notice that the level of ϕ(g) is lower than the value of ϕ(α∗t ) = ϕ(α
∗) cor-
responding to the ”dynamic demand function, innovation stage”, depicted as the hor-
izontal line which is located above the ”dynamic demand function, non-convergence
trap” dashed line. We remind that the ”dynamic demand function, innovation stage”
line reflects the level of demand for the acquisition of human capital when the economy
reaches the innovation stage. That ϕ(g) is less than ϕ(α∗) follows from our assumption
regarding the innovation stage. There, the level of domestic technology increases at a
3.2 Corruption 87
rate which is higher than g, representing the growth rate of the leading technological
frontier.32 Therefore, from equation (3.16) it follows that ϕ(g) < ϕ(α∗).
Consider point C corresponding to α∗t on the horizontal axis, which is lower than
α̂∗, the lowest value of α∗t satisfying inequality (3.20). As soon as the economy reaches
α̂∗, it transits from the ”dynamic demand function, adoption stage” curve to point C,
which is a part of the ”dynamic demand function, non-convergence trap” line. On one
hand, as α∗t < α̂
∗ does not satisfy inequality (3.20), at α∗t , the owner acquires the stor-
age asset instead of investing in a new technology. However, on the other hand, α∗t also
reflects the average share of income αt which the representative owner invests in the
acquisition of new technologies as long as the economy stays in the non-convergence
trap. As we showed in the previous subsection, in the presence of corruption the ac-
tual level of αt varies from zero, when α∗t is too low to satisfy inequality (3.20), to
αt = α
∗
t > 0, when, as a result of a higher distance to the leading frontier
ALt,1
At,1
, the
optimal value of αt, which is defined in equation (3.12), becomes larger, and thus sat-
isfies inequality (3.20). On average, the level of technology evolves at the rate g, which
determines the level of α∗t . As the pace of technological advancement is as large as
the one of the world technological frontier, it thus follows that the distance between
the local technology and the leading frontier remains unaltered. Therefore, accord-
ing to equation (3.16), the aggregate human capital stock Ht also grows at a constant
rate, corresponding to the dashed line, which we call ”dynamic demand function, non-
convergence trap” , i.e. to ϕ(g).
Assume that the government plans to implement a reform to improve the level of
education in the economy, and the authority believes that the economy will continue
converging to the leading frontier. The latter implies that the government believes that
the dynamic demand function is continuous, as in Figure 2, and therefore the level of
demand corresponds to point B. As in our benchmark model, we again assume that
the available supply of educational services corresponds to point A. The actual level
of demand for education is, however, represented by point C. Therefore, the level of
32As in the opposite case the economy will not be able to converge to the leading frontier.
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demand for education is lower than the level of supply and thus an educational reform
which increases the level of supply to point B, does not result in a higher human capital
stock.
We are ready to formulate our key result:
Proposition 4.
1. In the presence of corruption, the level of demand for education reduces as a
consequence of a lower level of investment in new technologies.
2. Therefore, an educational reform which aims to increase the level of supply of
education in order to accumulate a larger human capital stock, might fail to
increase the equilibrium level of human capital.
Proof. The first part of Proposition 4 follows directly from equation (3.16).
As for the second part, we, first, notice that, as in the previous section, the actual
level of investment in the acquisition of additional human capital is defined from the
following equation:
ϕt = min
{
ϕS,1t , ϕ
D
t
}
(3.24)
where ϕS,1t corresponds to the initial level of supply of education, and ϕDt = ϕ(α
∗
t ),
where ϕ(α∗t ) is determined in equation (3.16), reflects, by contrast, the level of de-
mand for education. If the latter corresponds to the ”dynamic demand function, adop-
tion stage” curve, then, as we showed in the proof for Proposition 2, an educational
reform is effective. If, however, the dynamic demand function is instead represented
by ”dynamic demand function, non-convergence trap” line, then the level of educa-
tion which is demanded by the employees might be lower than the initial level of
supply, i.e. ϕDt < ϕ
S,1
t . In the latter case, the actual level of investment in the acqui-
sition of human capital is equal to ϕDt = min
{
ϕS,1t , ϕ
D
t
}
, and thus an educational
reform which increases the level of supply from ϕS,1t to ϕ
S,2
t , where ϕ
S,2
t > ϕ
S,1
t ,
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does not result in a larger level of investment in the acquisition of human capital, as
ϕt = min
{
ϕS,2t , ϕ
D
t
}
= ϕDt .
We therefore conclude that corruption might result in a low level of demand for
education, and, as a consequence, the effect of educational reform can be limited.33
As we show in the following section, an educational reform, however, has a stronger
potential to be successful if it is carried out together with an anti-corruption campaign.
The latter reduces the level of γ, which shifts the adoption function in Figure 3 upward.
As a consequence, the non-convergence set becomes smaller and therefore domestic
technology has higher opportunity to converge to the world technological frontier. As
a result, the employees invest a higher level of ϕt in the acquisition of human capital,
and thus an educational reform becomes potentially more effective.
3.3 Dealing with low Level of Investment
As we showed in the previous section, corruption can result in a lower level of invest-
ment in the acquisition of new technologies. The latter weakens incentives to acquire
human capital, and, as a result, an educational reform which aims to accumulate more
human capital, might become ineffective. It thus follows that an educational reform
33Moreover, when individuals can transfer their human capital between two different economies, they
might end up migrating to the economy where the level of corruption is lower. To show that this result is
indeed the case, we consider two economies which have different levels of corruption, but are otherwise
identical. Generation t belonging to less corrupt economy A invests into a new technology and acquires
human capital, which implies that αAt > 0 and ϕ
A
t > 0. More corrupt economy B invests instead into
the storage asset, since corruption reduces the return to investment into a new technology.
Assume that individuals from economy B can freely transfer their human capital to country A, and vice
versa. In equilibrium, a typical employee should earn the same income in both countries, which implies
the following result:
mA
mB
=
1
1− ϕAt
(3.25)
where mj , is the number of employees who work at the representative firm in country j = A,B.
As 0 ≤ ϕAt ≤ 1, it follows that mA ≥ mB , which implies that the number of employees increases in
economy A, while in country B it instead becomes lower. Therefore, it can occur that those employees
who plan to transfer their human capital to economy A will benefit from the implementations of the
educational reform in country B, as they can acquire more human capital which can be later used in
economy A.
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becomes more successful, if it is preceded by a policy which encourages firms to in-
vest more in the acquisition of new technologies and therefore also induces individuals
to acquire a higher level of human capital. In this section, we will briefly review the
effect of an anti-corruption campaign which can be implemented to reduce the nega-
tive impact of corruption on the level of investment into a new technology and human
capital.
As an effective anti-corruption campaign reduces the level of γ, from equation
(3.21) it follows that the threshold fraction of income α̂∗, which the owner invests in
the acquisition of new technologies, also becomes lower. From equation (3.12) it fol-
lows that a lower level of α̂∗ corresponds to a lower gap between domestic technology
and the leading frontier
ALt,1
At,1
. Therefore, if γ becomes lower, the level of domestic
technology moves closer to the leading frontier. If the level of corruption becomes low
enough, the economy moves sufficiently close to the frontier technology to substitute
imitation with innovation. As a consequence of a higher level of investment into a new
technology, the level of demand for education increases, and therefore a reform which
expands the level of supply of education becomes more effective.
The literature on various methods of reducing the level of corruption is vast (see,
for instance, Reinikka and Svensson, 2005, or OECD, 2005.), and therefore we do
not survey this literature in our work. Instead, we emphasize that the effectiveness
of an anticorruption campaign might be limited. For instance, Persson, Rothstein and
Teorell (2012) argue that a lot of anti-corruption reforms in Africa were unsuccessful.
Bertucci and Armstrong, (2000) and Hanna at al (2011) survey possible reasons for
the failure of anticorruption campaigns.
As the effect of an anticorruption campaign can be limited, in Appendix C we
suggest an alternative solution to the problem of low investment. Even though this
solution does not reduce the level corruption, in particular cases, it might, nevertheless,
induce the economy to increase the level of investment into new technologies and
acquire more human capital. We show, however, that the alternative approach can
incur significant costs without producing, at the same time, any substantial result, and
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therefore it should be introduced with substantial cautiousness.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we consider a baseline economy where a typical firm combines tech-
nology and human capital to produce output. The representative firm also invests a part
of its income in the acquisition of new technologies: it starts from imitating technolo-
gies from the world technological frontier, and later, when the economy moves closer
to the frontier level of technology, it substitutes imitation with innovation. Employees
use their human capital stock to produce output and to acquire more human capital. As
technology and human capital are complementary factors of production, a larger pace
of technological evolution encourages the employees to allocate more human capital
to the acquisition of additional education.
We assume that the level of supply of education is low compared to the existing de-
mand, and therefore a reform enhancing the availability of educational services might
induce the economy to acquire a larger human capital stock.
As many developing economies suffer from the presence of imperfect institutions,
we incorporate corruption into our baseline model. We show that the latter reduces
firms’ incentives to invest in the acquisition of new technologies. As a result, employ-
ees adjust their investment into human capital by acquiring less education. Therefore,
an educational reform might become less effective, as an improvement in the education
system brought about by the reform can remain unused.
As a particular solutions to the problem of low investment, we consider a policy
which reduces the level of corruption, thus resulting in a faster pace of technological
evolution and human capital accumulation.
This model can be extended to show how an educational reform can lead to the
outflow of human capital. If the level of corruption in the economy remains high, indi-
viduals have incentives to transfer their human capital to a less corrupt country, where
the level of technology and therefore incomes are higher. Thus, those individuals who
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plan to transfer their human capital to a less corrupt economy will benefit from the im-
plementation of an educational reform in the source country, as there they can acquire
more human capital which they will later use in a more developed economy. The latter
result is similar to ”knowledge leaks” which are discussed in Easterly (2001). When
the level of knowledge in a particular society is on average high, individuals have high
incentives to invest into education. If instead the level of knowledge is low, individu-
als have little incentives to invest into human capital, or if they do so, they will likely
migrate from the economy in a ”brain drain”.
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3.5 Appendices
3.5.1 Appendix A
Derivation of equations (3.12), (3.13), (3.16). Each owner maximizes his income
by choosing the optimal share αt:
Wo = (1− αt) βAθt,1 (ht,1 (1− ϕt)mt)1−θ + βAθt,2 (ht,1 (1 + ϕt)mt)1−θ
Employees instead search for the optimal share of their human capital endowment
ϕt to maximize their labor income
We = (1− β)Aθt,1 (ht,1 (1− ϕt)mt)1−θ + (1− β)Aθt,2 (ht,1 (1 + ϕt)mt)1−θ
The respective FOCs are:
−βAθt,1 (ht,1 (1− ϕt)mt)1−θ + θβAθ−1t,2
∂At,2
∂αt
(ht,1 (1 + ϕt)mt)
1−θ = 0
(1− β) (1− θ)
[
Aθt,1 (ht,1 (1− ϕt)mt)−θ ht,1mt − Aθt,2 (ht,1 (1 + ϕt)mt)−θ ht,1mt
]
= 0
After rearranging, we receive the following result:
∂At,2
∂αt
=
At,1
θ
(3.26)
At,2
At,1
=
1 + ϕt
1− ϕt (3.27)
One can combine equation (3.5) and equation (3.26) to derive equations (3.12) and
(3.13). Equation (3.16) follows from equation (3.27).
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Dynamics of α∗t . We can rewrite equation (3.12) as follows:
η′(α∗t ) =
1
θ
(
ALt−1,1(1+g)
At−1,1+η(α∗t−1)(ALt,1−At−1,1)
− 1
) (3.28)
From equation (3.28) we notice that when the denominator of the following ex-
pression
ALt−1,1(1 + g)
At−1,1 + η(α∗t−1)
(
ALt−1,1 − At−1,1
)
increases more than its numerator as a result of investing the share of income α∗t−1, i.e.
when the domestic level of technology grows faster than g, the economy approaches
the leading technological frontier, and therefore the gap between the level of local
technology and the leading frontier, i.e.
ALt,1
At,1
, reduces. As
ALt,1
At,1
positively affects the
level of α∗t , this implies that α
∗
t reduces as well, and therefore α
∗
t < α
∗
t−1.
When, on the contrary, the denominator of
ALt−1,1(1 + g)
At−1,1 + η(α∗t−1)
(
ALt−1,1 − At−1,1
)
increases less than its the numerator, i.e. when the level of domestic technology grows
slower than the world frontier, then the distance to technological frontier increases,
which reverses the inequality, i.e. α∗t becomes larger than α
∗
t−1.
Finally, when the numerator of
ALt−1,1(1 + g)
At−1,1 + η(α∗t−1)
(
ALt−1,1 − At−1,1
)
increases as fast as does its denominator, i.e. at the rate g, the gap between the level
of local technology and the leading frontier remains constant, and therefore it follows
that α∗t = α
∗
t−1.
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Uniqueness of α∗t . We take a derivative of
α∗t+1
α∗t
with respect to α∗t :
∂
(
α∗t+1
α∗t
)
∂α∗t
=
∂α∗t+1
∂α∗t
α∗t − α∗t+1
(α∗t )
2 < 0
The latter inequality follows as ∂α
∗
t+1
∂α∗t
< 0, which we established in the previous
section of the current Appendix.
∂
(
α∗t+1
α∗t
)
∂α∗t
< 0 implies that α
∗
t+1
α∗t
decreases when the
value of α∗t increases. α
∗
t reaches its steady-state level when the following results hold:
α∗t+1
α∗t
= 1, ∂α
∗
t+1
∂α∗t
= 1, and therefore
∂
(
α∗t+1
α∗t
)
∂α∗t
= 0. As α
∗
t+1
α∗t
always decreases when α∗t
instead becomes larger, the steady-state is unique.
Global stability of the steady-state level of α∗t . We write down the first order condi-
tion for the representative firm which imitates technologies from the leading frontier:
η′(α∗t ) =
1
θ
(
ALt,1
At,1
− 1
) (3.29)
As η′(α∗t ) is monotonically decreasing in α
∗
t , we can rewrite equation (3.29) as
follows:
α∗t = (η
′)−1
 1
θ
(
ALt,1
At,1
− 1
)
 (3.30)
Since η(α∗t ) is concave, which implies that η
′′(α∗t ) < 0, the inverse of η
′(α∗t ),
which is (η′)−1, is also a decreasing function of its argument, i.e
(
(η′)−1
)′
< 0.
To prove global stability, we consider α∗t ∈ (α∗, α∗0), where α∗ is a steady-state
level of α∗t , and α
∗
0 is the level of initial share which is invested by generation t = 0.
We can use equation (3.30) to show that for all α∗t ∈ (α∗, α∗0)
α∗t+1 − α∗ = (η′)−1
 1
θ
(
ALt+1,1
At+1,1(α∗t )
− 1
)
− (η′)−1
 1
θ
(
ALt,1
At,1(α∗)
− 1
)
 =
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= −α∗tα∗
(
(η′)−1
)′
> 0 (3.31)
The latter inequality follows from
(
(η′)−1
)′
< 0. We therefore conclude that
α∗t+1 > α
∗.
As we showed that α
∗
t+1
α∗t
decreases when α∗t ∈ (α∗, α∗0), we can now derive the
following result:
α∗t+1
α∗t
− 1 < α
∗
α∗
− 1 = 0 (3.32)
Equation (3.31) together with equation (3.32) establish that for all α∗t ∈ (α∗, α∗0),
it follows that α∗t+1 ∈ (α∗, α∗t ). A similar argument can be used to show that for all
α∗t ∈ (α∗0, α∗), α∗t+1 ∈ (α∗t , α∗). Therefore, {α∗t}∞0 monotonically converges to α∗ and
is globally stable.
Adoption function is increasing in α∗t . To show that the following expression
Rt = (1− ϕ(α∗t ))1−θ
[
1− α∗t +
1 + ϕ(α∗t )
1− ϕ(α∗t )
]
is increasing with respect to α∗t , we first rewrite this equation as follows:
Rt =
(
At,2 + At,1
At,1
− α∗t
)(
2At,1
At,2 + At,1
)1−θ
and then differentiate the above expression with respect to α∗t :(
1
θ
− 1
)(
2At,1
At,2 + At,1
)1−θ
−
− (1− θ)
(
2At,1
At,2 + At,1
)−θ (
2At,1
At,2 + At,1
)
At,1
θ (At,2 + At,1)
(
At,2 + At,1
At,1
− α∗t
)
=
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=
(
1
θ
− 1
)(
2At,1
At,2 + At,1
)1−θ
α∗t
At,1
At,2 + At,1
> 0
which establishes the result
3.5.2 Appendix B
In the case of corruption, we consider the following inequality:
(1− γ)
[
(1− α∗t ) βAθt,1 (ht,1 (1− ϕ(α∗t ))mt)1−θ + βAθt,2 (ht,1 (1 + ϕ(α∗t ))mt)1−θ
]
≥
≥ βAθt,1 (ht,1mt)1−θ + βAθt,1 (ht,1mt)1−θ
which reduces to
(1− γ) (1− ϕ(α∗t ))1−θ
[
1− α∗t +
1 + ϕ(α∗t )t
1− ϕ(α∗t )
]
≥ 2
From this result inequality (3.20) follows immediately.
3.5.3 Appendix C
The cost of market concentration
A common solution to the problem of low investment is a subsidy, as it reduces the cost
of investment for a firm and thus increases the profitability of an investment project.
However, if the fiscal system is underdeveloped, which is likely to be the case for
many developing economies, an alternative solution is to restrict competition. For in-
stance, Aghion and Griffith (2008) argue that after WWII Mexico, Peru, Brazil, several
South-East Asian countries, Japan and a number of European economies introduced
restrictions on competition and favored the creation of domestic monopolies. Ace-
moglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006) also argue that to induce firms to increase the level
of investment, the government could impose restrictions on competition, and a similar
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argument was also put forward by Gerschenkron (1962). In this section we show how
restricted competition can help the economy to leave the non-convergence trap.34
We assume that the government introduces restrictions on competition to induce
firms to invest more in the acquisition of new technologies.35 As a result of restricted
competition, the number of firms reduces, while the number of workers employed at
the representative firm, becomes instead larger. In particular, we assume that a typical
firm becomesK times larger than before, and therefore the number of employees in the
representative firm increases fromm toKm. We also assume that larger restrictions on
competition translate in a higher value of K. Finally, we assume that the government
does not limit competition unconditionally: if firms do not invest into the acquisition
of new technologies in period j = 1, then the government does not limit competition
any longer. As a result, equation (3.21), which reflects the case when the owner is
indifferent between investing into a new technology or retaining the old one, can be
rewritten as follows:
γ = 1− 1 +
1
K1−θ[
1− α̂∗ + 1+ϕ(α̂∗)
1−ϕ(α̂∗)
]
(1− ϕ(α̂∗))1−θ
(3.33)
, where K > 1 represents the number of firms which were transformed into one large
firm as a result of a higher level of market concentration. For the derivation of equation
(3.33), see Appendix D.1.
We remind that α̂∗ reflects the value of α∗t at which the payoffs from investing into a
new technology and acquiring the storage technology are identical. As it follows from
equation (3.33), when α̂∗ is equal to 0, and when K > 1, indicating that competition
34One can pose the following question: why is the state interference a necessary way out? Why can’t
firms voluntarily merge to overcome the negative effect caused by corruption?
To answer this question, assume thatK firms merged and created one large firm withK shareholders.
We assume that whenever two (or more) small firms merge, the new big firm employs everyone from
the two (or more than two) smaller firms. It is easy to check that in this case equation (3.21) holds
again. Intuitively, if corruption affects the incentives of K different owners who own K comparatively
small firms, then it equaly affects the incentives of K shareholders who own one large firm. Then, if the
number of owners stays the same, a voluntary merger can not result in an improvement.
35To this end, the government can introduce higher licensing standards, nationalize firms, etc.
3.5 Appendices 99
is restricted, the level of γ, representing a share of the owner’s income taken by a
bureaucrat, is equal to
1− 1
K1−θ
2
> 0. The latter implies that if the level of corruption
γ does not exceed
1− 1
K1−θ
2
, then the representative firm is better off investing into a
new technology at any α∗t ≥ 0, and therefore corruption does not affect the level of
investment in the acquisition of a new technology. The latter was not the case for the
competitive economy with corruption, which was considered in Section 3. Intuitively,
a higher level of market concentration generates a higher level of income per firm, and.
as a result, the representative firm’s incentives to invest into the acquisition of new
technologies become larger even in the presence of corruption, whereas investment
into the storage technology becomes instead less attractive.
We are now ready to formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 5. If the government restricts competition, the representative owner in-
vests more in the acquisition of new technologies and, as a result, the distance to the
leading technological frontier reduces. Moreover, the government can introduce a
sufficiently large level of restrictions to induce the economy to move as close to the
leading technological frontier, as to be able to substitute imitation with innovation. As
a result of a higher market concentration, the level of investment into human capital
also becomes higher.
Proof. From equation (3.33) it follows that the value of α̂∗ corresponding to particular
γ becomes smaller compared to the level of α̂∗ which we obtained from equation
(3.21).36 According to equation (3.12), a lower level of α̂∗ corresponds, in turn, to
36To show that tht latter result is the case, we subtract equation (3.21) from equation (3.33), which
results in the following expression:
2
(1− ϕ(α̂∗1))1−θ
[
1− α̂∗1 + 1+ϕ(α̂
∗
1)
1−ϕ(α̂∗1)
] − 1 + 1K1−θ
(1− ϕ(α̂∗2))1−θ
[
1− α̂∗2 + 1+ϕ(α̂
∗
2)
1−ϕ(α̂∗2)
] = 0 (3.34)
where α̂∗1 corresponds to equation (3.21) and α̂
∗
2 instead corresponds to equation (3.33). The numerator
of the first term of the upper expression is larger than the numerator of its second term, as 2 > 1+ 1
K1−θ
wheneverK > 1. To satisfy equation (3.34), the denominator of the first term should therefore be larger
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a lower distance to technological frontier
ALt,1
At,1
, and therefore it follows that a higher
market concentration let the economy move closer to the leading frontier.
It is also possible to choose a sufficiently large level of K such that the economy
can move to the leading frontier close enough to substitute imitation with innovation.
To see this, suppose that the economy substitutes imitation with innovation when α∗t =
α∗. From equation (3.33) it follows that given a particular value of γ, we can choose
K such that α∗t = α
∗ will satisfy equation (3.33).
Let’s assume that the value of α∗ is, for instance, sufficiently low. As a consequence,
the denominator of the second term on the right-hand side of equation (3.33) is low
as well. As a result, the ratio on the right-hand side of equation (3.33) is large, and,
therefore, the entire right-hand side of equation (3.33) instead is low. If γ, reflecting
the level of corruption, is large, then equation (3.33) can not be satisfied, which implies
that the owner will prefer to retain the old technology, and not to invest into a new one.
The government, however, can restrict competition, i.e. it can choose a larger level of
K such that equation (3.33) is satisfied, as a higher K results in a higher level of the
right-hand side of equation (3.33). As a result of restricted competition, the owner will
therefore change his decision in favor of investment into a new technology.
We can illustrate the working of Proposition 3 in Figure 5:
than the denominator of the second term. As the value of (1− ϕ(α̂∗))1−θ
[
1− α̂∗ + 1+ϕ(α̂∗)1−ϕ(α̂∗)
]
is larger
when the level of α̂∗ is higher, it thus follows that α̂∗1 > α̂
∗
2.
3.5 Appendices 101
Figure 5. The steady-state level of investments in the economy with corruption and
limited competition.
As a larger firm generates higher income, after the firm pays the respective share
γ of this income to a bureaucrat, the remaining income is comparatively large, and,
as a result, the representative owner has higher incentives to invest in the acquisition
of new technologies. As investment into the storage technology becomes instead rel-
atively less attractive, the horizontal line Rt = 1 + 1K1−θ representing the payoff from
the storage technology is shifted down. Algebraically, instead of Rt = 2, as is on the
right-hand side of equation (3.33), now the payoff from the storage asset corresponds
toRt = 1+ 1K1−θ ,which is less than 2 wheneverK > 1. The latter results in a new inter-
section point between the horizontal line and the adoption function.. If we project this
new intersection point on the horizontal axis, we can see that the corresponding point
on the α∗t -axis, i.e. point α̂
∗, is located closer to zero than a similar point in the case
of free competition, reflected in Figure 3. The latter implies that the non-convergence
set, which is again depicted as a bold section of the horizontal axis, becomes smaller.
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A larger restriction on competition corresponding to a higher value of K, results
in a larger increase in the level of the representative firm’s incomes. The latter further
reduces the attractiveness of investing into the storage asset. Algebraically, a higher
level of K results in a smaller value ofRt = 1+ 1K1−θ , and graphically this corresponds
to a larger downward shift of the horizontal line which reflects the payoff from the
storage asset. Therefore, when K is high, owners tend to invest more into a new
technology, and therefore the economy moves closer to the frontier technology.
At the same time, we emphasize that the government should not choose K ar-
bitrarily, since, as we show in the following section, market concentration results in
significant costs for the economy. A larger value of K corresponding to a higher level
of restrictions results in a higher level of costs. Therefore, to minimize these costs,
the government should select a minimal level of K which induces firms to invest into
adoption as much, as to be able to reach the steady-state level of α∗t . The horizontal
line Rt = 1 + 1K1−θ therefore should intersect the adoption function exactly at point
α̂∗ = α∗, where the adoption function itself intersects with the vertical line reflecting
the innovation stage, and where the economy substitutes imitation with innovation, as
it is shown in Figure 5.
The cost of market concentration
To determine the level of costs resulting from a higher level of market concentration,
we need to compare the level of production under the limited competition regime with
the output level which is produced when competition is instead unrestricted. To elim-
inate the effect of corruption, we temporarily assume that the level of corruption is
zero, i.e. γ = 0.
In Appendix D.2 we show that the comparison between the output levels produced
in a less competitive and a more competitive economies reduces to comparison be-
tween 1 and Kθ, where K > 1. As the latter is larger than the former, it follows that
a less competitive economy produces a lower level of output, and therefore a larger K
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representing the level of market concentration, results in a lower level of production.
In the presence of corruption, however, restrictions on competition can benefit the
economy. To show this result, we compare the following two expressions:
Y Rt = (1− ϕ(α∗t ))1−θ
[
1− βα∗t +
1 + ϕ(α∗t )
1− ϕ(α∗t )
]
(3.35)
and
Y NRt = 2K
θ (3.36)
where Y Rt denotes the owner’s normalized payoff when competition is restricted,
and Y NRt denotes the owner’s normalized payoff in the absence of restrictions on com-
petition. For the derivation of equations (3.35) and (3.36), see Appendix D.2.
As soon as the government restricts competition, the level of output reduces as a
result of a higher level of market concentration. These costs, however, can be compen-
sated if in the less competitive economy firms invest into new technologies, and em-
ployees acquire additional human capital, i.e. when α∗t and therefore ϕ(α
∗
t ) are both
positive. Assume that two economies are identical but in country A the government
limits competition, and, as a result, the level of output declines, while in B competition
remains unrestricted. However, as more limited competition induces firms to acquire
new technologies, the level of technology in A evolves faster and moves closer to the
leading frontier. The latter also results in a faster accumulation of human capital. As
the level of technology increases and the stock of human capital becomes larger, the
level of output in A increases as well. On the contrary, in country B competition is
free, however, in the presence of corruption the local technology does not converge to
the leading frontier. Both, the level of human capital and the level of technology in
B increase slowly, and, as a result, B lags behind economy A considering the level of
technology and the stock of human capital. Therefore, starting from a particular point,
the level of production in A becomes larger than the level of output in B. The latter
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occurs as soon as the following expression holds:
(
AAt,1
ABt,1
)θ(
hAt,1
hBt,1
)1−θ
(1− ϕ(α∗t ))1−θ
[
1− βα∗t +
1 + ϕ(α∗t )
1− ϕ(α∗t )
]
≥ 2Kθ (3.37)
where AAt,1 and h
A
t,1, correspondingly, denote the level of technology and human
capital stock in less competitive A, and ABt,1and h
B
t reflect technology and human capi-
tal levels in country B, where environment is instead more competitive. For derivation
of inequality (3.37) see Appendix D.2.
One can notice that expression (3.37) contains a scalar
(
AAt,1
ABt,1
)θ (hAt,1
hBt,1
)1−θ
, which
is larger whenever a higher market concentration results in faster evolution of tech-
nology and human capital accumulation. As was showed in section 3, a competitive
economy can fail to reach the steady-state, as it does not converge to the world fron-
tier, and therefore it can stay in the adoption stage forever. At the same time, since
a less competitive economy has a higher potential to reach the innovation stage, its
technology develops faster.37 Thus, a less competitive economy reaches higher levels
of technological development and human capital than a more competitive one.
We therefore conclude that market concentration has an important limitation, as a
higher level of monopolization results in a lower level of production. This limitation
arises because as a policy, consolidation deals with negative effects of corruption, but
not with the level of corruption per se. It helps the economy move closer to the leading
technological frontier and acquire more human capital, but as it can not solve the
problem of corruption, the latter finds a different channel to produce a negative effect
on the economy. This is the key difference between market concentration and anti-
corruption campaign, as, to result in a higher level of investment, the latter does not
require to impose restrictions on competition, and therefore the level of output does
not become lower.
37This is because if it falls down into a non-convergence trap, a competitive economy grows as fast
as does the leading frontier, i.e. at a rate g. The latter, by assumption, is lower than the growth rate of
an innovating economy.
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We also emphasize another potential problem which might arise when the authority
restricts the level of competition in the economy. So far, we assumed that the share of
income which a bureaucrat diverts from the owner, i.e. γ, remains constant. However,
in response to a larger income which the representative firm receives under restricted
competition, a bureaucrat might increase the level of γ. In the latter case, a higher
market concentration will enrich the bureaucracy instead of a increasing the pace of
technological evolution and human capital accumulation. As a result, not only the level
of production will decline below its potential, but also the economy will not be able
to leave the non-convergence trap. Therefore, if the level of corruption increases, the
economy might end up being worse off as a result of restricted competition.
Finally, we show that the positive effect of restricted competition is stronger when
the difference between the level of α̂∗ corresponding to equation (3.21), and the level of
α∗, corresponding to the steady-state, is low. In this case, even though firms need addi-
tional incentives to move from point α̂∗ to the steady-state point, the level of required
additional incentives is low. Therefore, the government does not need to introduce
large restrictions on competition, which implies that the level of K is low, and, as a
result, the level of costs associated with a lower level of competition is low as well.
We can show this result graphically.
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Figure 6. The necessary level of restrictions on competition in two economies with
different levels of corruption.
Assume that two economies, A and B, have different levels of corruption, but are
otherwise identical. Assume that the value of γB, the share of income which bu-
reaucrats divert in country B, is larger than the level of γA, corresponding instead to
the level of corruption in A. From equation (3.21) it follows that a higher level of
corruption in B results in a larger downward shift of the adoption function and, as a
consequence, a larger non-convergence set in this economy. The non-convergence set
in B is equal to the distance between 0 and point D on the horizontal axis. The non-
convergence set in economy A is instead smaller and equals to the distance between
0 and point C, which is shorter than the distance between 0 and D. Therefore, in
economy B firms need higher additional incentives to move to the steady-state, and
thus the government needs to introduce larger restrictions on competition, which re-
sults in a larger level of K. Therefore, as KB > KA, in country B the payoff from
investing into storage asset Rt = 1 + 1K1−θB
intersects the vertical line, representing
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innovation stage, at point F , which is located below point E, the intersection point
between Rt = 1 + 1K1−θB
, corresponding to the payoff from acquiring the storage asset
in economy A, and the vertical line. A higher value of KB, reflecting the level of re-
strictions on competition, results in a larger reduction in the level of output in country
B. In economy A the required level of KA is instead smaller, which results in a lower
reduction in the level of production. We therefore conclude that, if the authority im-
plements an industrial policy in order to increase the pace of technological evolution,
a higher value of γ results in larger restrictions on competition, and as a consequence,
leads to a larger reduction in the level of output.
Educational reform and market concentration
We thus showed how a higher level of market concentration can encourage the owners
to invest more in the acquisition of new technology. As a result of restricted compe-
tition, the domestic technology might improve, and therefore employees have higher
incentives to acquire human capital. Thus, in the presence of a higher market concen-
tration, new educational opportunities brought about by an educational reform might
become more demanded by employees.
3.5.4 Appendix D.1
For an arbitrary level of γ the following expression should hold:
(1− γ)
(
(1− α∗t ) βAθt1 (ht,1 (1− ϕ(α∗t ))Kmt)1−θ + βAθt,2 (ht,1 (1 + ϕ(α∗t ))Kmt)1−θ
)
=
= βAθt,1 (ht,1Kmt)
1−θ + βAθt,1 (ht,1mt)
1−θ
After we divide it over β, it transforms to the following result:
(1− γ)
(
(1− α∗t )Aθt,1 (ht,1 (1− ϕ(α∗t ))Kmt)1−θ + Aθt,2 (ht,1 (1 + ϕ(α∗t ))Kmt)1−θ
)
=
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= (1 + r)Aθt,1 (ht,1Kmt)
1−θ + Aθt,1 (ht,1mt)
1−θ
Finally, after we simplify the above expression, we receive the following result:
(1− γ)K1−θ (1− ϕ(α∗t ))1−θ
[
1− α∗t +
1 + ϕ(α∗t )
1− ϕ(α∗t )
]
= K1−θ + 1
From this expression equation (3.33) follows immediately
3.5.5 Appendix D.2
We, first, compare the level of production under the limited competition regime with
the output level which is produced when competition is instead unrestricted. To elimi-
nate the effect of corruption, we temporarily assume that the latter is zero, i.e. γ = 0.
As in the absence of corruption the level of investment into a new technology is
the same for the less and the more competitive economies, we can reduce the above
comparison to the following two expressions:
Y Rt,1 = A
θ
t,1 (ht,1Kmt)
1−θ (3.38)
and
Y URt,1 = KA
θ
t,1 (ht,1mt)
1−θ (3.39)
Equation (3.38) corresponds to the level of output produced by the representative
firm in a less competitive economy in period j = 1, while equation (3.39) reflects the
level of output produced by K firms in a more competitive economy within the same
period j = 1. The representative firm in the less competitive economy employs as
many individuals as K firms in the more competitive one. We divide equations (3.38)
and (3.39) over Aθt,1 (ht,1Kmt)
1−θ, and as a result, we have to compare 1, correspond-
ing to the normalized output level under restricted competition, and Kθ, reflecting
instead the level of production in the economy without restrictions. As K ≥ 1, we
conclude that Kθ ≥ 1, implying a higher level of production in the economy with a
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lower level of market concentration.
We turn to the situation when the level of corruption is positive, i.e. γ > 0, and we
consider the case when the level of production in the economy with restricted compe-
tition becomes larger than the level of output in the economy with free competition. In
the presence of corruption, the latter occurs when the following expression holds:
Aθt,1 (ht,1 (1− ϕ(α∗t ))Kmt)1−θ (β (1− α∗t ) + (1− β))+Aθt,2 (ht,1 (1 + ϕ(α∗t ))Kmt)1−θ ≥
≥ 2KAθt,1 (htmt)1−θ
or after simplification
K1−θ
(
β (1− α∗t ) + (1− β) +
1 + ϕ(α∗t )
1− ϕ(α∗t )
)
≥ 2K (3.40)
Equation (3.35) directly follows from equation (3.40).
Consider the following inequality again:
Aθt,1 (ht,1 (1− ϕ(α∗t ))Kmt)1−θ (β (1− α∗t ) + (1− β))+Aθt,2 (ht,1 (1 + ϕ(α∗t ))Kmt)1−θ ≥
≥ 2KAθt,1 (htmt)1−θ
Let AAt,1 and h
A
t,1 represent the level of technology and human capital under re-
stricted competition, and let ABt1and h
B
t instead correspond to technology and human
capital levels in the more competitive economy, AAt,1 6= ABt,1, and hAt1 6= hBt . Substitute
AAt,1 and h
A
t,1 into the left-hand side of the above inequality, and A
B
t,1and h
B
t into its
right-hand side. Then, after minor manipulations, we arrive at inequality (3.37).

Chapter 4
Growth Alone is not Enough
4.1 Introduction
In October 2012, after 8 years of profound institutional reforms which resulted in a
substantial reduction in the level of bureaucratic corruption, a higher effectiveness of
the national energy sector, the emergence of modern public finance system and profes-
sional and transparent bureaucracy, Georgian president Saakashvili’s United National
Movement lost an election against the Georgian Dream, a political alternative estab-
lished by a billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili. Despite high growth rates, which reached
double-digit levels in particular years and on average a nearly double-digit level be-
tween 2004 and 2007, Saakashvili’s rule was also characterized by low level of income
redistribution and relatively high poverty. Growth was not followed by an adequate
job creation, while the wages of employed individuals were instead increasing sub-
stantially. High-educated citizens reaped significant benefits from economic growth,
whereas most of low-educated Georgians stayed poor. Overall, the level of poverty de-
clined from 28.5% in 2003 to 24.7% in 2009, which was not proportionate to the speed
of economic growth within the same period. According to the World Bank (2011),
”Economic growth in Georgia has not been pro-poor... ”. Unfavorable distribution
of benefits from economic growth induced poor individuals not to support Saakashvili
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and his reforms, but instead to grant their votes to alternative political force, which they
considered as potentially less reformist, but also as more redistributing and therefore
pro-poor.
This recent episode can be considered as a part of a broader context which, since
1980s, has been affecting the mainstream development roadmaps, as, for instance, the
Washington or the Post-Washington Consensuses. Both of them emphasized the im-
portance of growth-enhancing policies, leaving, however, a peripheral role to income
redistribution. The lack of redistribution concerns as an important inadequacy of a
development plan was also indicated by Joseph Stiglitz (2004) in his critical review of
the Post-Washington Consensus:
”Is a society in which the vast majority of its citizens are becoming worse
off - but in which a few at the top are doing so well that average incomes
are rising - better off than one in which the vast majority are doing better?
While there may be disagreements - and those at the very top may well
stress that average income is the appropriate measure - the possibility that
increases in GDP may not benefit most individuals means that we cannot
simply ignore issues of distribution. Some economists argued that distri-
bution concerns could be ignored because they believed in trickle down
economics - somehow everybody would benefit; a rising tide would lift
all boats. But the evidence against trickle down economics is now over-
whelming, at least in the sense that an increase in average incomes is not
sufficient to raise the incomes of the poor for quite prolonged periods.
Some economists argued that distribution concerns could and should be
ignored, because such concerns were outside the province of economics;
economists should focus on efficiency and growth alone. Distribution was
a matter for politics”.
We argue that the lack of income redistribution concerns is an important flaw of
modern development practices. As the presence of a large disadvantaged cohort which
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is disconnected from fast growing sectors1 is a feature of many developing societies,
economic growth alone might therefore not be very helpful for reducing the level of
poverty. It thus should be complemented with a redistribution policy, which, as long as
the poor cohort is separated from rapidly developing economic activities, might play
an important role for mitigating the most severe consequences of poverty.
That economic growth can play a limited role in reducing the level of poverty
is recognized by modern development practices, as, for instance, Inclusive Growth.
However, instead of implementing direct redistribution, the latter suggests to expand
the disadvantaged cohort’s opportunities to participate in fast-growing economic ac-
tivities, as it follows from the World Bank (2009):
”While absolute pro-poor growth can be the result of direct income re-
distribution schemes, for growth to be inclusive, productivity must be im-
proved and new employment opportunities created. In short, inclusive
growth is about raising the pace of growth and enlarging the size of the
economy, while levelling the playing field for investment and increasing
productive employment opportunities” and ”Inclusive Growth focuses on
productive employment rather than income redistribution”.
We argue though that as the main effects of such a policy might realize after a long
time, it thus can not substitute income redistribution in the short term. For instance, a
reform which increases the accessibility of education in order to enhance social mo-
bility, can achieve its goals years later, as transferring human capital is inherently
a long-term process. Therefore, before the main effects of this reform are realized,
the disadvantaged cohort can remain poor and thus sensitive to income redistribution
policies. If the latter are not implemented, poor individuals might support a political
regime which practices income transfers, even though this regime’s growth-enhancing
policies are, at the same time, potentially less effective. It is therefore essential to
1As, for instance, individuals who are self-employed in subsistance farming.
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incorporate income redistribution into development policies, as otherwise the latter
might become politically unfeasible.
To introduce this intuition in the form of a model, we consider a non-overlapping
generation developing economy where high-educated and low-educated individuals
combine their human capital with evolving technology to produce output.
We incorporate institutions into the model and show that the pace of technological
evolution and economic growth are larger under the high-quality institutions, and they
are instead small in the opposite case of low-quality institutions.
We assume that, as opposed to the large group of low-educated individuals, a rel-
atively small high-educated cohort controls a larger share in output, and therefore its
representative member derives comparatively high benefits from economic growth.
The less educated individuals’ share in output is instead low, and, as a result, their
benefits from economic growth are low as well. As a consequence, a high level of
poverty might sustain even in the presence of high growth rates.
To link these features with political outcomes, we consider two alternative politi-
cal regimes. A clientelistic regime derives benefits if the quality of institutions remains
low, and therefore it has incentives to retain low-quality institutions as long as possible.
As low-quality institutions are broadly recognized as a key impediment to economic
growth (see, for instance, Blume, Rubinfeld and Shapiro 1984, Kaplow 1986, and Ep-
stein 2008), growth rates remain low as long as the clientelistic regime keeps power.
However, as staying in power requires retaining a certain level of popularity, the clien-
telistic regime implements a redistribution policy which benefits low-educated indi-
viduals and thus earns their political sympathies. A reformist regime instead improves
the quality of institutions, which increases the pace of technological evolution, accel-
erates human capital accumulation, and results in faster economic growth. We show,
however, that the latter might be insufficient for sustaining political popularity, as the
low-educated cohort, which makes up a majority of individuals, might be compara-
tively more sensitive to income redistribution, than to economic growth. Therefore,
complementing an institutional reform with income redistribution policy might be a
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key to winning political competition. The central role in politics transits from eco-
nomic growth to redistribution as long as the economy becomes more developed, and
thus growth rates decline. We conclude that the reformist regime might loose political
competition against the clientelistic alternative, if it ignores income redistribution.2 As
a result, growth-enhancing policy can be reversed and the economy might end up in a
non-convergence trap.
As an alternative to income redistribution, a part of the low-educated cohort can
transit to the high-educated group if the authority, instead of redistributing incomes,
implements a reform which increases the accessibility of education. As a result of the
latter reform, the level of output becomes larger, as well as the size of the middle class,
and thus the number of individuals who benefit from economic growth increases. We
therefore follow Muller and Shavit, (1998), as we assume that a broader access to high-
quality educational services enhances the attainment of the middle-class occupations,
which results in the emergence of a larger middle class. Our key assumption, how-
ever, suggests that the time which is required for the acquisition of additional human
capital is comparatively long, and, as a consequence, the educational reform might im-
pact only the following generation of low-educated individuals, without affecting the
current one.3 As is argued in Tiongson (2012) ”...Education policy reforms have long
term effects on poverty and income distribution...”. As a result, inclusive growth can
2Even though it is associated with slow growth, the clientelistic regime, nevertheless, might earn
substantial political popularity among the low-educated group, as income transfers which it provides
might be more important for the low-educated individuals than economic growth.
3At the same time, we assume that much less time is needed to improve the quality of institutions in
a particular economy. Moreover, economic effect of improved institutions might also realize relatively
fast.
For instance, Georgia needed 3 years to increase its FDI inflow from 500 million USD in 2004 to
2 bln USD in 2007, as a result of its anti-corruption efforts which were implemented within the same
years.
Another illustration is a successful anti-corruption campaign which was implemented in Liberia. The
latter made a substantial progress in reducing the level of corruption, as it had been ranked 137 out of
158 countries according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perseption Index in 2005, but ended
up at the 87th position out of 178 economies in 2010 (see Transparency International, 2011).
By contrast, economic effect of an educational policy is intrinsically more delayed, as years are
required to implement the reform, to educate individuals, to employ them, etc.
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not substitute income redistribution in the short term, as the current generation of low-
educated individuals can still have low sensitivity to economic growth. Its dependence
on income redistribution, by contrast, remains comparatively high.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the liter-
ature and provides the model outline. Section 3 addresses the problem of low-quality
institutions in the context of our benchmark growth model, and shows how does its
presence result in a non-convergence trap. In Section 4, we introduce political com-
petition as an opportunity to remove low-quality institutions, and show how this op-
portunity can remain unemployed if an institutional reform is not complemented with
income redistribution. In the extension to our chapter, which we present in Section
5, we argue that the effect of investing into human capital, which we consider as a
potential alternative to income redistribution policy, realizes only in the long-run, and
therefore can not reduce the level of income inequality in the short term. Section 6
provides a summary.
4.2 Literature Review and Model Outline
Our model brings together different strands of the literature. First, our argument is
related to the extensive literature which studies the link between growth and inequality.
For instance, Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Alesina
(1994) argue that polarization is an obstacle to economic growth, as it shifts political
focus from economic growth to income redistribution. As a result, a larger political
pressure for redistribution discourages investment and therefore reduces the pace of
economic growth.
Another set of arguments related to income polarization, as the ones of Loury
(1981) or Galor and Zeira (1993), focuses on credit market imperfections as an im-
portant flaw which reduces poor individuals’ investment opportunities and therefore
lowers growth rates. As a result of a low accessibility of credit, poor individuals
might be restricted from undertaking the optimal level of investment. In the pres-
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ence of decreasing returns, their underfunded projects, however, are characterized by
higher marginal product, and therefore, as redistribution might compensate the lack
of investment credit, economic growth can become faster. In this context, Galor and
Zeira (1993), for instance, argue that a society with high income inequality has a small
middle class. The poor class is instead large and facing a binding liquidity constraint,
which reduces its opportunities to accumulate human capital, thus resulting in a lower
level of production.
There is also a literature which links income inequality and security of property
rights. In the presence of a widening gap between rich and poor, the latter have moti-
vation to expropriate assets from the former, and thus as investing becomes less secure,
incentives to invest decline (see, for instance, Grossman, 1991, 1994, Acemoglu, 1995,
Tornell and Velasco, 1992, Benhabib and Rustichini, 1996).
Finally, Adelman and Morris (1967) and Landes (1998), provide historical evi-
dence for the importance of the middle class, and therefore lower inequality, for eco-
nomic development in Europe.
Even though we also link inequality and economic growth, our focus is, however,
different. We argue that, as inequality results in a higher popularity of income re-
distribution, it therefore might enhance political survival of ineffective and corrupt
regimes, thus negatively affecting the long-term growth. For instance, even though
a rent-seeking regime can cause a substantial slowing down in economic growth, it
might, nevertheless, remain popular if it provides income transfers to the poor. We
therefore emphasize that income redistribution might be a key ingredient for political
success, and thus it should also be implemented by reformist regimes to enhance their
political sustainability.
Our work is also related to political science literature which addresses the issue
of persistence of clientelistic policies (see, for instance, Kitschelt, 2000). Brusco et
al (2004) and Calvo and Murillo (2004) argue that poor voters in Argentina are more
willing to support Peronists as the latter deliver clientelistic policies. Robinson and
Verdier (2003) show that poor and less productive societies practice clientelism more
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often. This literature, however, focuses on popularity of clientelistic regimes among
poor voters, without, by contrast to our argument, linking the latter with economic
growth.
Finally, a vast literature considers education as an important link between indi-
viduals’ social origin and their later social destination. Acemoglu (2002), Aghion et
al (1999) and Katz and Murphy (1992) indicate that education and skills play an im-
portant role in wage differentials, therefore implying that a more accessible education
system will result in a lower income inequality and a larger middle class. We refer to
this literature, as we consider a policy which enhances the availability of education for
the poor in order to integrate the latter into fast growing economic activities. This lit-
erature does not, however, link income redistribution with political sustainability. and
economic growth.
In our setting a firm which is owned by the representative capitalist combines tech-
nology and human capital to produce output. Following Lucas (1988), Acemoglu
(1994) and Redding (1996), we consider a non-overlapping generations economy where
output is shared between the capitalist and two groups of employees, a low-educated
group and a high-educated one. When young, each employee receives a particular en-
dowment of human capital from the previous generation and becomes a high-educated
individual if the level of human capital endowment is large, or a low-educated indi-
vidual in the opposite case of a low intergenerational transfer of human capital. High-
and low-educated individuals then decide how to allocate their human capital endow-
ments between production and acquisition of additional human capital. Their decision
is affected by the capitalist, who invests a part of his revenue from production into the
acquisition of a new technology. The capitalist and employees share the same informa-
tion, and thus the employees can perfectly foresee how much output does the capitalist
plan to invest in a new technology. When the capitalist invests more into technological
evolution, both groups of employees also prefer to acquire more human capital, since
in this case the latter will earn a higher return. Higher educational attainments and
investment into a new technology result, respectively, in a larger human capital stock
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and a more advanced technology, which are used to produce output when the capitalist,
high-educated and low-educated employees become old.
We incorporate the quality of institutions into the model, and consider it as an im-
portant determinant of the level of investment into new technologies. When the quality
of institutions is high, the economy develops faster, as the representative capitalist in-
vests more into technological evolution, imitating technologies from the leading econ-
omy and thus letting domestic technology converge to the world technological frontier.
However, as empirical evidence suggest that convergence with more developed coun-
tries did not take place in the case of many developing economies (see, for instance,
Acemoglu, 2008), we also consider the case of low-quality institutions, and show how
the latter reduce the capitalist’s incentives to invest into new technologies. Since pro-
duction factors are complements, both groups of employees reduce their investments
into human capital in response to a slower pace of technological advancement.
We then introduce political competition into our model and consider it as an oppor-
tunity to replace low-quality institutions with the high-quality ones. We assume that
a reformist regime pursues a growth-enhancing policy, and, to this end, it improves
the quality of institutions. As the latter results in higher growth rates and therefore
makes the capitalists and the employees better off, the reformist regime should ac-
quire a broad political support, while its clientelistic opponent, which instead practices
rent seeking and thus maintains low-quality institutions, should become extremely un-
popular. As we show, the latter, however, is not necessarily the case if most of the
current generation’s employees belong to the low-educated group. As in this case
less educated individuals acquire low benefits from economic growth, their support to
growth-enhancing policy remains low as well. On the contrary, a sufficiently generous
redistribution policy can increase the low-educated cohort income level more substan-
tially. If the reformist regime does not transfer incomes to the low-educated employees,
while its clientelistic opponent instead does, the political survival of the former, and
therefore the implementation of institutional reform, becomes less feasible. Therefore,
to win political competition, the reformist regime should combine institutional reform
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with income redistribution.
Finally, we consider the working of a particular growth policy4 which helps low-
educated employees transit to the high-educated group. We assume that the reformist
regime, instead of using tax revenues to redistribute incomes, can improve the quality
of education and transfer more human capital to the less educated cohort, therefore
decreasing its size and increasing instead the size of the high-educated group. We
suppose, however, that the former effect realizes in the long run, benefiting the next
generation of low-educated employees, but not the current one. The latter implies that
in the short term the educational policy can’t substitute income redistribution, which
remains an important determinant of the reformist regime’s political survival.
4.3 The Benchmark Model of Economic Growth
In this section we introduce our baseline growth model, where two representative
groups of employees and the representative capitalist, all belonging to a particular
generation, combine, respectively, human capital and technology in order to produce
output. Moreover, the employees acquire additional human capital, and the capitalist
instead improves upon the technology which he inherited from the previous generation.
After the current generation passes away, the human capital stock and technology are
transferred to the next generation.
Incentives to acquire new technologies and human capital are affected by the qual-
ity of institutions. In the presence of low-quality institutions, the representative capi-
talist invests less into a new technology, while the employees, in turn, accumulate less
human capital. As a result, the economy fails to catch up with a more developed refer-
ence country, and stays behind the latter as long as the quality of institutions remains
low.
4As, for instance, Inclusive Growth
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4.3.1 Production
Following Redding (1996), we consider two non-overlapping generations economies,5
D and F ,6 where every generation lives for two periods 1 and 2. We focus our analysis
on country D, while country F is instead introduced as a reference economy.
In period 1 a new generation t is born, it produces output Y it,1, i = D,F , invests a
particular share of Y it,1 in the acquisition of new technologies and accumulates human
capital. In the following period, i.e. in period 2, the same generation t produces output
Y it,2 and passes away.
We assume for simplicity that the size of population in D does not change over
time, and it is as large as the size of population in country F . Each generation is made
up of L (ni + 1) individuals, where L represents the number of capitalists in economy
i = D,F and ni = ni1 + n
i
2 corresponds to the number of employees working for a
typical capitalist in economy i = D,F . A group of employees of size ni1 working for
the representative capitalist receives a large per capita human capital endowment hi,1t,1,
while in the other group of size ni2 a typical employee inherits instead a low level of
human capital hi,2t,1, which implies that h
i,1
t,1 > h
i,2
t,1, i = D,F .
The representative capitalist owns a firm, where technology, which belongs to the
capitalist, is combined with human capital, belonging instead to the employees, in
order to produce the final output yit,1, i = D,F . In both periods j = 1, 2, the repre-
sentative firm in each economy produces a particular level of output according to the
following production function:
yit,j =
(
Ait,j
)1−θ1−θ2 (hi,1t,jni1)θ (hi,2t,jni2)θ2 (4.1)
where i = D,F and j = 1, 2.
Therefore, within periods 1 and 2, the representative firm in economy i = D,F
5We do not use a standard overlapping generations approach, as we need to make sure that investing
in two factors of production takes place synchronically. The latter is possible if the owners of the
respective production factors make up the same generation.
6Where D and F correspond to ”Domestic ” and ”Foreign” respectively.
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produces as much output as follows:
yit =
2
j=1
(
Ait,j
)1−θ1−θ2 (hi,1t,jni1)θ1 (hi,2t,jni2)θ2 (4.2)
where yit is the level of output which is produced by the representative firm belonging
to generation t in economy i,Ait,j is the level of technology belonging to the representa-
tive capitalist in country i = D,F in period j = 1, 2, hi,1t,j and h
i,2
t,j reflect, respectively,
the amount of human capital per the representative employee from the more and the
less educated groups in country i = D,F in period j = 1, 2, and ni1 and n
i
2 represent
the number of employees per firm, belonging to the more and the less educated groups
correspondingly.
We assume that θ1 > θ2, which implies that high-educated employees are more
important for production.
In both periods j = 1, 2 the representative employee belonging to the more edu-
cated group and employed at a typical firm receives a wage rate wi,1t,j , while her coun-
terpart from the less educated group receives instead wi,2t,j , i = D,F . The equilibrium
wage rate wi,1t,j is equal to the marginal productivity of employing n
i
1 individuals from
the more educated group:
wi,1t,j = θ1
(
Ait,j
)1−θ1−θ2 (hi,1t,j)θ1 (hi,2t,jni2)θ2 (ni1)θ1−1 (4.3)
while the ratewi,2t,j corresponds to the marginal productivity of n
i
2 employees belonging
to the less educated group
wi,2t,j = θ2
(
Ait,j
)1−θ1−θ2 (hi,1t,jni1)θ1 (hi,2t,j)θ2 (ni2)θ2−1 (4.4)
In total, the high-educated and the low-educated groups working at a typical firm,
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receive the following income in period j = 1, 2:
I it,j = n
i
1w
i,1
t,j + n
i
2w
i,2
t,j (4.5)
The representative capitalist therefore acquires the remaining part of output:
W it,j = Yt,j − ni1wi,1t,1 − ni2wi,2t,1 = (1− θ1 − θ2)Y it,j (4.6)
In both economies, D and F , a new generation inherits technology and human
capital from the previous generation. Therefore, when a new generation is young, it
uses the following technology to produce output:
Ait,1 = A
i
t−1,2 (4.7)
where Ait−1,2 is the level of technology a new generation t inherited from its predeces-
sor, generation t − 1. In economy D, each generation can invest in the acquisition of
new technologies, therefore increasing the level of technology it inherited from the
previous generation.
In the benchmark model we assume that the level of technology in country F , i.e.
AF , is a constant.7 We also assume that the initial generation t = 0 in country D owns
a technology which is less developed than the one in economy F , i.e. AH0,1 < A
F .
Following Lucas (1988), we also assume that, similar to the level of technology,
the human capital stock H it−1,2 is transferred from the previous generation t− 1 to the
current one, i.e. to t. We assume that the more educated group of employees receives
a larger per capita share 0 < δ1 < 1 in the total human capital stock H it−1,2, while per
capita share in the less educated cohort, δ2, is instead smaller. Within each group the
level of human capital endowment is, however, identical for all the members belonging
7However, we relax this assumption in Appendix D, as a constant level of the leading technological
frontier represented by AF is not a realistic assumption. Adding a possibility of evolution of the world
technological frontier does not, however, affect our key results.
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to a particular cohort, which reflects equal distribution of wealth in each cohort.8
Similarly to the level of AF , we also assume that the total human capital stock in
country F is constant. Finally, we assume that HD0,1 < H
F which implies that for
the initial generation t = 0 the stock of human capital in D is lower than the one in
economy F .
Given that employees are identically distributed between high-educated and low-
educated cohorts in both D and F , i.e. nD1 = n
F
1 and n
D
2 = n
F
2 ,
9 these two as-
sumptions, i.e. AD0,1 < A
F and HD0,1 < H
F , together with production function yit,1 =(
Ait,1
)1−θ1−θ2 (hi,1t,1ni1)θ1 (hi,2t,1ni2)θ2 , imply that for the initial generation t = 0, in pe-
riod j = 1, the level of output produced by the representative firm in country F is
larger than the one produced in economy D.
4.3.2 Investment
At the end of the first period, j = 1, the representative capitalist in D decides whether
to improve uponADt,1, the level of technologyD inherited from the previous generation
t− 1, or to invest in a storage technology.
The storage technology is available in both economies, D and F , and pays a return
r = 0 in period j = 2 if the capitalist invests his income in this technology in period
j = 1. We introduce the storage technology to capture a possibility of non-convergence
trap, which emerges when D fails to catch up with country F . The representative firm
in D invests in the storage asset if the payoff from improving upon ADt,1 is negative.
In the latter case, the capitalist in D stops investing into technological progress, and
therefore the economy stays with the same level of technology.
The representative capitalist can improve upon the old technology, i.e upon ADt,1 =
8Adifferent assumption would result in a more complicated aggregation of our key variables, and the
whole analysis of the model would become more complicated as well, without delivering, at the same
time, any interesting and important insights.
9We will relax this assumption later, when we discuss the Inclusive Growth policy.
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ADt−1,2, in the following way:
ADt,2 = η (xt)A
F + (1− η (xt))ADt,1 (4.8)
Equation (4.8) reflects a possibility of adoption from the leading technological
frontier, which is represented by AF , the level of technology in country F . As a result
of adoption, the level of technology in economy D in period j = 2 , i.e. ADt,2, becomes
larger and contains two parts: first, this is ADt,1, the level of technology the capitalist
inherited from the previous generation t − 1 and uses to produce output in period
j = 1, and second, this is an additional part, which the capitalist adopts from the
leading frontier AF .10 0 ≤ xt ≤ 1 corresponds to the share of the capitalist’s income
(1− θ1 − θ2) yDt,j in period j = 1, invested into a new technology. η (xt) satisfies the
following properties: 0 ≤ η (xt) ≤ 1, η′ (xt) > 0, η′′ (xt) < 0, η (0) = 0, it also
follows the Inada conditions, i.e. η′(∞) = 0 and η′(0) =∞.
In period j = 1, the capitalist invests a share xt of his income (1− θ1 − θ2) yDt,1
into a new technology, and the return is realized in period j = 2. Therefore, the
capitalist receives (1− xt) (1− θ1 − θ2) yDt,1 in period j = 1 and (1− θ1 − θ2) yDt,2 in
the following period, j = 2.
In period j = 1, the more and the less educated employees, working at the rep-
resentative firm in economy D, receive, correspondingly, θ1yDt,1 and θ2y
D
t,1, and in the
next period, j = 2 these groups’ incomes change to θ1yDt,2 and θ2y
D
t,2. A member of
the more educated group can invest a fraction ϕ1t of her human capital endowment to
augment her human capital stock, while a typical employee from the less educated
group can instead invest a fraction ϕ2t of her human capital endowment to have more
human capital in period j = 2. For simplicity, we assume that in both groups human
capital is created according to a one-to-one technology, and therefore in period j = 2
10We can rewrite ADt,2, corresponding to the left-hand side of equation (4.8) as the level of the old
technology which is represented by ADt,1 plus a part of the distance between the old technology and the
leading frontier, i.e.: ADt,2 = A
D
t,1 + η (xt)
(
AF −ADt,1
)
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an employee from the more educated group receives (1 + ϕ1t )h
1,D
t,1 in case she invested
ϕth
1,D
t,1 in period j = 1, while her counterpart from the less educated group receives
(1 + ϕ2t )h
2,D
t,1 if ϕ
2
th
2,D
t,1 was invested in period j = 1.
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4.3.3 Institutions
In this subsection, we incorporate institutions into the model. We show how the pres-
ence of low-quality institutions, which is a feature of many developing economies,
reduces country D’s opportunities to catch up with more developed economy F . Fol-
lowing Blume, Rubinfeld and Shapiro (1984), Kaplow (1986), and Epstein (2008), we
argue that the presence of low-quality institutions, which we model as a positive prob-
ability p of expropriation of the firm belonging to the representative capitalist, results
in slower economic growth. In particular, we show that expropriation reduces the pace
of technological evolution and human capital accumulation, therefore leading to a non-
reducible distance between the level of technology in D and the world technological
frontier.
We assume that the ruling regime can either maintain low-quality institutions,
which corresponds to a positive level of probability of expropriation p, or, alterna-
tively, it can choose high-quality institutions resulting in p = 0. In the presence of
low-quality institutions, the regime can expropriate the firm from the representative
capitalist. We assume that the ruling regime has no skills to run the firm profitably,
and, as a consequence, it never expropriates it in period j = 1, as if instead the firm
is expropriated in the following period j = 2, the regime will receive at least as much
as it can receive in period j = 1. The latter is a result of a higher level of output in
period j = 2, i.e. a higher yDt,2, as in period j = 2 the return on investment into a new
technology and human capital is realized. When the regime expropriates the firm in
period j = 2, it keeps the capitalist’s income (1− θ1 − θ2) yDt,2 and then shuts the firm
11A different assumption would cost us algebraic and geometric convenience, including explicit alge-
braic solutions and their geometric counterparts, without producing any tangible benefits and additional
insights.
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down. In t+1 a new capitalist establishes a new firm and the same story repeats again.
If the quality of institutions is instead high, p equals to zero, and therefore the
representative owner receives (1− θ1 − θ2) yDt,2 in period j = 2.
4.3.4 Equilibrium
We write down the capitalist’s payoff function, which, according to equation (4.6),
takes the following form:
WDt = (1− xt)WDt,1 +WDt,2 =
= (1− xt) (1− θ1 − θ2) yDt,1 + (1− p) (1− θ1 − θ2) yDt,2 (4.9)
where the level of output produced at the representative firm in period j = 1 is as large
as the following:
yDt,1 =
(
ADt,1
)1−θ1−θ2 (
hD,1t,1 n
D
1
(
1− ϕ1t
))θ1 (
hD,2t,1 n
D
2
(
1− ϕ2t
))θ2
while in the next period j = 2 the level of output is equal to:
yDt,2 =
(
ADt,2
)1−θ1−θ2 (
hD,1t,1 n
D
1
(
1 + ϕ1t
))θ1 (
hD,2t,1 n
D
2
(
1 + ϕ2t
))θ2
Considering the employees, in the more educated group, the representative em-
ployee’s payoff function corresponds to the following expression:
wD,1t,1 + w
D,1
t,2 −→ max
ϕ1
(4.10)
where wD,1t,1 is a wage rate which an employee belonging to the more educated
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group receives in period j = 1:
wD,1t,1 = θ1
(
ADt,1
)1−θ1−θ2 (
hD,1t,1
(
1− ϕ1t
))θ1 (
hD,2t,1 n
D
2
(
1− ϕ2t
))θ2 (
nD1
)θ1−1 (4.11)
while wD,1t,2 is a wage she acquires in the following period, i.e. j = 2:
wD,1t,2 = θ1
(
ADt,2
)1−θ1−θ2 (
hD,1t,1
(
1 + ϕ1t
))θ1 (
hD,2t,1 n
D
2
(
1 + ϕ2t
))θ2 (
nD1
)θ1−1 (4.12)
A typical employee from the less educated group maximizes instead the following
income:
wD,2t,1 + w
D,2
t,2 −→ max
ϕ2
(4.13)
where wD,2t,1 is a wage rate which an employee from the less educated cohort earns
in period j = 1:
wD,2t,1 = θ2
(
ADt,1
)1−θ1−θ2 (
hD,1t,1 n
D
1
(
1− ϕ1t
))θ1 (
hD,2t,1 n
D
2
(
1− ϕ2t
))θ2 (
nD2
)θ2−1
(4.14)
and wD,2t,2 is instead her wage in period j = 2
wD,2t,2 = θ2
(
ADt,2
)1−θ1−θ2 (
hD,1t,1 n
D
1
(
1 + ϕ1t
))θ1 (
hD,2t,1 n
D
2
(
1 + ϕ2t
))θ2 (
nD2
)θ2−1
(4.15)
In period j = 1, the capitalist makes a decision about the level of investment into
a new technology, while the employees instead decide how much human capital to
acquire.
Maximization of equations (4.9), (4.10) and (4.13) with respect to xt, ϕ1t and ϕ
2
t
correspondingly, and combining the respective FOCs, results in the following expres-
sion:
η′(x∗t ) =
1
(1− θ1 − θ2) (1− p)
(
AFt,1
ADt,1
− 1
) (4.16)
From equation (4.16) we can conclude that a larger importance of technology for
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production, i.e. a higher level of 1 − θ1 − θ2, a larger distance to the leading frontier
AFt,1
ADt,1
, and a lower probability of expropriation p, all result in a higher level of investment
into a new technology.
Employees instead search for the optimal share of human capital ϕt which they
invest in education. Maximizing equations (4.10) and (4.13) with respect to ϕ1t and ϕ
2
t
correspondingly, produces the following first order condition:
ϕ∗t = ϕ
1
t = ϕ
2
t =
ADt,2 − ADt,1
ADt,2 + A
D
t,1
(4.17)
See Appendix A for a detailed derivation of equations (4.16) and (4.17).
The right-hand side of equation (4.17) is lower than 1 and declines over time as the
difference between ADt,2 and A
D
t,1 reduces.
12 The fraction of human capital endowment
ϕkt , k = 1, 2 which is used to acquire additional human capital, is higher the higher is
the level of ADt,2. As we will see shortly, A
D
t,2 is larger, the further away is the level of
technology in D from the leading frontier AF .
We are now ready to formulate our first result.
Proposition 1.
1. The level of technology in economy D converges to the unique steady-state. The
latter corresponds to the leading technology AF when the quality of institutions
is high, i.e. when the probability of expropriation p is equal to zero. However, the
steady-state level of technology is below the world technological frontier AF if
the quality of institutions is instead low, i.e. when the probability of expropria-
tion p is positive. Moreover, a larger p results in a higher level of technological
backwardness corresponding to a higher distance to technological frontier A
F
ADt,1
.
12To show that the latter is indeed the case, we represent equation (4.17) as follows:
ϕ1t = ϕ
2
t =
ADt,2+A
D
t,1−2ADt,1
ADt,2+A
D
t,1
= 1− 2A
D
t,1
ADt,2+A
D
t,1
The right-hand side of the upper expression is approaching 0 as soon as ADt,2 is getting closer to A
D
t,1,
and it is close to 1 when ADt,2 is instead significantly larger than A
D
t,1.
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2. Furthermore, the distance to the leading frontier A
F
ADt,1
and the measure of impor-
tance of technology for production 1−θ1−θ2, both affect the level of investments
into technology and human capital accumulation positively. By contrast, the
probability of expropriation p reduces the representative capitalist’s incentives
to imitate technologies from Foreign. The latter also lowers the optimal level of
human capital acquisition ϕ∗t .
3. Low-educated and high-educated employees invest the same fraction ϕ∗t of their
human capital endowment in the acquisition of additional human capital.
Proof. To prove the first part of Proposition 1, we lag equation (4.8) one step back,
such that it corresponds to generation t−1. We use equation (4.7) to show that asADt,1 is
a function of x∗t−1, the more the previous generation, i.e. generation t−1, invested into
a new technology, i.e. the higher was the level of x∗t−1, the larger becomes the level of
technology which was inherited from generation t−1, i.e. the higher isADt,1. As a result
of a higher level of domestic technology ADt,1 in period j = 1, the distance between
ADt,1 and the leading technological frontier A
F reduces. From the expropriation-free,
i.e. p = 0, version of equation (4.16) corresponding to the following expression
η′(x∗t ) =
1
(1− θ1 − θ2)
(
AFt,1
ADt,1
− 1
) (4.18)
it follows that x∗t becomes smaller when the distance to frontier
AF
ADt,1
declines. It there-
fore follows that x∗t−1 is larger than x
∗
t . Nevertheless, as x
∗
t is positive, the level of
technology in economy D moves closer to the leading frontier technology AF . When
the level of technology in country D, i.e. ADt,1, converges to A
F entirely, the denom-
inator of the right-hand side of equation (4.18) becomes equal to zero, and the whole
right-hand side of this expression therefore becomes equal to infinity. As η′(0) = ∞
by assumption, the level of x∗t thus equals to 0, which corresponds to the steady-state
level of investment into a new technology in the absence of expropriation, i.e. when
p = 0. As AF is a constant, the steady-state level of technology in economy D also
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remains a constant, as there is nothing to adopt from economy F any longer.13
From equation (4.17) it follows that the steady-state level of investment into human
capital equals to zero as well.
In the presence of low-quality institutions, probability of expropriation p is instead
positive. If the capitalist invests into a new technology, his payoff function corresponds
to equation (4.9), which we reproduce below for convenience:
WDt = (1− xt) (1− θ1 − θ2) yDt,1 + (1− p) (1− θ1 − θ2) yDt,2
where in period j = 1 the level of output produced at the representative firm is as
large as the following:
yDt,1 =
(
ADt,1
)1−θ1−θ2 (
hD,1t,1 n
D
1
(
1− ϕ1t
))θ1 (
hD,2t,1 n
D
2
(
1− ϕ2t
))θ2
while in the next period j = 2 the level of output is instead equal to:
yDt,2 =
(
ADt,2
)1−θ1−θ2 (
hD,1t,1 n
D
1
(
1 + ϕ1t
))θ1 (
hD,2t,1 n
D
2
(
1 + ϕ2t
))θ2
Investing into the storage technology results in the following payoff:
SDt = (1− θ1 − θ2) yDt,1 + (1− θ1 − θ2) (1− p) yDt,1 (4.19)
where, as, following the capitalist’s decision not to invest into a new technology, high-
educated and low-educated employees do not acquire additional human capital, the
level of yDt,1 is as large as the following:
yDt,1 =
(
ADt,1
)1−θ1−θ2 (
hD,1t,1 n
D
1
)θ1 (
hD,2t,1 n
D
2
)θ2
From equations (4.9) and (4.19) it follows that the capitalist is indifferent between
13We complete the proof of uniqueness and global stability of the steady-state in Appendix A.
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acquiring a new technology and investing into the storage asset when the following
equality holds:
(1− ϕ(x∗t ))θ1+θ2
[
1− x∗t + (1− p)
1 + ϕ(x∗t )
1− ϕ(x∗t )
]
= 2− p (4.20)
In Appendix B we show that the left-hand side of equation (4.20) equals to 2−p when
x∗t = 0, it becomes lower than 2 − p when x∗t is located between 0 and p, attains a
minimum level when x∗t = p, and it starts growing when the value of x
∗
t is larger than
p. Therefore, for a particular set of values of x∗t the left-hand side of equation (4.20)
is lower than 2 − p, corresponding instead to the right-hand side of equation (4.20).
The latter implies that the capitalist receives a higher payoff when he invests into the
storage technology.
Equation (4.20) has two solutions, x̂1t = 0 and x̂
2
t > 0. The former solution
occurs when the level of technology in economy D converges to the one in country
F , i.e. when A
F
ADt,1
equals to 1. However, the presence of expropriation reduces country
D’s opportunities to converge to AF . To see this, consider the second solution of
equation (4.20), x̂2t > 0. As x̂
2
t is positive, from equation (4.8) it follows that the
level of technology in economy D becomes larger. As a result of a higher level of
technology in D, the distance to technological frontier instead becomes lower, which,
according to equation (4.16), results in a lower share of income the representative
capitalist belonging to generation t+1 invests into a new technology, i.e. a lower x∗t+1.
However, as the level of x∗t+1 is lower than x̂
2
t > 0, which is the positive solution of
equitation (4.20), the left-hand side of equation (4.20) becomes lower than its right-
hand side. In this case, the representative capitalist prefers investing into the storage
asset instead of investing into a new technology. Therefore, the actual level of xt+1
equals to 0, and thus the level of technology in economy D remains constant.
In Appendix C we show that the level of x̂2t > 0, a positive solution to equation
(4.20), becomes larger when the probability of expropriation p becomes higher. Ac-
cording to equation (4.16) a higher level of x̂2t corresponds to a larger distance to the
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leading technological frontier A
F
ADt,1
. Therefore, a large value of p results in a higher
level of technological backwardness A
F
ADt,1
. Intuitively, in the presence of expropriation,
the capitalist has incentives to invest into a new technology if the latter results in a
sufficiently high level of return, which, according to equation (4.16), is the case when
the level of A
F
ADt,1
is large.
The proof of the second and the third parts of the proposition follows directly from
equations (4.16) and (4.17).
To transit to a graphical representation of these results, we introduce a number of
important definitions which we will also be using throughout the chapter.
We start from comparing the capitalist’s payoffs from investing into a new tech-
nology and the storage asset. The former is at least as large as the latter when the
following inequality holds:
(
ADt,1
)1−θ1−θ2 (
hD,1t,1 n
D
1
)θ1 (
hD,2t,1 n
D
2
)θ2
(1− ϕ(x∗t ))θ1+θ2
[
1− x∗t + (1− p)
1 + ϕ(x∗t )
1− ϕ(x∗t )
]
≥
≥ (2− p) (ADt,1)1−θ1−θ2 (hD,1t,1 nD1 )θ1 (hD,2t,1 nD2 )θ2 (4.21)
We divide both sides of inequality (4.21) over
(
ADt,1
)1−θ1−θ2 (hD,1t,1 nD1 )θ1 (hD,2t,1 nD2 )θ2
in order to transform it into the following expression:
(1− ϕ(x∗t ))θ1+θ2
[
1− x∗t + (1− p)
1 + ϕ(x∗t )
1− ϕ(x∗t )
]
≥ 2− p (4.22)
We call the left-hand side of inequality (4.22) the adoption function, as it reflects
the capitalist’s payoff from investing in the adoption of new technologies. The right-
hand side of inequality (4.22) instead corresponds to the payoff from investing into the
storage technology.
We also divide the level of output produced in country F by generation t, which
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corresponds to the following equation:
Y F = 2L
(
AF
)1−θ1−θ2 (
hF,1nF1
)θ1 (
hF,2nF2
)θ2 (4.23)
over the output level which is produced in economy D by the same generation t
in period j = 1, i.e. over Y Dt,1 = L
(
ADt,1
)1−θ1−θ2 (hD,1t,1 nD1 )θ1 (hD,2t,1 nD2 )θ2 . As we
temporarily assume that nD1 = n
F
1 and n
D
2 = n
F
2 , we receive the following ratio:
Y F
Y Dt,1
= 2
(
AF
ADt,1
)1−θ1−θ2 (hF,1
hD,1t,1
)θ1 (
hF,2
hD,2t,1
)θ2
(4.24)
We call the latter expression the output gap function, as it reflects the gap in income
levels between economies D and F .
As it follows from Proposition 1, when the probability of expropriation p is equal to
0, the level of domestic technology, i.e. ADt,1, entirely converges to the leading frontier
AF , and, as a result, A
F
ADt,1
equals to one in the steady-state. If, at the same time, high-
educated and low-educated employees in economy D become as educated as their
foreign counterparts, h
F,1
hD,1t,2
and h
F,2
hD,2t,2
both equal to one as well, and then equation (4.24)
reduces to Y
F
Y Dt,1
= 2, which implies that the output gap between D and F disappears.
We replicate these results in the following figure.
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Figure 1. In the absence of expropriation economy D converges with country F.
In Figure 1, the share of income which the capitalist invests in a new technology
x∗t is placed along the horizontal axis, while Rt is instead placed along the vertical
one and represents either a payoff from investing into a new technology, or instead
a payoff from investing into the storage asset, corresponding respectively, to the left-
hand and to the right-hand sides of inequality (4.22). In Figure 1, the adoption function
corresponds to the expropriation-free, i.e. p = 0, version of the left-hand side of
inequality (4.22), which equals to the following expression:
Rt = (1− ϕ(x∗t ))θ1+θ2
[
1− x∗t +
1 + ϕ(x∗t )
1− ϕ(x∗t )
]
(4.25)
In Appendix A we show that equation (4.25) is a monotonically increasing function
of x∗t . Moreover, as we know from equation (4.16), a larger value of x
∗
t corresponds
to a larger distance to the leading frontier A
F
ADt,1
. Therefore, as equation (4.25) is larger
when x∗t is higher, it thus is also larger when the distance to the leading frontier
AF
ADt,1
is higher. As a result, the value of equation (4.25) declines when the distance to the
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leading frontier becomes smaller. Therefore, since a larger value of x∗t corresponds
to a higher level of A
F
ADt,1
, a point on the adoption function which is close to the dashed
line, as pointA, reflects a lower stage of technological development. On the contrary, a
point as pointB, which is instead relatively far away from the dashed line, corresponds
to a lower share of income which the capitalist invests into a new technology x∗t and
thus to a smaller distance to the leading frontier A
F
ADt,1
. The economy thus becomes
more developed as long as it moves along the adoption function towards the steady-
state point C. In point C the share x∗t equals to 0, reflecting the absence of investment
into a new technology. As a result, the left-hand side of inequality (4.24) becomes
equal to 2, which indicates that the level of output in country D totally converges with
the one in economy F .
The horizontal line which is called ”storage technology”, reflects the payoff from
investing into the storage asset. As this line intersects the vertical axis in Rt = 2,
corresponding to expropriation-free, i.e. p = 0, version of the right-hand side of
inequality (4.22), it follows that the payoff from investing into the storage technology
is lower than the payoff from investing into a new technology as long as x∗t > 0, which
is the case when A
F
At,1
> 1. The latter follows from equation (4.25), as its right-hand
side, representing the payoff from investing into a new technology, is larger than 2
as long as x∗t > 0. Therefore, in the absence of expropriation, the capitalist always
chooses investment into a new technology, leaving instead the opportunity to invest
into the storage asset unexploited.
When economy D reaches the steady-state level of technology, technological gap
between D and F reduces to zero, i.e. A
F
ADt,1
= 1, and therefore D does not adopt
new technologies any longer. Nor, according to equation (4.17), it invests into the
acquisition of additional human capital, as, when x∗t = 0, the level of technology
remains constant, i.e. ADt,1 = A
D
t.2 = A
F , and, as it follows from equation (4.17), the
share of human capital which is used to acquire additional capital is thus ϕ1t = ϕ
2
t =
ϕ(x∗t ) = 0.
As long asD converges to economyF , the output gap between these two economies
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reduces, which results in a downward shift of the output gap function. Form Propo-
sition 1, equation (4.24), and the assumption that the high-educated and low-educated
employees in economyD become as educated as their foreign counterparts, i.e. h
F,1
hD,1t,2
=
hF,2
hD,2t,2
= 1, it follows that the output gap between country D and economy F disappears
in the steady-state, i.e. Y
F
Y Dt,1
= 2 .
We now consider the case when p is instead positive. According to Proposition
1, as a result of a positive probability of expropriation p, the level of technology in
economy D, i.e. ADt,1, fails to catch up with the world technological frontier A
F . We
illustrate this result in the following figure:
Figure 2. Non-convergence trap.
The presence of expropriation changes the shape of adoption function. In Ap-
pendix B, we show that as long as p > 0, the adoption function has a minimum point
at x∗t = p ≥ 0 instead of x∗t = 0 as in the case of p = 0. As a result, a part of
the adoption function is now located below the horizontal line representing the payoff
from the storage technology, which was not the case in the absence of expropriation.
We call the set of values of x∗t corresponding to this part of the adoption function as
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”non-convergence set”. This set is represented as a bold section on the horizontal axis.
In point A the capitalist is indifferent between acquiring a new technology or in-
vesting into the storage asset. Therefore, this point corresponds to the share x∗t > 0
satisfying equation (4.20), which we reproduce below for convenience:
(1− ϕ(x∗t ))θ1+θ2
[
1− x∗t + (1− p)
1 + ϕ(x∗t )
1− ϕ(x∗t )
]
= 2− p
As in the case of x∗t > 0 the level of technology becomes higher, from equation
(4.16) it follows that the next generation t+1 will choose x∗t+1 < x
∗
t . As x
∗
t+1 does not
satisfy equation (4.20), the right-hand side of this expression becomes larger than its
left-hand side. The latter implies that the storage technology will thus pay a higher re-
turn to the capitalist belonging to generation t+1, and, as the result, the capitalist does
not have incentives to invest into a new technology. Therefore, the level of technology
in Home ADt,1 remains lower than the world technological frontier A
F .
From equation (4.17) it follows that expropriation also lowers the rate of human
capital accumulation. As expropriation reduces investment into a new technology,
employees, correspondingly, reduce their investments into human capital. The latter
implies that, in addition to a non-reducible technological gap A
F
ADt,1
, expropriation also
results in a constant educational gap between economies D and F , reflected in h
F,1
t
hD,1t,1
>
1 and h
F,2
hD,2t,1
> 1. Therefore, a positive probability of expropriation p also leads to
educational backwardness.
From equation (4.24) it follows that technological and educational gaps translate
into a non-reducible output gap. Therefore, in the presence of expropriation the output
gap between economiesD and F always remains positive, which implies that Y
F
t
Y Dt,1
> 2.
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4.4 Political Equilibrium
As expropriation results in a lower pace of technological development, slower human
capital accumulation, and, as a consequence, lower rate of economic growth, an in-
stitutional reform which reduces the risk of expropriation, might help the economy to
transit to its expropriation-free version. The implementation of this policy therefore
should gain substantial popularity, as it makes everyone, apart from the corrupt regime,
better off.
To show why the latter might be the case, we combine equations (4.17), (4.14) and
(4.15) to derive the optimal life-time labor incomes belonging to typical individuals
from high-educated and low-educated groups, which, respectively, correspond to the
following expressions:
wD,1t,1 + w
D,1
t,2 =
= θ1
(
ADt,1
)1−θ1−θ2 (
hD,1t,1
)θ1 (
hD,2t,1 n
D
2
)θ2 (
nD1
)θ1−1 2
(1− ϕt)1−θ1−θ2
(4.26)
wD,2t,1 + w
D,2
t,2 =
= θ2
(
ADt,1
)1−θ1−θ2 (
hD,1t,1 n
D
1
)θ1 (
hD,2t,1
)θ2 (
nD2
)θ2−1 2
(1− ϕt)1−θ1−θ2
(4.27)
As, according to equation (4.17), a higher pace of technological evolution results
in a larger ϕt, from equations (4.26) and (4.27) it follows that a faster technological
progress increases the level of life-time income for both groups of employees. There-
fore, as an institutional reform results in faster technological development, it benefits
all the employees, as well as the capitalist. As a consequence, a political regime which
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eliminates expropriation should earn substantial popularity, and thus the presence of
political competition should help to solve the problem of expropriation, as individuals
receive an opportunity to replace the regime which practices expropriation with the one
which instead will eliminate it. We show, however, that low-educated employees might
not support the reformist policy, and therefore regardless the harm the expropriating
regime produces for the economy, it can nevertheless be politically survivable.
In this section, we incorporate political competition into the model and introduce
two political regimes. We assume that under the rule of clientelistic regime the qual-
ity of institutions remains low, which is reflected in a positive level of probability of
expropriation p, while the reformist regime instead chooses high-quality institutions
resulting in p = 0. As we show, even though the policy of the reformist regime re-
sults in faster economic growth, the latter might play little role for the representative
low-educated employee.14 On the contrary, income transfers can make the current gen-
eration of low-educated individuals substantially better off. Therefore, if low-educated
employees make up a majority of population and thus play an important political role,
providing income redistribution might become a key to political success.
4.4.1 The Reformist Regime
We, first, consider a policy which is implemented by the reformist regime. We assume
that the latter eliminates expropriation, and therefore the probability of expropriation p
becomes equal to 0. As a result, inequality (4.22) changes to the following expression:
(1− ϕ(x∗t ))θ1+θ2
[
1− x∗t +
1 + ϕ(x∗t )
1− ϕ(x∗t )
]
≥ 2 (4.28)
As we show in Appendix A, when p = 0, the left-hand side of inequality (4.28)
14This is a consequence of a low labor income of the representative employee belonging to the low-
educated cohort. The income level is low as the output share belonging to the less educated group,
i.e. θ2, is small, and, moreover, the number of low-educated employees is instead large, which lowers
this group’s per capita labor income even further. As a consequence, even fast economic growth might
result in a too small increase in per capita income level of the representative employee belonging to the
low-educated cohort.
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becomes a monotonic function of x∗t , which is reflected in Figure 1 in the previous
section. From Figure 1 it follows that in the absence of expropriation the adoption
function is placed above the storage technology line as long as x∗t > 0. The latter im-
plies that the payoff from investing into a new technology is always at least as large as
the one from investing into the storage asset, and therefore the capitalist acquires new
technologies until economy D entirely converges to the world technological frontier.
As x∗t remains positive as long as economy D converges to the leading frontier,
from equation (4.17) it follows that high-educated and low-educated employees ac-
quire additional human capital, i.e. ϕt = ϕ1t = ϕ
2
t > 0. As investment into new
technologies and human capital remains positive along economy D’s path towards the
leading technological frontier, the output gap function, corresponding to the following
equation
Y F
Y Dt,1
= 2
(
AF
ADt,1
)1−θ1−θ2 (hF,1
hD,1t,1
)θ1 (
hF,2
hD,2t,1
)θ2
moves down and for a particular generation t it becomes equal to 2, which implies that
the output level in D entirely converges to the one in economy F .
We therefore conclude that the reformist policy results in faster economic growth
and lets economy D reach substantially larger level of income, benefiting all the em-
ployees.
4.4.2 The Clientelistic Regime
Even though higher-quality institutions, corresponding to p = 0, result in faster growth,
its benefits might be inequally allocated among the employees. To show this, we again
consider labor incomes which are earned by the more educated and the less educated
groups working at the representative firm. The high-educated group employed at a
typical firm receives the following income:
nDt,1
(
wD,1t,1 + w
D,1
t,2
)
= θ1y
D
t (4.29)
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while the labor income of low-educated employees is instead as large as the following:
nDt,2
(
wD,2t,1 + w
D,2
t,2
)
= θ2y
D
t (4.30)
The representative capitalist receives the remaining part of income, i.e. (1− θ1 − θ2) yDt .
We notice that, given our assumption about income shares, i.e. θ1 > θ2, form
equations (4.29) and (4.30) it follows that per capita income level in the more educated
group is larger than the one in the low-educated cohort whenever nDt,1 ≤ nDt,2, i.e. when
the size of the less educated group is at least as large as the size of the more educated
one. The latter result follows directly after we divide equations (4.29) and (4.30), over
nDt,1 and n
D
t,2 respectively, such that they transform into per capita labor incomes:
wD,1t,1 + w
D,1
t,2 =
θ1y
D
t
nDt,1
(4.31)
wD,2t,1 + w
D,2
t,2 =
θ2y
D
t
nDt,2
(4.32)
From equation (4.32) it follows that a low θ2 and a high nDt,2, both lead to a low
level of per capita income in the less educated group. As a consequence, even fast
economic growth can add too little to the level of per capita income within the low-
educated cohort. Less educated employees can therefore be sensitive to redistribution
policy, as the latter might result in a larger increase in the level of per capita income.
Therefore, even though the clientelistic regime can not compete with the reformist one
regarding economic growth, it can, however, provide larger income transfers to the
low-educated cohort.
We assume that under the rule of the clientelistic regime, the share of the low-
educated cohort in output is as large as βC,2t ≥ θ2, while under the rule of the reformist
regime it is instead equal to βR,2t ≥ θ2.
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4.4.3 Political Competition
We assume that the low-educated cohort forms a majority in economy D, and, there-
fore, the representative employee from this group plays a pivotal role in politics.15
To earn political sympathies of a typical employee from the low-educated cohort,
the clientelistic regime should implement redistribution policy which makes the em-
ployee’s income larger than the one which she would receive under the reformist
regime’s rule. The latter is reflected in the following expression:
wCt,1 + w
C
t,2 ≥ wRt,1 + wRt,2 (4.33)
wherewCt,1+w
C
t,2 is the representative low-educated employee’s labor income under
the clientelistic regime rule, while wRt,1 + w
R
t,2 corresponds instead to the level of her
labor income in the economy where the reformist regime is in power. We denote the
lowest βC,2t satisfying inequality (4.33) as β
C,2
t,min,
16 and therefore at point βC,2t = β
C,2
t,min
inequality (4.33) transforms into the following equation:
βC,2t,min
2
(1− ϕt(p))1−θ1−θ2
= βR,2t
2
(1− ϕt)1−θ1−θ2
(4.34)
We notice that βC,2t,min should be less than 1, as if β
C,2
t,min is instead equal to 1 then
neither the capitalist, nor the employees belonging to the other group receive a positive
income.17
After rearranging, equation (4.34) turns into the following expression:
βC,2t,min =
(
1− ϕt (p)
1− ϕt
)1−θ1−θ2
βR,2t (4.35)
15The latter assumption holds for developing economies, where the level of education is compara-
tively low.
16We consider the minimum level of redistribution βC,2t,min as the ruling regime receives
p (1− β1 − β2)Yt,2 and therefore it has incentives to minimize the level of β2, as the latter results
in a higher level of regime’s income.
17We assume that all the employees and the capitalists receive a strictly positive income.
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We notice that the share of human capital endowment which is invested in the
acquisition of additional human capital, i.e. ϕt, is positively linked with the rate of
economic growth: a larger level of ϕt results in faster growth in economy D. We
therefore can use ϕt to measure the pace of output growth.
From equation (4.35) it follows that a large difference between growth rate un-
der the reformist regime rule and the one under the rule of clientelistic alternative,
reflected in 1−ϕt(p)
1−ϕt , and a higher share in output β
R,2
t of a typical employee from the
low-educated group under the rule of the reformist regime, both result in a higher level
of βC,2t,min, the representative employee´s share in output when the clientelistic regime is
in power.
Regarding the difference in growth rates reflected in 1−ϕt(p)
1−ϕt , a positive probability
of expropriation p > 0 under the clientelistic regime rule results in a lower level of
investment in the acquisition of new technologies, a slower speed of human capital
accumulation and, as a consequence, a smaller pace of economic growth compared to
the case when expropriation is instead absent. A higher level of p results in a larger
difference between growth rates under the rule of reformist and clientelistic regimes,
reflected in a larger value of 1−ϕt(p)
1−ϕt . Moreover, if economy D ends up in a non-
convergence trap, then no investment into new technology and human capital takes
place, and, as a result, ϕt (p) = 0, i.e. economy D does not grow at all.
From equation (4.27) it follows that a higher probability of expropriation p also
translates into slower growth of a low-educated employee’s labor income wCt,1 + w
C
t,2.
To compensate for a slower growth of the representative low-educated employee’s
income, i.e. wCt,1 + w
C
t,2, the clientelistic regime needs to transfer more output to a
typical low-educated employee, which results in a higher level of βC,2t,min.
A higher share in output belonging to the representative employee from the low-
educated group under the reformist regime´s rule, i.e. a higher βRt,2, also induces the
clientelistic regime to redistribute more output towards the employees.
Therefore, if under the reformist regime rule the economy is growing at a high rate,
compared to the rate under the rule of the clientelistic regime, and, moreover, employ-
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ees benefit from growth, from equation (4.35) it follows that βC,2t,min should be large to
let the clientelistic regime win the political competition against the reformist opponent.
As the maximum value of βC,2t,min is strictly lower than 1, the reformist regime can there-
fore choose the share βR,2t such that winning political competition becomes impossible
for the clientelistic regime. From equation (4.35) it follows that for the latter to be the
case, the lowest value of βR,2t should be equal to the following expression:
βR,2t,min =
(
1− ϕt
1− ϕt(p)
)1−θ1−θ2
(4.36)
as, if equation (4.36) holds, the level of βC,2t,min is equal to 1, which contradicts our
assumption that the largest βC,2t,min should be instead strictly less than 1. From equa-
tion (4.36) it follows that a larger difference between growth rates under the reformist
and clientelistic regimes rules results in a lower right-hand side of equation (4.36),
and therefore the reformist regime needs to redistribute comparatively less income to
win political competition against the clientelistic alternative. The difference between
growth rates is large when the probability of expropriation p is high, as in this case
ϕt(p) is low compared to ϕt. On the contrary, the difference between growth rates is
comparatively low if the clientelistic regime is less corrupt, or when D becomes more
matured economy, as in the latter case, according to equation (4.17), ϕt is relatively
low, and therefore the difference between ϕt and ϕt(p) is low as well. The latter result
implies that as soon as D becomes more developed, the level of redistribution which
is implemented by the reformist regime should increase. We, therefore, notice the
important difference between policies in the less developed economies and the more
developed ones: in the latter, redistribution plays a comparatively more important role
in political competition than in the former.
If, however, the reformist regime redistributes less than what is implied by equation
(4.36), as, for instance, βRt,2 = θ2, corresponding to the case of no redistribution, then
political opportunities of the clientelistic regime become larger.
We summarize our findings in the following proposition:
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Proposition 2. A high difference between growth rates under the rule of the reformist
and the clientelistic regimes, reflected in a large distance between ϕt and ϕt(p), and
a large share in output belonging to the representative employee under the reformist
regime’s rule βR,2t , all reduce the clientelistic regime’s political opportunities.
Proof. From equation (4.35) it follows that a larger distance between ϕt, reflecting
the rate of growth under the reformist regime, and ϕt(p), corresponding to growth rate
when instead the clientelistic regime is in power, and a higher βR,2t reflecting the output
share of the representative employee from the low-educated group under the reformist
regime, all result in a higher level of βC,2t,min, the output share belonging to a typical
employee when the clientelistic regime is in office. As βC,2t,min should be strictly lower
than 1, there is less chance that βC,2t,min corresponding to equation (4.35) will meet the
latter requirement, when the difference between ϕt and ϕt(p), as well as the level of
βR,2t , are large.
4.4.4 Discussion
We therefore conclude that redistribution might be important for political survival of
the reformist regime. If the difference between growth rates provided by two regimes
is comparatively low, income redistribution might be a key to political feasibility of
growth enhancing policy.
What are the alternatives to the policy of income redistribution? Is there another
policy which, on one hand, is effective for enhancing political popularity of the re-
formist regime, but can also capitalize resources which are invested into it? As we
argue, even though such a policy exists, its benefits, however, are realized in the long
run. Within a shorter period of time, income redistribution is still necessary to facilitate
political survival of the reformist regime.
Notice that political survival of the clientelistic regime also becomes low when the
representative employee belongs to the high-educated group. In this case, equation
(4.35) changes to the following expression:
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βC,2t,min =
(
1− ϕt (p)
1− ϕt
)1−θ1−θ2
θ1 (4.37)
As 1−ϕt(p)
1−ϕt is larger than 1, and θ1 is large compared to θ2, β
C,2
t,min should also be suffi-
ciently large. As βC,2t,min is strictly lower than 1 by assumption, there is little chance that
the clientelistic regime will win the political competition.
However, for the high-educated group to make up a majority, the ruling regime
should implement an educational policy, which, at a particular cost, transfers a larger
per capita share δ1 of the aggregate human capital stockHDt−1,2 to the majority of young
individuals. The latter reform corresponds to the Inclusive Growth policy, which we
briefly mentioned in the introductory part of the chapter. The policy aims to increase
the level of productivity in a developing society, in order to enhance the effect of
economic growth: ”While absolute pro-poor growth can be the result of direct income
redistribution schemes, for growth to be inclusive, productivity must be improved and
new employment opportunities created. In short, inclusive growth is about raising the
pace of growth and enlarging the size of the economy, while levelling the playing field
for investment and increasing productive employment opportunities”.18
In the extension to our chapter, which we present in the following subsection, we
show that, regardless the benefits this policy brings about to economy D, as, for in-
stance, ”enlarging the size of the economy”, ”raising the pace of growth” or increasing
the size of the high-educated cohort, it still might be less popular than the conventional
income redistribution policy which can be implemented by the clientelistic regime.
The key assumption which leads to this result is that the implementation of this pol-
icy might take a lot of time, as, for instance, transferring human capital is typically a
long-term process, and therefore the main benefits of it will impact the following, but
not the current generation of the low-educated employees, who instead will stay unaf-
fected. Inclusive growth thus can not be a substitute for income transfers in the short
18The World Bank (2009).
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run. As a result, the current generation of low-educated individuals remains sensitive
to income transfers, and if the latter are not provided by the reformist regime, then
political chances of the clientelistic alternative become higher.
4.5 Extension: Inclusive Growth and Redistribution
As we mentioned in the previous subsection, economic growth alone might be insuffi-
cient to deliver benefits to a broad cohort of individuals, as in the presence of a large
disadvantaged group, benefits from the implementation of the institutional reform will
not be equally distributed. A typical employee belonging to the high-educated cohort
will derive substantial benefits from the introduction of the reform, which, however,
will not be the case for the representative employee from the low-educated group.
This, however, can be changed if the ruling regime transfers more human capital to
employees, therefore increasing the size of the high-educated group.19 At the same
time, we assume that this policy affects the next generation of employees, but not the
current one.
To show how does this reform can be implemented, we maximize equations (4.10)
and (4.13) with respect to ϕ1t and ϕ
2
t again, which, as was shown in Section 3, results
in the following expression:
ϕ2t = ϕ
1
t =
AHt,2 (xt)− AHt,1
AHt,2 (xt) + A
H
t,1
(4.38)
We combine equations (4.38), (4.10) and (4.13) to derive labor incomes belonging
to the representative employees from the high-educated and the low-educated groups.
As a result, we receive that the representative individual belonging to the more
19This is, of course, the reformist regime which implements this policy, as the clientelistic one does
not have insentives to introduce such a reform.
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educated cohort earns the following income:
wD,1t,1 + w
D,1
t,2 = θ1
(
hD,1t,1
)θ1
(nD1 )
1−θ1
(
AHt,1
)θ1 (
hD,2t,1 n
D
2
)θ2 2
(1− ϕ1t )1−θ1−θ2
(4.39)
The equilibrium level of labor income of her counterpart from the less educated
group is instead as large as:
wD,2t,1 + w
D,2
t,2 = θ2
(
hD,2t,1
)θ2
(nD2 )
1−θ2
(
AHt,1
)θ1 (
hD,1t,1 n
D
1
)θ1 2
(1− ϕ1t )1−θ1−θ2
(4.40)
The ratio between equation (4.39) and equation (4.40) reflects the wage gap be-
tween two groups of employees:
wD,1t,1 + w
D,1
t,2
wD,2t,1 + w
D,2
t,2
=
θ1
θ2
nD2
nD1
(4.41)
As was shown in the previous subsection, from equation (4.41) it follows that a
larger number of employees belonging to the less educated group, reflected in higher
nD2 , and a low importance of this group for production, which is mirrored in a low
level of θ2, both result in a smaller w
D,2
t,1 +w
D,2
t,2 , the labor income of a typical individ-
ual from the low-educated group, compared to wD,1t,1 + w
D,1
t,2 , the labor income of the
representative individual belonging to the high-educated cohort.
As a consequence, the implementation of a policy which eliminates expropriation
and therefore enhances economic growth, might produce a limited effect on the low-
educated group. Even fast economic growth might result in a too small increase in
per capita income level of the representative employee belonging to the less educated
cohort. The positive effect of a reform which reduces the risk of expropriation can,
however, become more substantial for the low-educated group if such a reform is com-
plemented by an educational policy which results in transferring the high per capita
share δ1 of the aggregate human capital stock Ht−1,2 to a larger group of employees.
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As a result of the educational policy, the number of low-educated employees reduces,
while the size of the high-educated cohort instead increases. Therefore, n
D
2
nD1
reduces,
and thus according to equation (4.41) the wage gap becomes lower. To implement
this policy, the reformist regime needs to spend a particular amount of output which it
receives from taxing the capitalist.
We assume that this reform does not, however, affect the current generation of
employees. Instead, it impacts individuals belonging to generation t+ 1.20 As a result
of this reform, a high level of human capital endowment hD,1t+1,1 is transferred to a
broader group of individuals belonging to generation t + 1, and therefore the size of
the high-educated group increases. As a consequence, a reform which eliminates the
risk of expropriation will benefit a larger number of employees, as the more educated
employees’ labor income is higher compared to the one of the low-educated workers.
We show in Appendix F, that the optimal number of high-educated employees be-
longing to generation t + 1, n∗t+1,1 is derived from maximization of the following
expression:
yt+1,1(n
D
1 ) + yt+1,2(n
D
1 ) −→ max
nDt+1,1
(4.42)
and satisfies the following condition:
θ1
θ2
n∗t+1,2
n∗t+1,1
= 1 (4.43)
We notice that from equations (4.43) and (4.41) it follows that if the number of em-
ployees belonging to the more educated group is defined optimally, the labor incomes
of two groups of employees become identical:
wD,1t+1,1 + w
D,1
t+1,2 = w
D,2
t+1,1 + w
D,2
t+1,2 (4.44)
As θ1 > θ2 by assumption, which implies that the high-educated group is more
20The rest of employees from generation t + 1 are provided with the low per capita share δ2 in
aggregated human capital stock Ht−1,2, δ2 < δ1.
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important for production, from equation (4.43) it therefore follows that in the optimum
the number of low-educated employees n∗t+1,2 should be lower than the size of the high-
educated cohort, i.e. n∗t+1,1. As a result, economic growth will benefit a larger number
of employees, as the low-educated cohort becomes smaller, while the high-educated,
and better paid one instead becomes larger.
We combine identity nD = nDt+1,1 + n
D
t+1,2 with equation (4.43) to receive the
following solutions:
n∗t+1,1 = n
D θ1
θ1 + θ2
(4.45)
and
n∗t+1,2 = n
D θ2
θ1 + θ2
(4.46)
From equations (4.45) and (4.46) it follows that a larger importance of the high-
educated group for production reflected in a higher level of θ1 results in a larger optimal
number of high-educated individuals n∗t+1,1.
We summarize our findings in the following proposition:
Proposition 3. If high-educated employees are more important for production, i.e. if
θ1 > θ2, then the optimal size of the more educated group belonging to generation
t+ 1 will be larger than its low-educated counterpart, i.e. n∗t+1,1 > n
∗
t+1,2.
Proof. If the high-educated group is more important for production than the low-
educated one, i.e. if θ1 is larger than θ2, then according to equations (4.45) and (4.46)
the number of high-educated individuals n∗t+1,1 is larger than n
∗
t+1,2, reflecting instead
the size of the low-educated group. This establishes the result
As the labor incomes within the high-educated and the low-educated cohorts are
the same when equation (4.43) holds, i.e. wD,1t+1,1 + w
D,1
t+1,2 = w
D,2
t+1,1 + w
D,2
t+1,2, both
groups of employees equally benefit from economic growth. Moreover, wD,2t+1,1+w
D,2
t+1,2
satisfying equation (4.44) is larger than the level of labor income belonging to the rep-
resentative low-educated employee in the case of non-optimally large size of the less
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educated group. This implies that the less educated cohort can derive higher benefits
from economic growth and therefore the institutional reform which was considered in
the previous subsection, not only results in higher rates of economic growth, but also
benefits a larger cohort of employees.21
Our findings are consistent with the resent history of Georgia, where in October
2012, after 8 years of reforms, president Saakashvili’s United National Movement lost
elections against the Georgian Dream, a populist alternative established by a billionaire
Bidzina Ivanishvili. Despite the reforms which resulted in a substantial improvement
in the public sector quality, corresponding, in terms of our model, to a lower p, and
higher growth rates reflected in a larger ϕt, Saakashvili’s rule was also characterized
by a low level of redistribution and relatively high poverty. Growth was not followed
by an adequate job creation, while, by contrast, wages of employed individuals were
increasing substantially. In terms of our model, employed Georgians can be consid-
ered as individuals with a high level of human capital endowment hD,1t,1 , while poor
Georgians instead correspond to those employees who inherited a low human capital
21We also notice that if the number of high-educated individuals in economy D is lower than the
level n∗t+1,1 corresponding to equation (4.45), then the output gap between countries D and F remains
positive even if the level of technology and the human capital stock in economyD catch up with the ones
in country F . To show this, we normalize equation (4.23) which reflects the level of output produced
by generation t+ 1 in economy F in the absence of technological development:
Y Ft+1 = 2L
F
(
AFt+1,1
)1−θ1−θ2 (
hF,1t+1,1n
F
t+1,1
)θ1 (
hF,2t+1,1n
F
t+1,2
)θ2
(4.47)
over the level of output produced by generation t + 1 in country D in period j = 1 if the level of
technology in D also remains constant
Y Dt+1 = L
H
(
AHt+1,1
)1−θ1−θ2 (
hD,1t+1,1n
D
t+1,1
)θ1 (
hD,2t+1,1n
D
t+1,2
)θ2
(4.48)
which, if technology and human capital stocks are the same in F and D, results in the following
expression:
Y Ft+1
Y Dt+1
= 2
(
nFt+1,1
nDt+1,1
)θ1 (
nFt+1,2
nDt+1,2
)θ2
(4.49)
As it follows from equation (4.49), if the number of high-educated employees nFt+1,1 in economy F
is chosen optimally, while in country D the size of the high-educated cohort nDt+1,1 is lower than it is
optimally required, then, as θ1 > θ2, the output gap remains positive, i.e.
Y Ft+1
Y Dt+1
> 2, even if technology
and the level of human capital in economy D are as large as the ones in country F .
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level hD,2t,1 . As poor individuals did not benefit from growth, their incentives to vote for
Saakashvili and his reforms were low. Instead, they granted their votes to a political
force which was characterized by a larger corruption potential, but promised to provide
more redistribution.
4.6 Conclusion
We consider a non-overlapping generations economy where individuals combine hu-
man capital and technology to produce output. Each generation lives for two periods
and is made up of capitalists who own a technology, and two groups of employees,
possessing instead the human capital stock. Each capitalist employs a particular num-
ber of individuals from both groups in order to produce output. Using a possibility
of adoption from exogenously given leading technological frontier, the representative
capitalist improves upon a technology which he inherited from the previous generation.
In our setting, high-educated employees inherit a large human capital endowment,
while their low-educated counterparts, by contrast, receive a low level of human capi-
tal stock from the previous generation. Both groups of employees, a high-educated and
a low-educated one, invest in the acquisition of additional human capital. As human
capital and technology are complementary factors of production, employees accumu-
late more human capital if the pace of technological evolution is larger. The latter
occurs when the capitalist invests more in the acquisition of a new technology.
According to our assumption, the high-educated cohort is more important for pro-
duction, and therefore it acquires a larger share in output and thus receives higher ben-
efits when the latter increases. The share of the low-educated group is instead smaller,
and, if this cohort makes up a majority of population, the level of per capita income in
this group, as well as benefits from economic growth, are low.
We also introduce low-quality institutions into the benchmark economy and show
how do bad institutions result in a lower level of investment into a new technology,
slower accumulation of human capital stock and a smaller pace of economic growth.
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In the presence of low-quality institutions the economy can not converge to the leading
technological frontier and therefore remains a technological laggard.
We then assess under which circumstances a reform which improves the quality of
institutions, increases the pace of economic growth, and thus makes all the employees,
as well as the capitalists, better off, might be politically infeasible. To this end, we in-
corporate political competition into the model and consider two political regimes, one
of them practicing expropriation and therefore maintaining the quality of institutions
at a low level, while the other, by contrast, improving the quality of institutions. In or-
der to gain political popularity, the former implements income redistribution, making
transfers to the low-educated cohort. If less educated individuals make up a major-
ity of population, their per capita income level is low, and so are their benefits from
economic growth. As a result, the low-educated group’s sensitivity to income redistri-
bution remains high. We conclude that the alternative regime should complement its
institutional reform with income redistribution policy to become more popular than its
clientelistic opponent. If instead the redistribution policy is neglected by the reformist
regime, its popularity might be low, and therefore the institutional reform can become
less politically feasible.
As an alternative to income redistribution, we consider a policy which, instead of
redistributing incomes, transfers more human capital to employees in order to enhance
social mobility, enlarge the high-educated cohort and therefore broaden the group of
employees benefiting from economic growth. We assume, however, that the latter ef-
fect realizes in the long run, therefore affecting the next generation, but not the current
one. As a result, this policy might substitute income redistribution in the long run,
however, in the short run income transfers remain an important component of political
competition. We suggest to replace income transfers with growth enhancing policy
gradually, redistributing less to those individuals who transited to the high-educated
cohort and continuing transferring incomes to those ones who instead remain poor.
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4.7 Appendices
4.7.1 Appendix A
Appendix A.1. Derivation of equations (4.16), (4.86), (4.17). In period j = 1 a
typical employee belonging to the more educated group receives the following wage:
wD,1t,1 = θ1
(
ADt,1
)1−θ1−θ2 (
hD,1t,1
(
1− ϕ1t
))θ1 (
hD,1t,2 n
D
2
(
1− ϕ2t
))θ2 (
nD1
)θ1−1 (4.50)
and in period j = 2 the same employee receives instead the wage rate which is
equal to:
wD,1t,2 = θ1
(
ADt,2
)1−θ1−θ2 (
hD,1t,1
(
1 + ϕ1t
))θ1 (
hD,1t,2 n
D
2
(
1 + ϕ2t
))θ2 (
nD1
)θ1−1 (4.51)
Similarly, in period j = 1 an employee from the more educated cohort receives the
following wage:
wD,2t,1 = θ2
(
ADt,1
)1−θ1−θ2 (
hD,1t,1 n
D
1
(
1− ϕ1t
))θ1 (
hD,1t,2
(
1− ϕ2t
))θ2 (
nD2
)θ2−1 (4.52)
and in period j = 2 the same employee receives the wage rate which is equal to:
wD,2t,2 = θ2
(
ADt,2
)θ1 (
h1n
D
1
(
1 + ϕ1t
))θ1 (
h2
(
1 + ϕ2t
))θ2 (nD2 )θ2−1 (4.53)
An employee from the more educated group solves the following problem:
wD,1t,1 + w
D,1
t,2 −→ max
ϕ1t
(4.54)
While her counterpart from the less educated group instead maximizes the follow-
ing payoff function:
wD,2t,1 + w
D,2
t,2 −→ max
ϕ2t
(4.55)
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The capitalist maximizes his payoff, which is equal to the following expression:
(1− xt)
[
yDt,1 − nD1 wD,1t,1 − nD2 wD,2t,1
]
+ (1− p)
[
yDt,2 − nD1 wD,1t,2 − nD2 wD,2t,2
]
−→ max
xt
(4.56)
where
yDt,1 =
(
ADt,1
)1−θ1−θ2 (
hD,1t,1 n
D
1
(
1− ϕ1t
))θ1 (
hD,2t,1 n
D
2
(
1− ϕ2t
))θ2
and
yDt,2 =
(
ADt,2
)1−θ1−θ2 (
hD,1t,1 n
D
1
(
1 + ϕ1t
))θ1 (
hD,2t,1 n
D
2
(
1 + ϕ2t
))θ2
After taking derivatives and rearranging we receive the following first order condi-
tions: (
ADt,2 (xt)
ADt,1
)1−θ1−θ2 (
1 + ϕ1t
1− ϕ1t
)θ1
=
(
1 + ϕ2t
1− ϕ2t
)1−θ2
(4.57)
or (
ADt,2 (xt)
ADt,1
)1−θ1−θ2 (
1 + ϕ2t
1− ϕ2t
)θ2
=
(
1 + ϕ1t
1− ϕ1t
)1−θ1
(4.58)
and(
ADt,2 (xt)
ADt,1
)1−θ1−θ2 (
1 + ϕ1t
1− ϕ1t
)θ1 (1 + ϕ2t
1− ϕ2t
)θ2
=
ADt,2
(1− θ1 − θ2) (1− p) ∂(A
D
t,2(xt))
∂xt
(4.59)
Dividing equation (4.57) over equation (4.58) results in the following expression:
1 + ϕ2t
1− ϕ2t
=
1 + ϕ1t
1− ϕ1t
(4.60)
which, after rearranging, leads to the following result:
ϕ2t = ϕ
1
t (4.61)
Substituting equation (4.60) into equation (4.59) and equation (4.58) results in the
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following expression:
ADt,2 (xt)
ADt,1
=
1 + ϕ2t
1− ϕ2t
=
1 + ϕ1t
1− ϕ1t
(4.62)
or, after rearranging:
ϕ2t = ϕ
1
t =
ADt,2 (xt)− ADt,1
ADt,2 (xt) + A
D
t,1
(4.63)
From equations (4.59) and (4.60) results in the following expression:
∂ADt,2
∂xt
=
ADt,1
(1− θ1 − θ2) (1− p) (4.64)
One can combine equation (4.64) with equation (4.8) or with equation (4.85) from
Appendix D to derive equation (4.16) or equation (4.86) respectively.
Dynamics of x∗t . We can rewrite equation (4.16) as follows:
η′(x∗t ) =
1
(1− θ1 − θ2) (1− p)
(
AFt−1,1(1+g)
ADt−1,1+η(x
∗
t−1)(AFt−1,1−ADt−1,1)
− 1
) (4.65)
From equation (4.65) it follows that when the denominator of
AFt−1,1(1 + g)
ADt−1,1 + η(x
∗
t−1)
(
AFt−1,1 − ADt−1,1
)
increases more than its numerator, the economy approaches the leading technological
frontier, and therefore the gap between the level of local technology and the leading
frontier reduces.
As
AFt,1
ADt,1
positively affects the level of x∗t , this implies that x
∗
t < x
∗
t−1.
When, on the contrary, the denominator of
AFt−1,1(1 + g)
ADt−1,1 + η(x
∗
t−1)
(
AFt−1,1 − ADt−1,1
)
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increases less than the numerator, then the distance to technological frontier increases
as well, which results in x∗t > x
∗
t−1.
Finally, when the numerator of
AFt−1,1(1 + g)
ADt−1,1 + η(x
∗
t−1)
(
AFt−1,1 − ADt−1,1
)
increases as much as does the denominator, x∗t = x
∗
t−1.
Appendix A.2. Uniqueness and global stability of the steady-state level of x∗t .
First we show uniqueness:
∂
(
x∗t+1
x∗t
)
∂x∗t
=
∂x∗t+1
∂x∗t
x∗t − x∗t+1
(x∗t )
2 < 0
The latter result holds as from equation (4.16) we know that ∂x
∗
t+1
∂x∗t
< 0. This
implies that x
∗
t+1
x∗t
increases when x∗t decreases. As
x∗t+1
x∗t
= 1 in the steady-state, and
x∗t+1
x∗t
is everywhere increasing when x∗t is decreasing, the steady-state is unique.
Global stability of the steady-state level of x∗t .
η′(x∗t ) =
1
(1− θ1 − θ2) (1− p)
(
AFt,1
ADt,1
− 1
) (4.66)
Since η′(x∗t ) is monotonically decreasing in x
∗
t , we can write the following expres-
sion:
x∗t = (η
′)−1
 1
(1− θ1 − θ2) (1− p)
(
AFt,1
ADt,1
− 1
)
 (4.67)
Since η(x∗t ) is concave, which implies that η
′′(x∗t ) < 0, the inverse of η
′(x∗t ), which
is (η′)−1, is also a decreasing function of its argument. To prove global stability, we
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consider x∗t ∈ (x∗, x∗0), where x∗ is a steady-state share in output x∗t , and x∗0 is a share
in output for the initial generation t = 0.
We use equation (4.67) to show that
x∗t+1 − x∗ = (η′)−1
 1
(1− θ1 − θ2) (1− p)
(
AFt+1,1
ADt+1,1(x
∗
t )
− 1
)
−
− (η′)−1
 1
(1− θ1 − θ2) (1− p)
(
AFt,1
ADt,1(x
∗) − 1
)
 =
= −x∗0x∗
(
(η′)−1
)′
> 0 (4.68)
Since we proved that x
∗
t+1
x∗t
increases when x∗t instead decreases, we can now derive
the following result:
x∗t+1
x∗t
− 1 =
(η′)−1
 1
(1−θ1−θ2)
(
AFt+1,1
ADt+1,1(x
∗
t )
−1
)

(η′)−1
 1
(1−θ1−θ2)
(
AFt,1
ADt,1(x
∗
t−1)
−1
)

− 1 < x
∗
x∗
− 1 = 0 (4.69)
Equation (4.68) together with equation (4.69) establishes that for all x∗t ∈ (x∗, x∗0)
the following result holds: x∗t+1 ∈ (x∗, x∗t ). Using a similar argument we can show
that for all x∗t ≤ x∗, x∗t+1 ∈ (x∗t , x∗). Therefore, a sequence {x∗t}∞0 monotonically
converges to x∗ and is globally stable.
Appendix A.3. Adoption function is decreasing in x∗t when p = 0. To show
that (1− ϕ(x∗t ))θ1+θ2
[
1− x∗t + 1+ϕ(x
∗
t )
1−ϕ(x∗t )
]
is increasing with respect to x∗t , we first rewrite
it as follows:
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(
ADt,2 + A
D
t,1
ADt,1
− x∗t
)(
2ADt,1
ADt,2 + A
D
t,1
)θ1+θ2
and then differentiate it with respect to
x∗t :
(
1
1− θ1 − θ2 − 1
)(
2ADt,1
ADt,2 + A
D
t,1
)θ1+θ2
−
− (θ1 + θ2)
(
2ADt,1
ADt,2 + A
D
t,1
)θ1+θ2
ADt,1
(1− θ1 − θ2)
(
ADt,2 + A
D
t,1
) (ADt,2 + ADt,1
ADt,1
− x∗t
)
=
=
(
1
1− θ1 − θ2 − 1
)(
2ADt,1
ADt,2 + A
D
t,1
)θ1+θ2
x∗t
ADt,1
ADt,2 + A
D
t,1
> 0
which establishes the result
4.7.2 Appendix B
We take a derivative of the adoption function Rt with respect to x∗t . First we use
ϕ(x∗t ) =
ADt,2−ADt,1
ADt,2+A
D
t,1
to rewrite the adoption function
Rt = (1− ϕ(x∗t ))θ1+θ2
[
1− x∗t + (1− p)
1 + ϕ(x∗t )
1− ϕ(x∗t )
]
(4.70)
as follows
Rt =
(
2ADt,1
ADt,2 + A
D
t,1
)θ1+θ2 [
ADt,2
ADt,1
(1− p) + 1− x∗t
]
(4.71)
Taking a derivative of equation (4.71) with respect to x∗t results in the following
expression:
∂Rt
∂x∗t
= − (θ1 + θ2)
(
2ADt,1
ADt,2 + A
D
t,1
)θ1+θ2−1 2ADt,1 ∂ADt,2∂x∗t(
ADt,2 + A
D
t,1
)2
(
ADt,2
ADt,1
(1− p) + 1− x∗t
)
+
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+
(1− p) ∂ADt,2∂x∗t
ADt,1
− 1
( 2ADt,1
ADt,2 + A
D
t,1
)θ1+θ2
= (4.72)
From equations (4.8) and (4.16) it follows that
∂ADt,2
∂x∗t
=
ADt,1
(1−θ1−θ2)(1−p) . We therefore
can rewrite equation (4.72) as follows
∂Rt
∂x∗t
=
(
2ADt,1
ADt,2 + A
D
t,1
)θ1+θ2
[
− θ1 + θ2
1− θ1 − θ2
ADt,1
(1− p) (ADt,2 + ADt,1)
(
AD2,t
AD1,t
(1− p) + 1− x∗t
)
+
θ1 + θ2
1− θ1 − θ2
]
=
=
(
2ADt,1
ADt,2 + A
D
t,1
)θ1+θ2
θ1 + θ2
1− θ1 − θ2
[
− A
D
t,2 (1− p)(
ADt,2 + A
D
t,1
)
(1− p) −
ADt,1 (1− x∗t )
(1− p) (ADt,2 + ADt,1) + (1− p)
(
ADt,2 + A
D
t,1
)
(1− p) (ADt,2 + ADt,1)
]
=
=
(
2ADt,1
ADt,2 + A
D
t,1
)θ1+θ2
θ1 + θ2
1− θ1 − θ2
ADt,1
(1− p) (ADt,2 + ADt,1)(x∗t − p) (4.73)
From equation (4.73) it follows that equation (4.70) reaches its minimum when
x∗t = p, it increases whenever x
∗
t > p and declines whenever the opposite occurs.
We now show that the minimum point of equation (4.70) declines when p increases.
We substitute x∗t = p into equation (4.70)
Rt = (1− ϕ(p))θ1+θ2
[
1− p+ (1− p)1 + ϕ(p)
1− ϕ(p)
]
= (1− p) 2
(1− ϕ(p))1−θ1−θ2
(4.74)
and take a derivative of equation (4.74) with respect to p:
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∂Rt
∂p
=
−2 (1− ϕ(p))1−θ1−θ2 + 2 (1− θ1 − θ2) (1− ϕ(p))−θ1−θ2 (1− p)∂ϕ(p)∂p
(1− ϕ(p))2(1−θ1−θ2)
=
=
2
(1− ϕ(p))1−θ1−θ2
[
(1− θ1 − θ2) (1− p)∂ϕ(p)∂p
1− ϕ(p) − 1
]
(4.75)
We substitute ϕ(x∗t ) =
At,2−At,1
At,2+At,1
into equation (4.75) and use equation (4.16) to
receive the following result:
∂Rt
∂p
=
2
(
ADt,2 + A
D
t,1
)1−θ1−θ2(
2ADt,1
)1−θ1−θ2
[
ADt,1
ADt,2 + A
D
t,1
− 1
]
=
−2
(
ADt,2 + A
D
t,1
)1−θ1−θ2(
2ADt,1
)1−θ1−θ2 ADt,2ADt,2 + ADt,1 < 0 (4.76)
Expression (4.76) implies that a larger p reduces the minimum point of Rt.
4.7.3 Appendix C
We now show that a larger p results in a larger x∗t corresponding to the intersection
between equation (4.70) and 2− p.
At the intersection point, equation (4.70) equals to 2− p:
Rt = (1− ϕ(x∗t ))θ1+θ2
[
1− x∗t + (1− p)
1 + ϕ(x∗t )
1− ϕ(x∗t )
]
= 2− p (4.77)
As, according to equation (4.16), x∗t is a function of p, we can rewrite equation
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(4.77) as follow
(1− ϕ(x∗t (p)))θ1+θ2
[
1− x∗t (p) + (1− p)
1 + ϕ(x∗t (p))
1− ϕ(x∗t (p))
]
− 2 + p = 0 (4.78)
We use ϕ(α∗t ) =
ADt,2−ADt,1
ADt,2+A
D
t,1
together with the implicit function theorem to derive the
following result:
−(θ1 + θ2)
(
2ADt,1
ADt,2(x
∗
t (p)) + A
D
t,1
)θ1+θ2−1 2ADt,1 ∂ADt,2∂x∗t(
ADt,2(x
∗
t (p)) + A
D
t,1
)2 ∂x∗t∂p
[
ADt,2(x
∗
t (p))
ADt,1
(1− p) + 1− x∗t (p)
]
+
+
(
2ADt,1
ADt,2(x
∗
t (p)) + A
D
t,1
)θ1+θ2 ∂x∗t
∂p
∂ADt,2
∂x∗t
ADt,1
(1− p)− A
D
t,2(x
∗
t (p))
ADt,1
− ∂x
∗
t
∂p
+ 1 = 0
(4.79)
We can simplify the upper expression in order to receive the following result (most
derivations replicate the ones from Appendix B):
∂x∗t
∂p
=
ADt,2(x
∗
t (p))
ADt,1
−
(
ADt,2(x
∗
t (p))+A
D
t,1
2ADt,1
)θ1+θ2
ADt,1(x
∗
t (p)−p)
(1−p)(ADt,2(x∗t (p))+ADt,1)
(
θ1+θ2
1−θ1−θ2
) (4.80)
To define the sign of equation (4.80) we have to find the sign of x∗t (p) − p and
ADt,2(x
∗
t (p))
At,1
−
(
ADt,2(x
∗
t (p))+A
D
t,1
2ADt,1
)θ1+θ2
. Equation (4.77) holds for a value of x∗t (p) which is
located to the right from the minimum point x∗t (p) = p, i.e. x
∗
t (p) > p, which implies
that x∗t (p)− p > 0. We now rewrite A
D
t,2(x
∗
t (p))
At,1
−
(
ADt,2(x
∗
t (p))+At,1
2At,1
)θ1+θ2
as follows:
ADt,2(x
∗
t (p))
ADt,1
(
ADt,2(x
∗
t (p))+A
D
t,1
2ADt,1
)1−θ1−θ2 − ADt,2(x∗t (p))+ADt,1
2ADt,1(
ADt,2(x
∗
t (p))+A
D
t,1
2ADt,1
)1−θ1−θ2 =
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=
ADt,2(x
∗
t (p))
ADt,1
[(
ADt,2(x
∗
t (p))+A
D
t,1
2ADt,1
)1−θ1−θ2 − 1
2
]
− 1
2(
ADt,2(x
∗
t (p))+A
D
t,1
2ADt,1
)1−θ1−θ2 (4.81)
The numerator of equation (4.81) is positive, since
(
ADt,2(x
∗
t (p))+A
D
t,1
2ADt,1
)1−θ1−θ2
> 1,
which implies that
(
ADt,2(x
∗
t (p))+A
D
t,1
2ADt,1
)1−θ1−θ2
> 1
2
, and therefore, since
ADt,2(x
∗
t (p))
ADt,1
> 1,
ADt,2(x
∗
t (p))
ADt,1
[(
ADt,2(x
∗
t (p))+A
D
t,1
2ADt,1
)1−θ1−θ2 − 1
2
]
> 1
2
as well.
Thus we conclude that ∂x
∗
t
∂p
> 0.
4.7.4 Appendix D
In Section 3 we assumed that the level of AFt is constant, and, as imitation of tech-
nologies from country F was the only opportunity for economy D to improve upon its
domestic technology, the steady-state level of technology in country D also remained
constant. However, as a constant level of the world technological frontier is not a re-
alistic assumption, in this Appendix we allow for a positive growth rate of the leading
technology level, corresponding to AFt , which is the level of technology in country F .
We therefore introduce a more natural assumption of evolving technological frontier,
and assume that the level of technology in economy F grows at a constant rate g.
As it follows from equation (4.16), when the leading technology is growing at a
constant rate g, the steady-state level of ADt also increases at the same rate. However,
even in the absence of expropriation, i.e. when p = 0, the level of technology in
country D can not entirely converge to the one in F . To show the latter, we use the
following result:
ADt,1(1 + g) = η (x
∗)AFt + (1− η (x∗))ADt,1 (4.82)
where x∗ is the steady-state level of x∗t . Equation (4.82) implies that the steady-
state level of ADt increases at a rate g. After rearranging, equation (4.82) results in the
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following expression:
ADt,1 =
η (x∗)AFt
g + η (x∗)
(4.83)
As η(x
∗)
g+η(x∗) is less than 1, from equation (4.83) it follows that the steady-state level
of ADt,1 always remains below A
F
t . Therefore, the level of output in economy D can
not entirely converge to the one in country F . From equation (4.24) it follows that
the output gap always remains positive, as ADt,1, and, as a result, h
D,1
t,1 and h
D,2
t,1 as
well, do not catch up, correspondingly, with AFt,1, h
F,1
t,1 and h
F,1
t,1 . It follows that
Y F
Y Dt,1
=
2
(
AF
ADt,1
)1−θ1−θ2 (
hF,1
hD,1t,1
)θ1 (
hF,2
hD,2t,1
)θ2
, which is equation (4.24), is larger than 2. The
latter implies that D does not catch up with economy F .22
Therefore, to converge to the leading frontier AFt , the level of technology in econ-
omy D should always grow at a rate which is higher than g. To allow for convergence,
we thus assume that country D substitutes imitation of technologies with innovation
as soon as the adoption-induced technological growth becomes sufficiently slow.23
If the capitalist in economy D invests into innovations, he spends a share xt of
his income in period j = 1, which results in a higher level of technology λ(xt)ADt,1
in period j = 2 with probability µ > 0, where λ(xt) ≥ 1, λ′(xt) > 0, λ′′(xt) < 0,
λ(0) = 1, λ′(0) = ∞ and λ′(∞) = 0. With probability 1 − µ investing into a new
technology results instead in no improvement in the level of technology. Therefore, in
period j = 2 the level of technology in economyD equals to the following expression:
ADt,2 = µλ(xt)A
D
t,1 + (1− µ)ADt,1 (4.85)
22From the previous subsection we know that economy D converges to country F entirely when Y
F
t
Y Dt,1
is, on the contrary, equal to 2
23Country D substitutes imitation with innovation when the following inequality holds:
µ ≥ g
λ(x∗t )− 1
(4.84)
Inequality (4.84) implies that starting from a particular level of x∗t innovation results in a faster tech-
nological progress than adoption. As ADt,1 grows faster than A
F
t , the level of technology in economy
D converges to the one in country F . If condition (4.84) instead does not hold, economy D imitates
technologies forever, and therefore economy D never converges to F .
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We then substitute this result into equations (4.9), (4.10) and (4.13). Maximiz-
ing equations (4.9), (4.10) and (4.13) with respect to xt, ϕ1t and ϕ
2
t respectively and
rearranging, results in the following expression:
λ′(x∗t ) =
1
(1− θ1 − θ2) (1− p)µ (4.86)
If the capitalist invests into innovations, the optimal level of xt thus corresponds
to equation (4.86). Therefore, equation (4.86) replaces equation (4.16) if the economy
substitutes imitation with innovation. We notice that, as (1− θ1 − θ2), µ and p are
constants, from equation (4.86) it thus follows that x∗t is a constant as well.
We are ready to formulate our next proposition:
Proposition 3.
The rate of technological development in economy D converges to the unique
steady-state, when the quality of institutions is high, i.e. when the probability of expro-
priation p is equal to zero. In the latter case, the representative capitalist transits from
imitating of technology to innovating, As a result, the steady-state rate of technological
evolution corresponds to the rate of technological innovations.
However, if the quality of institutions is instead low, i.e. when the probability of expro-
priation p is positive, the rate of technological progress in economyD is equal to g, the
rate of evolution of technology in country F . In the latter case, the level of technology
in economy D remains below the world technological frontier AFt .
Proof. We first consider the case when the probability of expropriation p is equal to
zero. If the probability of successful innovation µ is at least as large as g
λ(x∗t )−1 , the rep-
resentative capitalist substitutes imitation with innovation. In the latter case, the pace
of technological evolution is defined from the expropriation-free version of equation
(4.86), which corresponds to the following expression:
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λ′(x∗t ) =
1
(1− θ1 − θ2)µ (4.87)
From equation (4.87) it follows that the optimal level of x∗t is constant, as (1− θ1 − θ2)
and µ are both constants, and therefore it corresponds to the steady-state rate of tech-
nological evolution.
We proceed with considering the case of low-quality institutions, when the proba-
bility of expropriation p is positive. We notice that if the capitalist invests into innova-
tion, his optimal payoff function corresponds to the following expression:
WC =
(
ADt,1
)1−θ1−θ2 (
hD,1t,1 n
D
1
)θ1 (
hD,2t,1 n
D
2
)θ2
(1− ϕ(x∗))θ1+θ2
[
1− x∗ + (1− p)1 + ϕ(x
∗)
1− ϕ(x∗)
]
(4.88)
where (1− ϕ(x∗))θ1+θ2
[
1− x∗ + (1− p)1+ϕ(x∗)
1−ϕ(x∗)
]
is a constant, as x∗ is equal to
a constant.
Normalizing equation (4.88) over
(
ADt,1
)1−θ1−θ2 (hD,1t,1 n1)θ1 (hD,2t,1 n2)θ2 results into
the following expression:
Rt = (1− ϕ(x∗))θ1+θ2
[
1− x∗ + (1− p)1 + ϕ(x
∗)
1− ϕ(x∗)
]
(4.89)
Equation (4.89) corresponds to the innovation function, which we also depict in
the following Figure:
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Figure 3. Non-convergence trap in the case with innovations.
We remind that according to equation (4.20), which we again reproduce below for
convenience:
(1− ϕ(x∗t ))θ1+θ2
[
1− x∗t + (1− p)
1 + ϕ(x∗t )
1− ϕ(x∗t )
]
= 2− p
the adoption function, corresponding to the left-hand side of equation (4.20), decreases
when 0 ≤ x∗t < p, attains its minimum at x∗t = p, and increases when x∗t > p. If the
value of x∗t belongs to the non-convergence set represented as interval [0; x̂
2
t ], where
x̂2t is a positive solution of equation (4.20) corresponding to point A in Figure 3, the
respective value of the adoption function is less than 2 − p. As a consequence, the
capitalist prefers not to invest into a new technology, which results in the absence of
convergence with the leading frontier. In the example which is reflected in Figure 3,
two points at which the innovation function intersects the adoption curve, correspond
to x∗1 and x
∗
2 on the horizontal axis, both belonging to the bold section of the horizontal
axis, reflecting the non-convergence set. The latter implies that economy D does not
transit to the innovation stage.
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We notice the important difference between the case of constant leading technology
AF , which we considered in the previous section, and the one of the current section,
where AFt,1 instead grows at a rate g. In the previous subsection, ending up in the
non-convergence trap resulted in the absence of growth. However, when the world
frontier grows at a positive rate, the trapped economy develops at the same rate as
well. To show the latter result, consider again, as in the previous subsection, point A,
where the capitalist is indifferent between acquiring a new technology and investing
into the storage asset. From equation (4.16) it follows that the next generation t + 1
will choose x∗t+1 < x
∗
t . As x
∗
t+1 does not satisfy equation (4.20), the right-hand side
of this equation becomes larger than its left-hand side. The latter implies that the stor-
age technology will thus pay a higher return to the capitalist belonging to generation
t + 1, and, as the result, the capitalist does not have incentives to invest into a new
technology. As a result, the level of ADt+1,1 remains constant, while the level of the
world technology AFt instead increases at a rate g. As a consequence, next generation
t + 2 inherits a technology which is more faraway from the leading frontier, i.e. the
distance to the world frontier
AFt+2,1
ADt+2,1
becomes larger. From equation (4.16) it follows
that the level of x∗t+2 becomes larger as well. If the distance to the leading frontier
AFt+2,1
ADt+2,1
and therefore the level of x∗t+2, are sufficiently large, the left-hand side of equa-
tion (4.20) becomes larger than its right-hand side, which implies that investing into a
new technology benefits the capitalist more than investing into the storage technology.
As a result of investment into a new technology, the level of ADt+3,1 becomes larger,
which reduces the distance to the leading frontier
AFt+3,1
ADt+3,1
. Because of a smaller
AFt+3,1
ADt+3,1
,
the level of x∗t+3, the optimal share of income the representative capitalist belonging
to generation t+ 3 would invests into a new technology, becomes lower and therefore
investing into a new technology might again be less beneficial for the capitalist. Thus,
the level of technology in D develops when the distance to the world frontier becomes
sufficiently large, and it instead does not evolve when the distance to the leading tech-
nology reduces. On average, the level of technology in economyD grows at the rate g,
i.e. as fast as does the leading technology AFt,1. As a result, A
D
t,1, on average, remains
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a constant fraction of the world technological frontier, which implies that the level of
technology in country D does not converge to the frontier technology.
We therefore conclude that the presence of expropriation reduces the rate of eco-
nomic growth, which results in a non-diminishable distance between the level of tech-
nology in economies F and D.
4.7.5 Appendix E
We take a derivative of
Rt = (1− ϕ(x∗t ))θ1+θ2
[
1− x∗t + (1− p)
1 + ϕ(x∗t )
1− ϕ(x∗t )
]
= 2− p (4.90)
with respect p. We use ϕt =
ADt,2(xt)−ADt,1
ADt,2(xt)+A
D
t,1
to derive the following result:
−(θ1 + θ2)
(
2ADt,1
ADt,2(x
∗
t (p)) + A
D
t,1
)θ1+θ2−1 2ADt,1 ∂ADt,2∂x∗t(
ADt,2(x
∗
t (p)) + A
D
t,1
)2 ∂x∗t∂p
[
ADt,2(x
∗
t (p))
ADt,1
(1− p) + 1− x∗t (p)
]
+
+
(
2ADt,1
ADt,2(x
∗
t (p)) + A
D
t,1
)θ1+θ2 ∂x∗t
∂p
∂ADt,2
∂x∗t
ADt,1
(1− p)− A
D
t,2(x
∗
t (p))
ADt,1
− ∂x
∗
t
∂p
 (4.91)
The derivative of 2 − p with respect to p equals to −1. We need to compare −1
with expression (4.91), or, alternatively
∂x∗t
∂p
ADt,1(x
∗
t (p)− p)
(1− p) (ADt,2(x∗t (p)) + ADt,1)
(
θ1 + θ2
1− θ1 − θ2
)
− A
D
t,2(x
∗
t (p))
ADt,1
(4.92)
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with
(
ADt,2(x
∗
t (p)) + A
D
t,1
2ADt,1
)θ1+θ2
(4.93)
We have already shown that
ADt,2(x
∗
t (p))
ADt,1
>
(
ADt,2(x
∗
t (p))+A
D
t,1
2ADt,1
)θ1+θ2
which implies that
−ADt,2(x∗t (p))
ADt,1
< −
(
ADt,2(x
∗
t (p))+A
D
t,1
2ADt,1
)θ1+θ2
. From λ′(x∗t ) =
1
(1−θ1−θ2)µ we know that
∂x∗t
∂p
<
0. Therefore, if x∗t (p)− p > 0 expression (4.92) is smaller than expression (4.93).
4.7.6 Appendix F
The representative employee from the high-educated cohort receives the following in-
come:
w11 + w
2
1 = θ1
hθ1t,1
n1−θ1t,1
(
ADt,1
)1−θ1−θ2 (
ht,2n
D
t,2
)θ2 2
(1− ϕt)θ1+θ2
(4.94)
while her counterpart from the low-educated group earns instead as much as:
w1t,2 + w
2
t,2 = θ2
hθ2t,2(
nDt,2
)1−θ2 (ADt,1)1−θ1−θ2 (ht,1nDt,1)θ1 2(1− ϕt)θ1+θ2 (4.95)
We divide equation (4.94) over equation (4.95) to receive the following result:
w1t,1 + w
2
t,1
w1t,2 + w
2
t,2
=
θ1
θ2
nDt,2
nDt,1
(4.96)
The reformist regime maximizes the following expression with respect to nt,1
yDt,1 + y
D
t,2 −→ max
nDt,1
(4.97)
Maximization results in the following first order condition:
θ1
1
nDt,1
− θ2 1
n− nDt,1
+ θ1
1
nDt,1
1 + ϕ1t
1− ϕ1t
− θ2 1
n− nDt,1
1 + ϕ1t
1− ϕ1t
= 0 (4.98)
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which simplifies to the following result:
θ1
θ2
nDt,2
nDt,1
= 1 (4.99)
As nDt,1 + n
D
t,2 = n, and the total number of employees in economy D is equal to Ln
D
we can derive the following results:
nDt,1 = n
D θ1
θ1 + θ2
(4.100)
nDt,2 = n
D θ2
θ1 + θ2
(4.101)
Finally, we combine equations (4.99) and (4.96) to receive the following expres-
sion:
w1t,1 + w
2
t,1
w1t,2 + w
2
t,2
= 1 (4.102)
Chapter 5
Nederlandse samenvatting (Summary
in Dutch)
Dit proefschrift behandelt drie verschillende onderwerpen met betrekking tot het ge-
bied van de politieke economie en Economische Ontwikkeling.
Het eerste hoofdstuk, ”Inleiding”, schetst de thesis.
In het tweede hoofdstuk, ”Extractieve instellingen, gesloten grenzen en Economis-
che Ontwikkeling”, beschouw ik een autocratisch regime dat de toegang tot infor-
matie over de buitenwereld beperkt, om te voorkomen dat burgers leren over de re-
latief slechte prestaties van de economie in hun thuisland. Ik analyseer het gebruik
van censuur en modelleer het als een probleem van asymmetrische informatie, in
het kader van een aangepast Solow groeimodel. Ik vind dat een hogere technolo-
gische achterstand, een lagere kwaliteit van de binnenlandse instituten, laag niveau
van de inkomensongelijkheid en lage kosten van het verzamelen van informatie over
de buitenlandse economiee¨n leiden tot restrictievere en uitgebreidere censuur. Deze
bevindingen komen overeen met de verhalen van de socialistische dictaturen, zoals de
voormalige Sovjet-Unie of Noord-Korea, waar zeer restrictieve vormen van censuur
werden/worden gebruikt. Ook verklaar ik waarom de meest restrictieve vormen van
censuur, zoals politiek isolationisme, nu minder populair zijn. Ik betoog dat isolation-
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isme de mogelijkheden voor de invoering van technologiee¨n vermindert, wat resulteert
in onderontwikkeling, een hogere kwetsbaarheid voor negatieve schokken, en poten-
tieel hogere politieke turbulentie. Om dit te voorkomen, doet een regime er goed aan
de meest strenge vormen van censuur niet te implementeren. Deze bevinding is in lijn
met het censuur beleid dat wordt toegepast in hedendaags China.
In het derde hoofdstuk, ”Zijn onderwijsvernieuwingen noodzakelijk bevorderend
voor groei? Zwakke instellingen als de oorzaak van beleidsmislukkelingen”, anal-
yseer ik een ontwikkelende economie, waar een onderwijsvernieuwing die nieuwe
mogelijkheden cree¨hoger niveau van menselijke kapitaal. Om dit probleem aan te
pakken, introduceer ik een dynamisch model waarin de representatieve onderneming
een productiefunctie heeft waarin menselijk kapitaal en het beschikbare niveau van
de technologie complimentair zijn. Het bedrijf investeert in de aankoop van nieuwe
technologie, terwijl werknemers beslissen hoeveel menselijk kapitaal zij verwerven.
De snelheid van de accumulatie van menselijk kapitaal heeft een positief effect op de
groei van de economie en als gevolg daarvan kan een hervorming die het onderwi-
jssysteem verbetert leiden tot een snellere groei. Belangrijk is echter dat, indien eigen-
domsrechten zwak worden afgedwongen, bedrijven beperkte prikkels hebben om te in-
vesteren in de verwerving van nieuwe technologiee¨n. Dit zou de vraag naar menselijk
kapitaal beperken, en zorgt er potentieel voor dat een onderwijsvernieuwing mislukt.
Als eigendomsrechten zwak worden beschermd, leidt een educatieve hervorming tot de
keuze van een hoger niveau van onderwijs alleen als individuen hun menselijk kapitaal
kunnen overdragen naar een andere economie, waar de vraag naar hun vaardigheden
hoger is. Ik concludeer daarmee dat een verbetering van het school-systeem eenduidig
tot een snellere groei leidt alleen als het gecombineerd gaat met een betere handhaving
van het eigendomsrecht.
Tot slot, het vierde en het laatste hoofdstuk, ”Groei alleen is niet genoeg ”, is
ingegeven door een van de meest intrigerende resultaten van de parlementsverkiezin-
gen in Georgie¨ van 2012: het economisch succes van een groeibevorderend beleid
kan mogelijk niet worden omgezet in politieke populariteit. In het kader van een
175
niet-overlappende generaties groeimodel met hoog- en laaggeschoolde werknemers,
beargumenteer ik dat een mogelijke verklaring voor dit resultaat is dat een op groei
gericht beleid het belang van inkomensherverdeling negeert. Hoewel de hervormin-
gen economische groei vergroten, kan het zijn dat de hooggeschoolden profiteren van
de groei, terwijl de laaggeschoolden nauwelijks beter af zijn. De laatste groep blijft
daarom gevoelig voor inkomensoverdrachten. Indien deze niet worden geleverd door
het zittende regime, daalt de politieke overlevingskans zelfs met positieve groeicijfers.
Ik toon veder dat een beleid dat sociale mobiliteit bevordert (mogelijkheden genereren
waarbij laaggeschoolden omhoog kunnen klimmen) op de lange termijn een vervang-
ing kan zijn voor inkomensherverderling (maar niet op korte termijn).
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